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1.1 Health and social burden of chronic diseases
The rapid growth and ageing of global population accompanied by unhealthy health 
behaviour (i.e. smoking, physical inactivity, unhealthy diet and harmful use of alcohol) 
lead to increasing prevalence of chronic diseases. Worldwide, non-communicable dis-
eases (NCDs) cause more than 63% of all deaths, a number that is expected to increase 
by 15% at 2020 and by more than 20% at 2030. These mortality rates affect females 
and males almost equally [1]. Many non-communicable diseases are chronic diseases, 
like cardiovascular diseases (48% of total deaths due to NCD), cancers (21%), chronic 
respiratory diseases (12%), and diabetes (4%), which are on the top list of the deadli-
est NCDs. Twenty five percent of the deaths from NCD occur before the age of 60 [1]. 
Chronic diseases have high impact on global morbidity too. Seventy seven percent of 
total disability adjusted life years (DALYs) are caused by chronic diseases; mostly by 
cardiovascular diseases (23% of total DALYs), neuropsychiatric conditions (20%), cancers 
(11%), respiratory diseases (5%), and diabetes (2%) [2,3].
Furthermore, chronic diseases disproportionately affect people at lower socio-
economic status. At patient-level, chronic diseases and poverty create a vicious cycle 
whereby poverty exposes people to behavioural and environmental risk factors for 
chronic diseases and, in turn, the resulting chronic diseases may become an important 
driver to the downward spiral that leads families towards poverty. At country level, 80% 
of deaths related to NCDs occur in low-middle income countries [4]. Furthermore, the 
social impact of chronic diseases is even larger taking into account that they influence 
the mortality and quality of life of their informal care givers and family [5,6].
1.2 Economic burden of chronic diseases
It is estimated that over the next 20 years, chronic diseases will cost more than 48% of 
the global GDP in 2010 [7]. They account for a large extent of the increasing health care 
expenditure [8] because their direct and indirect costs in health care are a sizeable share 
of a country’s GDP. This share is continuously increasing due to the rising prevalence of 
chronic diseases [9]. As a result, chronic diseases constitute a great challenge to econo-
mies and a threat to the sustainability of health care systems worldwide.
This challenge is even greater when considering that chronic diseases have long-term 
macroeconomic impact on consumption, capital accumulation, labour productivity and 
labour supply [2]. Consequently, chronic diseases jeopardize global economic growth 
worldwide. The negative macroeconomic consequences are more severe in developing 
countries for two reasons [7]. The first reason is because these countries have a higher 
need for human and financial resources to maintain their relatively high economic 
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growth compared with higher income countries. The second reason is that in develop-
ing countries citizens frequently do not have a universal health insurance coverage and 
therefore, chronic diseases entrench people in poverty due to catastrophic expenditures 
for treatment.
1.3 Integrated care and disease management programs
A large percentage of chronic diseases is preventable through the reduction of four 
main behavioural risk factors: tobacco use, physical inactivity, harmful use of alcohol 
and unhealthy diet. If these risk factors were eliminated, around 75% of heart disease, 
stroke and type 2 diabetes as well as 40% of cancer would be prevented [1,10]. This 
potential to improve the sustainability of health care systems urges the switch of care 
for people with chronic diseases from acute and reactive to preventive and proactive. 
In other words, care for people with chronic diseases requires an integrated, multidisci-
plinary package of well-coordinated care that includes (besides prevention) monitoring 
and active participation of patients [11]. However, health care systems are currently 
focusing on acute, mono-disciplinary and segmented care. Therefore, many health care 
authorities worldwide strive to redesign chronic care.
Integrated care is the most promising concept in redesigning care to tackle the 
increasing threat of chronic diseases. It refers to a “range of approaches deployed to 
increase coordination, cooperation, continuity, collaboration, and networking across 
different components of health service delivery” [12]. It puts the patient and his or her 
individual needs in the centre and organizes care around the patient, thereby seeking to 
reduce redundancies and fragmentation in health care delivery [13]. However, the term 
integrate care is vague and confusing because there is no commonly agreed definition 
and because different terms (such as coordinated care, managed care, seamless care) 
have been used interchangeably with integrated care [14]. The underlying denominator 
of integrated care definitions is the improvement of outcomes for population groups 
with diverse and complex needs. This is reflected in the World Health Organization (WHO) 
definition of integrated care, which is described as “a concept bringing together inputs, 
delivery, management and organization of services related to diagnosis, treatment, care, 
rehabilitation and health promotion. Integration is a means to improve services in rela-
tion to access, quality, user satisfaction and efficiency” [15]. Kodner and Spreeuwenberg 
(2002) also addressed that the aim of integrated care is “to enhance quality of care and 
quality of life, consumer satisfaction and system efficiency for patients with complex, 
long-term problems cutting across multiple services, providers and settings” [14]. Busse 
et al. (2008) stated that integrated care aims to: (1) improve quality of care delivery, (2) 
ensure professional adherence to disease specific protocols and guidelines, (3) reduce 
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unnecessary hospital utilization by strengthening the primary care sector, (4) share 
financial responsibility with other stakeholders, and in the long-term, (5) contain the 
increasing chronic care expenditure [16].
Many governments around the world have experimented with models for integrating 
care for chronic disease. The first integrated care models were developed in the United 
States in the 1980s. The Kaiser Permanente’s “pyramid of care” model in California and 
the “Evercare” model in Minnesota are the most well-known and influential ones [11]. 
The American experience with the identification of chronic disease and providing care 
according to the patients’ needs have been influential in Europe and elsewhere [17-19]. 
It has been the basis of the introduction of case management in all Primary Care Trusts 
in the United Kingdom National Health System in 2007, which aimed to improve the 
quality and accessibility of care for people with chronic conditions and contain associ-
ated costs. In Sweden, many county councils offer chains of care for diabetes, dementia, 
and rheumatoid arthritis [20]. In France, the formation of local provider networks for 
ambulatory patients was stimulated through the 2002 Patients’ Rights and Quality of 
Care Act [21]. Likewise, in the province of Ontario in Canada networks of family doctors 
and local health integration networks were formed [22].
However, the most wide-spread model towards integrating care for chronic disease 
was the implementation of disease management programs (DMPs) [23]. Schrijvers (2009) 
defines these programs as ‘a group of coherent interventions designed to prevent or 
manage one or more chronic conditions using a systematic, multidisciplinary approach 
and potentially employing multiple treatment modalities’ [24]. In many cases, the dis-
ease management programs are based on Wagner’s Chronic Care Model (CCM), which 
provides a framework of elements that must be considered when developing improve-
ment strategies for providing care for people with chronic diseases, originally includ-
ing: (a) self-management support, (b) decision support, (c) delivery system design, (d) 
clinical information systems, (e) health care organization, and (f ) community resources 
and policies [25]. The CCM was later extended to put more emphasis on patient safety, 
care coordination and case management [11]. Several studies concluded that the CCM 
improves patient care and health outcomes [26,27].
The first structured DMPs were developed in the United States in the 1990s and 
were offered by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Medicare, Medicaid and 
other payers to treat a wide variety of chronic disease such as diabetes, congestive heart 
failure and asthma. In Germany large numbers of patients with a chronic disease were 
enrolled in DMPs that were introduced on a large scale [2]. In the Netherlands, recently 
developed DMPs [28] built further upon earlier successful shared care or “transmural” 
care projects [19,29,30] supported by a strong primary care sector [31]. DMPs were also 
promoted as part of the health care reforms in Austria [32,33] and France [23] to address 
the needs of people with chronic diseases.
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Literature reviews concluded that DMPs improve quality of care [34,35], patient’s 
quality of life and physical exercise [36] , patient self-management [37], and reduces 
hospitalization [38,39]. However, there is large variation in the components of provided 
DMPs and the participating population which causes large variation in their effective-
ness [40].
1.4 Payment schemes
Payment schemes are key-factors in influencing stakeholder behaviour, and can thus 
be used to stimulate their collaboration and steer health care delivery systems toward 
integration [13]. This is because they are not only influenced by their intrinsic motivation 
to provide good quality care but also by financial motives [15]. Traditional health care 
provider payment schemes include salary, capitation, and fee-for-service (FFS) [2]. These 
payment schemes lack specific incentives to stimulate multidisciplinary collaboration 
and improve the quality of chronic care [13,41]. A salary fails to stimulate integration 
of care because there are potential incentives to accept only healthy patients (cream 
skimming) and to refer complex cases to more costly secondary services (dumping). 
Capitation provides caregivers with an incentive to spend a little amount of time on each 
patient such that more patients can be enrolled that generate compensation. As such, 
chronically ill are financially unattractive as they require more time and services to treat, 
at the expense of the physician, who would otherwise receive the same remuneration 
for treating a healthier patient who merely requires an occasional simple, quick treat-
ment. FFS, on the other hand, generates an incentive to provide as many refundable 
services as possible. While FFS reduces the incentive to avoid the chronically ill, there is 
little incentive for caregivers to provide high quality of care and adequately address the 
needs of patients with chronic diseases. [16]. Consequently, these traditional payment 
schemes are unable to facilitate integration and high quality of chronic care [2].
Adequate financial incentives are prerequisites to improve chronic care [28]. There-
fore, several European countries have implemented different payment schemes in order 
to provide financial incentives to health care providers for implementing integrated 
care [42]. Similar to the US [43], adaptations of pay-for-coordination (PFC) (e.g. Austria, 
Denmark, France), pay-for-performance (PFP) (e.g. England, France), bundled payments 
(e.g. the Netherlands), and global payments (e.g. Germany) targeting different stake-
holders (mainly health care providers and payers) have been introduced the last decade 
in Europe [16].
Evidence from the literature suggests that PFP can potentially be effective [44], 
bundled payment may reduce health care utilization [45], and global payment may 
improve quality and reduce health care expenditure [46]. However, there is lack of 
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comprehensive information regarding which and how payment schemes have been 
implemented and robust evidence about how the organizational structure, quality, and 
efficiency of chronic care was impacted as a result.
1.5 Price setting for care provided by DMPs
Setting a price for the provision of a DMP is not a single task. Apparently, apart from the 
interventions provided by a DMP, two major cost components should be adequately 
anticipated and incorporated in this price in order to ensure the financial viability of 
DMP providers. The first component is the case-mix of patients included in a DMP. For 
instance in the Netherlands, health care insurers purchase chronic care from DMP provid-
ers based on a predefined price for an expected case-mix of chronic patients. This price 
is negotiable between the two parties; it is paid on a yearly basis per patient included 
in a DMP and it is roughly risk-adjusted [47]. Failing to correctly anticipate the case-mix 
of patients could lead to a negotiated price lower than the actual costs. The second 
component includes the development and implementation costs of DMPs. The develop-
ment costs include training costs, ICT costs, and costs of redesigning the care delivery 
process, while the implementation costs include multidisciplinary team meetings, the 
costs of coordination between care givers, the costs of monitoring and feedback. To 
which extent these costs are included in the payment of a DMP provider is often unclear. 
This is despite recommendations to report these costs separately from the health care 
utilization costs and to include them in the price of implementing a DMP [48].
The variability in health care utilization costs based on the case-mix of patients 
included in DMPs as well as the development and implementation costs of DMPs are 
poorly investigated so far.
1.6 Economic evaluation of integrated care
Although the implementation of integrated care programs and more specifically of DMPs 
is growing, the evidence about their cost-effectiveness is still inconclusive [2,35,49,50]. 
Some studies have found that DMPs are cost-saving [51-54] or cost-neutral [55]. Other 
studies however, have found positive net costs but still cost-effective results [56-60] or 
hardly any indications of cost-effectiveness [61].
This can largely be explained by the variation in study design, outcome measures, 
and costing methods used in the economic evaluations of DMPs [57,62]. Furthermore, 
the definition of DMPs is subject to national or local health care settings because they 
are very context-specific and setting-dependent, which might be another reason for dif-
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ferences in their outcomes so far. What contributes to the discrepancies in the economic 
evaluations of DMPs however, is the lack of a methodological framework to facilitate 
such evaluation [50]. Many sophisticated frameworks and complicated techniques have 
been developed in conventional cost-effectiveness analysis the last decades. However, 
their adequacy for evaluating DMPs is limited because of the multi-faceted nature of 
these programs, their context-dependent implementation, and the broad spectrum 
of outcomes related to their implementation. The lack of a consistent framework for 
evaluating DMPs has made comparisons of results hardly possible, meaning that much 
time and financial resources have been spent inefficiently [63]. Current decision-making 
incorporates traditional cost-effectiveness studies that may not be suitable for the com-
parison between DMPs and usual care. This is because DMPs are complex, multifaceted 
interventions that have a great variety of effects such as improved self-management 
capabilities, changed disease perceptions, coordination and continuity of care, reduced 
risk factors and complication rates, improved health-related quality of life, improved 
wellbeing, reduced burden on informal caregivers, etc. These cannot be expressed in 
a single unit of effect like a quality-adjusted life year (QALY) that is traditionally used 
in economic evaluations of health care interventions. Therefore, the establishment of 
a methodological framework to perform an analysis incorporating the most relevant 
costs and effects is desirable in performing economic evaluations of DMPs valuable to 
decision making.
Previous studies that attempted to develop such frameworks [63,64] have ac-
knowledged the fact that this would be methodologically challenging [48,50]. Such a 
framework could provide decision makers with information about the consequences 
of integrated care in quality of care, patient health, and monetary terms and therefore, 
support them in understanding whether current expenses could be regarded as in-
vestments [65]. However, a thorough analysis based on an evaluation framework that 
incorporates all related costs and effects and covers all relevant aspects of integrated 
care is still to be found.
1.7 Thesis aims and research questions
The aims of this thesis were to: 1) investigate payment schemes implemented to pro-
mote integrated care and assess their impact, 2) explore the variability in health care 
utilization costs determined by the case-mix of patients involved in DMPs as well as to 
examine the variability in the development and implementation costs of DMPs, and 3) 
determine the costs and effects of DMPs and develop a framework to facilitate a thor-
ough economic evaluation of DMPs.
The following research questions were formulated to address each of these aims.
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Addressing aim 1:
1. Which payment schemes have been implemented in Europe to promote integration 
of chronic care, what were the facilitators and barriers to their implementation, and 
how did stakeholders perceive their success?
2. How was the new bundled payment system in the Netherlands designed and imple-
mented and what were the facilitators and barriers to introducing this scheme?
3. What was the impact of different financial agreements to promote integrated care in 
Europe on national health care expenditures?
Addressing aim 2:
4. Which factors on patient-level and organizational-level are associated with the costs 
of patients with different chronic diseases enrolled in a DMP?
5. What is the variability in development and implementation costs among various 
DMPs and what are its determinants?
Addressing aim 3:
6. What are the changes in costs and outcomes after the implementation of DMPs, what 
are their determinants, and what is their short-term (i.e. 1-year) cost-effectiveness?
7. What is the long-term (i.e. 2-year) cost-effectiveness of implemented DMPs?
8. What would be an adequate methodological framework to facilitate a systematic 
and broader economic evaluation of DMPs including the most relevant outcomes 
and cost categories?
1.8 Thesis outline
Each research question is answered in a separate chapter in this thesis. The chapters are 
categorized into three parts, reflecting the three aims. Part 1 concerns payment schemes 
that promote integrated care and highlights their impact. In particular, Chapter 2 in-
vestigates different payments schemes implemented in Europe to promote integrated 
care and their perceived impact on different aspects. A more detailed description of 
such a payment scheme, i.e. the bundled payment scheme which was introduced in the 
Netherlands in 2010, is provided in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we empirically investigate 
the impact of these payment schemes on health care expenditure. Part 2 explores the 
variability and determinants of health care utilization costs of DMP enrolees (Chapter 5) 
and development and implementation costs of DMPs (Chapter 6). The last part of the 
thesis (i.e. Part 3) provides empirical evidence about the changes in costs and effects 
after the implementation of DMPs (Chapter 7), including a cost-effectiveness analysis 
of the most comprehensive DMPs over a 2-year period (Chapter 8). It also presents a 
methodological framework to systematically and thoroughly evaluate DMPs (Chapter 9). 
The answers to the research questions are summarised in the general discussion of the 
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thesis together with recommendations for future research (Chapter 10). Finally, Chapter 
11 provides a summary of the thesis in English and in Dutch as well as information about 
the author.
part a
Payment of integrated care
Chapter 2
Exploring payment schemes used to promote 
integrated chronic care in Europe
Apostolos Tsiachristas, Carolien Dikkers, Melinde R.S. Boland, 
Maureen P.M.H. Rutten-van Mölken
Health Policy 2013;113:296–304
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Abstract
The rising burden of chronic conditions has led several European countries to reform 
healthcare payment schemes. This paper aimed to explore the adoption and success 
of payment schemes that promote integration of chronic care in European countries. 
A literature review was used to identify European countries that employed pay-for-
coordination (PFC), pay-for-performance (PFP), and bundled payment schemes. Existing 
evidence from the literature was supplemented with fifteen interviews with chronic 
care experts in these countries to obtain detailed information regarding the payment 
schemes, facilitators and barriers to their implementation, and their perceived success.
Austria, France, England, the Netherlands, and Germany have implemented pay-
ment schemes that were specifically designed to promote the integration of chronic 
care. Prominent factors facilitating implementation included stakeholder cooperation, 
adequate financial incentives for stakeholders, and flexible task allocation among differ-
ent care provider disciplines. Common barriers to implementation included misaligned 
incentives across stakeholders and gaming. The implemented payment schemes tar-
geted different stakeholders (e.g. individual caregivers, multidisciplinary organizations 
of caregivers, regions, insurers) in different countries depending on the structure and 
financing of each health care system. All payment reforms appeared to have changed 
the structure of chronic care delivery. PFC, as it was implemented in Austria, France and 
Germany, was perceived to be the most successful in increasing collaboration within and 
across healthcare sectors, whereas PFP, as it was implemented in England and France, 
was perceived most successful in improving other indicators of the quality of the care 
process. Interviewees stated that the impact of the payment reforms on healthcare 
expenditures remained questionable.
The success of a payment scheme depends on the details of the specific implemen-
tation in a particular country, but a combination of the schemes may overcome the 
barriers of each individual scheme.
Exploring payment schemes used to promote integrated chronic care in Europe 25
2.1 Introduction
Chronic conditions place a largely increasing economic burden on national healthcare 
budgets worldwide because of their rising incidence and prevalence [[66]. Traditional 
healthcare payment schemes are designed for predominantly acute care settings and 
are therefore, restricted in their ability to tackle inefficiencies present in chronic care 
[16]. Tackling these inefficiencies could potentially reduce the increasing economic 
burden of chronic conditions [2].
Integrated chronic care refers to a “range of approaches deployed to increase 
coordination, cooperation, continuity, collaboration, and networking across different 
components of health service delivery” [12].It puts the patient and his or her individual 
needs in the center and organizes care around the patient, thereby seeking to reduce 
redundancies and fragmentation in healthcare delivery [13]. Specifically, integrated 
chronic care aims to: (1) improve quality of care delivery, (2) ensure professional ad-
herence to disease specific protocols and guidelines, (3) reduce unnecessary hospital 
utilization by strengthening the primary care sector, (4) share financial responsibility 
with other stakeholders, and in the long-term, (5) contain the increasing chronic care 
expenditure [16].
Several countries have experimented with innovative approaches to achieve in-
tegration of chronic care [2]. Wagner’s Chronic Care Model (CCM) is one of the most 
influential approaches and is based on the notion that productive interactions between 
stakeholders results in higher quality chronic care [25]. The CCM was used in many 
European countries to design and implement Disease Management Programs (DMPs) 
to achieve integration of chronic care [67]. DMPs are defined by the Disease Manage-
ment Association of America as “a system of coordinated healthcare interventions and 
communications for populations with conditions in which patients self-care efforts are 
significant”. The success of DMPs is largely dependent on the financing context and pay-
ment mechanisms relevant to the various stakeholders involved, as they are not only 
influenced by their intrinsic motivation to provide good quality care but also by financial 
motives [15].
Payment schemes are key-factors in influencing stakeholder behavior, and can thus 
be used to stimulate their collaboration and steer healthcare delivery systems toward 
integration [13]. [16][16]Therefore, several European countries have implemented differ-
ent payment schemes in order to implement integrated healthcare delivery systems with 
regard to chronic care. However, there remains in the literature a lack of comprehensive 
information regarding which and how payment schemes have been implemented as 
well as about how the organizational structure, quality, and efficiency of chronic care 
was impacted as a result.
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The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of payment schemes that have been 
implemented in Europe to promote integration of chronic care, highlight the facilita-
tors and barriers to their implementation, and assess how stakeholders perceived their 
success.
2.2 Methods
A literature review was conducted to identify payment schemes introduced to improve 
the integration of chronic care in European countries since 1997. We searched in Google 
Scholar and Pubmed for relevant published papers using combinations of the follow-
ing keywords: “chronic care”, “financing”, “payment”, “integrated”, “coordinated”, and 
“disease management”. The references of the resulting papers were then scanned to find 
additional publications relevant to our study. For our initial selection of countries, we 
searched websites of governmental organizations and research institutes as well as in 
conference proceedings to collect additional information. Based on this information, we 
made the final selection of those countries that had implemented payment schemes to 
improve chronic care on a national level (policies on local or regional level were exclud-
ed). Payment schemes of interest excluded traditional caregiver payment schemes (e.g. 
fee-for-service (FFS), capitation, salary), which are not particularly targeted at disease 
management, coordination of healthcare delivery and ultimately integration of chronic 
care [16]. From the literature we obtained information about the implemented payment 
scheme(s) in each country, the financial incentives provided, the barriers and facilitators 
for their implementation, and their impact on chronic care delivery and expenditure.
To supplement the findings from the literature, we conducted telephone interviews 
in the countries of interest. Potential interviewees were experts in chronic care (payment 
schemes) and were identified from the literature (authorship), (non-) governmental 
agencies (contact persons), and conference programs (presenters). Literature was also 
used to develop a template for the interviews. The template incorporated elements 
previous studies have considered while investigating similar, related topics [2,31,68][28]. 
Interviewees had broad, first-hand knowledge of the payment schemes in question, 
and ranged in expertise including researchers, health insurers, and patient organiza-
tions. The interview template consisted of two consecutive parts. Part one consisted 
of semi-open questions addressing the policy aim, details pertaining to stakeholders 
and policy implementation, and changes and realizations since implementation. Ques-
tions addressed the most relevant policy, and in some cases, multiple relevant policies. 
Part two consisted of statements relating to the success of implementation, effect on 
integration of care, effect on financing scheme, and policy evaluation. Response options 
for these statements had a five-point likert scale ranging from for example strongly 
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disagree to strongly agree (Appendix 1). The interviews were held in English or Dutch, 
were transcribed in English, and were analyzed qualitatively.
2.3 Payment schemes for integrated chronic care
Traditional healthcare payment schemes include salary, capitation, and FFS [16]. They 
are not specifically designed to stimulate integrated care or improve the quality of 
chronic care [13,41,69].
Providing adequate financial incentives is a key instrument in achieving the 
implementation of integrated chronic care [13], as they influence stakeholder behavior 
[25,69]. Several countries have implemented alternative payment schemes with financial 
incentives that overcome the limitations of traditional payment schemes to promote 
integrated chronic care [16,69]. These payment schemes include: pay-for-coordination 
(PFC), pay-for-performance (PFP), and bundled payment. The theoretical foundations of 
these payment schemes are summarized in Table 1.
PFC consists of payments to one or more providers to coordinate care between cer-
tain care services [70,71]. It seeks to provide an incentive for the extra effort required by 
stakeholders to cooperate with one another, share organized, transparent information 
on healthcare delivery and health outcomes, often set to predefined standards. As a 
result, PFC is expected to control unnecessary utilization, promote provider integration 
as well as encourage continuity of care. Its implementation is considered as feasible with 
relatively little effort.
PFP is a direct payment to a health care provider for achieving defined and measur-
able goals related to improvements in the process and/or outcomes of chronic care 
delivery [71,72]. PFP seeks to improve the quality of care by generating additional com-
pensation for caregivers that deliver high quality of care and comply with guidelines. 
Its implementation may be more or less demanding, depending on the level of ICT and 
the number and type of quality indicators. However, it weakly promotes integration 
between healthcare providers.
Bundled payment is a single payment for all multidisciplinary care required by a pa-
tient for one particular chronic disease during a predefined period of time [43,71,73]. It 
aims to control unnecessary health care utilization, encourage high quality of care, and 
promote integration between health care providers. Its implementation faces the chal-
lenge of defining the content of the care bundles and determining a price per bundle. 
Bundled payment provides a direct incentive to health care providers to increase their 
profit margin by reducing inefficiencies. It may be attractive to payers because they run 
relatively little financial risk.
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2.4 Results
From the literature review, five countries were identified as having implemented pay-
ment schemes to promote the integration of chronic care on a national level. These in-
Table 1 Theoretical foundations of payment schemes that facilitate integration of care
Increasing aggregation of services into a unit of payment
Pay-for-coordination Pay-for-performance 
(physician)
Bundled Payment
Description Payments to providers 
providing care coordination 
services that integrate care 
between providers
Physicians receive 
differential payments 
for meeting or missing 
performance benchmarks
A single “bundled” 
payment, which may 
include multiple providers 
in multiple care settings, is 
made for services delivered 
during an episode of 
care related to medical 
condition or procedure.
Attributes
Population
Episode of care √ √
Multiple types 
of delivery 
organizations
√
Fee for newly 
specified services
√
Objectives
Control unnecessary 
utilization
√√ √√
Encourage high 
quality
√ √√ √√
Promote provider 
integration
√√ √ √√
Operational 
feasibility
√√ √√ √√
Financial Incentives
Patient level
Provider Level Payment for support 
services not covered under 
a FFS or capitation
Higher payment when 
goals are achieved
Increase profit margin by 
reducing inefficiencies
Payer Level Avoidance of unnecessary 
and/or inefficient care (e.g. 
double payment for same 
treatment)
Limits financial exposure
Based on: Mechanic and Altman 2009; Schneider et al., 2011; adjusted by the authors; Note: PFC and PFP 
have the same aggregation level of services into a unit of payment
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cluded Austria, England, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Most payment schemes 
implemented in these countries were adaptations and a specific operationalization 
of the payment schemes described in the previous section. These adaptations were 
necessary because several of the payment schemes for integrated care were developed 
originally in the United States and had to be transferred to the European context. In 
many cases, the payment schemes were accompanied by restructuring of chronic care 
financing.
The next sections explore the implementation of various policies using PFC, PFP, 
and bundled payment schemes as a means to promote the integration of chronic care, 
including a description of the policies, when and by whom they were implemented, as 
well as which incentives they provide for various stakeholders (where applicable), their 
barriers and facilitators, and their perceived impact. The findings from literature and 
interviews are presented below together. The citation to each interview is given with 
the anonymous codes in brackets. A list of interviewees, their anonymous codes, and 
their profession is provided in Appendix 2.
2.5 Introduced payment schemes
PFC schemes were evident in Austria, France, and Germany, PFP in England and France, 
and bundled payment in the Netherlands. A summary of the financial incentives pro-
vided per payment scheme can be found in Table 2.
2.5.1.1	 Pay-for-coordination
In Austria, the Health Reform Act of 2005 was implemented by the Ministry of Health to 
promote integration and coordination of care, improve efficiency, resource allocation 
and funding by pooling financial resources and promoting DMPs [32,32,33]. This reform 
created financial pools at state level by combining 1–2% of the budget of social health 
insurers with that of regional governments. These pooled funds were available for in-
tegrated care projects between primary and secondary care [74]. This was expected to 
overcome segmentation between the social health insurance scheme to fund outpatient 
care and the provincial health funds in inpatient care and to be economically beneficial 
for both schemes (A.B.). The 2005 health reform act also promoted DMPs, funded by 
social health insurance, targeting general practitioners (GPs) and promoting their en-
gagement in the coordination of integrated care efforts. On a national level, a DMP has 
only been implemented for diabetes, incorporating guidelines for cardiovascular risk as-
sessment [75]. This was accompanied by a PFC payment scheme as physicians received 
an initial premium (€53) upon patient enrolment in DMP and a quarterly payment (€25) 
to supplement the traditional FFS. GPs qualified for providing DMPs if they participated 
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in a basic training regarding care coordination, and attended refreshment courses. Ad-
ditional courses on patient education were optional, for which physicians would receive 
an additional remuneration (A.B.). In Austria, there is no choice of insurer or competition 
among health insurance funds, as insurance is mandatory and contingent on place of 
residence or employer [33].
In France, the Health Insurance Reform Act (2004) was an initiative targeting the 
primary care sector, promoting the expanded use of DMPs for 30 chronic diseases 
including diabetes, COPD, cardiovascular diseases, muscoskeletal diseases and certain 
cancers [68] (F.C.). Initiated as a negotiation between the social health insurance and 
the association of GPs (F.A.), the aim of this program was to improve quality of care, 
patient monitoring, promote continuous medical education to communicate common 
guidelines to care providers, alleviate financial burden associated with unnecessary pro-
cedures, and strengthen the role of the GP [12]. It was accompanied by a PFC payment 
scheme as GPs received supplemental D 40 for care coordination [68] (F.A.). Patients 
benefited from waived co-payments, reduced waiting times as well as self-education 
and training programs. GPs were not obligated to engage in DMPs. While patients were 
Table 2 Financial incentives for integrating chronic care in each country
Patient Level Provider Level Pooler/Payer Level
Austria •  €53 initial + €25 quarterly 
per patient enrolled in 
DMP
•  1-2% of the combined 
existing budgets across 
sectors to be designated 
for integrated chronic care 
projects
France •  Reduced copayment if 
patient enrols in DMP
•  €40 annual per patient 
enrolled in DMP (PFC)
•  0% to 30% annual bonus 
(PFP)
England •  0% to 30% annual bonus 
(PFP)
The Netherlands •  Price negotiated between 
insurer and care group 
(bundled); Performance is a 
factor in price negotiations
Germany •  Reduced copayment if 
patient enrols in DMP
•  Additional services 
(e.g. self-management 
education) only 
reimbursable if patients 
participate in DMPs
•  €75 per patient per year for 
coordination costs (PFC)
•  Additional remuneration 
for disease specific 
education programs 
provided within a DMP
•  1% of ambulatory budget 
and 1% of hospital 
budget was earmarked for 
integrated care projects
•  €153 annual per patient 
enrolled in DMP for 
coordination costs (PFC)
•  Remuneration for 
enrolling chronically ill 
based on morbidity and 
mortality indicators
PFC: pay-for-coordination; PFP: pay-for-performance; DMP: disease management program
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free to supplement social health insurance with private health insurance, they are not 
free to choose the insurer within the social health insurance scheme (F.A.).
In Germany, the Risk Structure Compensation Reform Act was introduced in 2002. 
Under this scheme, health insurers received a fixed fee per patient per year for costs 
in primary and secondary care [76]. This compensation aimed on one hand to avoid 
cream-skimming from the insurers at the expense of chronically ill patients (G.B.) and 
on the other hand to promote DMPs, which were believed to improve quality of chronic 
care [74,77,78]. Initially, DMPs existed for breast cancer, diabetes, coronary heart disease, 
asthma, and COPD and these were extended to more disease areas [68]. Health care 
providers negotiated collectively for which conditions to provide DMPs and had uni-
form documentation forms for all patients independent of health insurer [77]. To recruit 
DMP participants, the insurer could reduce or waive patients’ co-payments [78,79]. The 
remuneration was contingent on whether the services provided were in line with the 
disease specific DMP guidelines (G.C.) [80]. Concerning the PFC payment, the reform 
introduced financial incentives for health insurers and health care providers. Health in-
surers who enrolled chronically ill patients in DMPs were provided with D 85 per patient 
per year and coordinating physicians received D 75 per patient per year for coordination 
costs, including necessary documentation [68,79]. Providers also received additional 
payment for disease specific education programs for registered patients. In 2009, when 
the participation in a DMP was no longer used as adjustor in the risk-equalization for-
mula, health insurers received €180 per patient per year for coordination costs which 
was decreased by 2012 to €153 [81] (G.A.). In addition, health insurers could retain 1% 
of the ambulatory budget and 1% from the hospital budget and make them available 
for integrated care projects. As a result, health care providers had a strong incentive to 
develop integrated care projects (extending to primary and secondary care) because 
they risked losing a share of their budgets to competitors [82]. The Social Health Insur-
ance Competition Strengthening Act was implemented in 2007 to further strengthen 
and promote care integration [68,74,83]. It extended the one-percent start-up provision 
for integrated care contracts until 2008, moved to include long-term care in integrated 
care contracts, and allowed non-medical healthcare professionals to contract with 
insurers. Long term integrated care contracts shared the aim of DMPs, but differed in 
that they were funded partially by the aforementioned start-up provision. Furthermore, 
integrated care contracts focused on coordination between hospitals and rehabilitation 
practices, most often addressing orthopedic indications (i.e. hip and knee surgery) [83] 
(G.C.).
2.5.1.2	 Pay-for-performance
In France, Contrats d’amelioration des pratiques individuelles2 (CAPI) was launched 
as a voluntary pilot in 2009 and expanded in 2012 [84] (F.B.). CAPI were signed by GPs 
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on voluntary basis for three years and provided addition remuneration on top of their 
FFS income. These contracts set a PFP payment scheme in which GPs were rewarded 
financially, not for specific disease treatments but rather for adequately registered pa-
tient records and for following evidence based guidelines. The number of performance 
indicators started at 16 and increased to 29 (F.C). GPs could possibly earn an additional 
€6,000 annually (30% of their base salary) when they achieved over 85% of the targets 
and treated more than 1,200 patients [84].
In England, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) was introduced in 2004 [85]. 
The QOF offered PFP contracts to GPs, by which GPs were rewarded additionally based 
on 146 performance indicators within four domains; clinical standards, organizational 
standards, patient experience, and additional services [86-88]. This aimed to enhance 
the quality of primary care provided according to national guidelines, and its imple-
mentation was justified by the success of various quality-improvement initiatives that 
had been introduced since 1991 [85]. In 2006, adjustments were made to the system, 
altering minimum and maximum payment thresholds, dropping, modifying, and intro-
ducing new indicators [88]. In 2009/2010, further adjustments were made, adding new 
indicators for heart failure, chronic kidney disease, depression, and diabetes, removing 
two indicators from the patient experience domain, and adjusting the point values of 
several indicators [33]. Initially, £1.8 billion was designated to reward GPs by a possible 
25% salary increase, which was later increased to 30% [88]. Exception reports, through 
which GPs can decide to exclude patients from the calculation of certain irrelevant 
performance indicators, ensured a focus on relevant and appropriate targets [87-89]. 
Patients can use information, published by the NHS information center, to compare and 
choose a GP practice in which to enroll [88].
2.5.1.3	 Bundled	payment
In the Netherlands, a bundled payment was piloted in 2007 with diabetes and expanded 
in 2010 to include COPD and cardiovascular disease management [47,89-91]. The aim of 
these payment reforms was to improve coordination between providers, promote the 
use of DMPs, strengthen adherence to medical guidelines, and increase quality of patient 
records [91]. Under the new payment scheme, chronic care is coordinated by groups of 
providers (called care groups) that implement DMPs organized in integrated centers in 
primary care or in groups of cooperating general practices, paramedical care givers and/
or hospitals [47]. Insurers negotiated with care groups a predefined fee (bundled pay-
ment) that covered all care needed by a patient with a particular chronic disease for a 
year (excluding inpatient care, medication, medical devices, and diagnostics). Then care 
groups negotiate with and subcontract individual care providers for the care delivery 
[91] (N.B.; N.A.). Negotiations generate significant price variations between care groups 
for a particular group of patients i.e. different prices for different diabetes DMPs, serving 
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to promote competition-induced quality improvements, on the basis of, but not limited 
to, performance measures, which are described in national care standards [47,92] (N.B.). 
Insurers are free to choose whether they contract care groups based on the bundled 
payment system, or instead provide care groups only with an additional payment for 
the organization, coordination, and transparency of care, while continuing to reimburse 
individual providers on a FFS basis. Patients are free to choose their GP and can change 
insurance company annually, choosing the most relevant, but least costly package to 
suit their medical needs [91](N.A., N.B.).
2.5.2 Facilitators and barriers per payment scheme
While each payment scheme was unique, they often experienced similar facilitators 
and barriers to their adoption and implementation. The most frequent facilitators were 
adequate financial incentives, flexible work roles (i.e. enabling nurses and GPs to share 
duties and responsibilities), and stakeholder cooperation, while the most frequent bar-
riers were misaligned incentives across stakeholders (e.g. the FFS of a dietician is higher 
than the share of the bundled payment that they receive) and gaming (e.g. enrolling 
pre-diabetic patients in diabetes DMP). Table 3 provides an overview of facilitators and 
barriers per payment scheme, which are explained in the following sections.
Table 3 Overview of facilitators and barriers per payment scheme
Facilitators Barriers
Pay-for-
coordination
•  Stakeholder cooperation (AUS, GER)
•  Patient Demand (AUS, FRA)
•  Adequate financial incentive for GPs 
(FRA)
•  Gaming (GER)
•  Misaligned incentives between 
stakeholders (AUS)
•  GP Opposition (AUS,GER, FRA)
•  Virtual budget (AUS)
•  Inflexible task allocation (AUS)
Pay-for-
performance
•  Adequate financial incentive for GPs 
(ENG, FR)
•  Gaming (ENG)
•  Defining performance indicators (ENG)
Bundled Payment •  Stakeholder cooperation (NL)
•  Flexible task allocation (NL)
•  Gaming (NL)
•  Lack of transparency (NL)
•  Lack of comprehensive means to address 
multi-morbidity (NL)
AUS=Austria; ENG=England, FR=France; GER=Germany; NL=the Netherlands
2.5.2.1	 Pay-for-coordination
The PFC scheme was facilitated by the: (a) cooperation between health insurers and 
healthcare providers (Austria) (A.A.), (b) cooperation between insurers and govern-
ment (Germany) (G.B.), (c) patient demand for integrated care services, as a result of 
the increased awareness about its benefits (Austria, France) (A.A.;F.C.) and (d) adequate 
financial incentives for GPs to engage patients in DMPs (France) (F.C.).
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However, the implementation of PFC initiatives experienced the following barriers. GP 
opposition in the implementation of PFC was evident because GPs (a) feared restrictions 
in their medical autonomy due to evidence-based guidelines (Austria, Germany, France) 
(A.A.;A.B.;G.A.;F.C.;F.A.), (b) rejected the notion of an education requirement to establish 
eligibility for DMP participation (Austria) (A.A.;A.B.), (c) considered PFC less financially 
attractive than FFS as they could earn more from the latter payment scheme in the same 
consultation time per patient (Austria) [74] (A.A.; A.B.), and (d) were not enthusiastic 
due to the additional administrative requirements associated with PFC (France) (F.A.). 
Moreover, misaligned incentives between health insurers and provinces in Austria (A.B.; 
A.A.) jeopardized the implementation of PFC.
Other barriers to PFC included the mislabeling of standard care procedures as in-
tegrated care to receive wrongly the PFC fee (Germany) (G.C.). Virtual budgets were a 
barrier in Austria because the decision to reallocate and merge a percentage of the GP 
and hospital budgets was left to the respective parties without providing a concrete 
incentive for them to do so (A.B.). Furthermore, inflexible task allocation between dif-
ferent providers (Austria) (A.B.) has also obscured the implementation of PFC schemes.
2.5.2.2	 Pay-for-performance
The facilitation of PFP in England and France was attributed primarily to the strong 
financial incentives for GPs as they could increase their income by 30% (E.B.; F.C.). In 
England, the pre-existing strong collaborations in the primary sector facilitated admin-
istrative and documentation demands of the QOF [82,87] (E.B.). There is speculation in 
England as to whether physicians optimized their financial rewards by labeling failed tar-
gets as exception reports, but gaming in this sense is expected to be minimal, if evident 
at all [86] (E.B.). In addition, the definition of performance indicators was troublesome 
in England [86]. In France, there were no barriers identified in the implementation and 
actual uptake of the recently introduced CAPI program [84] (F.A.; F.C.), probably because 
it was introduced only recently.
2.5.2.3	 Bundled	payment
In the Netherlands, the bundled payment scheme was facilitated by a high level of 
commitment by policy makers, care providers, and health insurers as well as a flexible 
responsibility allocation and task delegation from GPs and specialists to nurse practitio-
ners and GP assistants [91,92] (N.A.;N.B.). Barriers to the success of this scheme included: 
(a) care groups referred costly patients unnecessarily to hospitals in order to protect 
their budget [92] (N.B.), (b) lack of transparency in cost-pricing of bundled payments, 
stemming from underdeveloped IT systems and resulting in distrust between insurers 
and care groups, as insurers are sceptical about double payments (e.g. FFS and bundled 
Exploring payment schemes used to promote integrated chronic care in Europe 35
payment) for the same care provision [90,92,93], and (c) absence of a systematic way of 
addressing a patient with multi-morbidities [68,74,92].
2.5.3 Perceived impacts of integrated chronic care payment schemes
Table 4 provides an overview of the impact of integrated chronic care payment schemes 
implemented in Austria, France, England, the Netherlands, and Germany as perceived by 
the interviewees and supplemented with literature. In most cases, interviewees stated 
that the implementation of a payment scheme had a structural impact on the financing 
and process delivery of chronic care, while the perceived impact on decreasing the 
growth of chronic care expenditure was negative or sceptical at best. All but the PFC 
payment scheme in Germany were perceived as having introduced new budgetary con-
straints in the healthcare system. This implied that additional money was required by the 
healthcare system (without regarding or considering the possible return to investment) 
as a result of the payment scheme implementation. Detailed information regarding the 
perceived impacts of the various payment schemes is provided below.
Table 4 Perceived effects of integrated chronic care payment schemes
PFC PFP Bundled
AUS FR GER ENG FR NL
Structural impact on financing and process 
delivery of chronic care
– + ++ + + ++
Increased provider cooperation within a care 
sector
+ + – ? + +
New collaboration agreements between care 
sectors
+ ? – – – ?
Promotes integrated financing of different care 
sectors
+ ? – – – +
Introduced new budgetary constraints on 
healthcare system
+ + – ++ ? +
Decreased growth of chronic care expenditure – ? ? ? ? –
PFC= pay-for-coordination, PFP=pay-for-performance, AUS=Austria, ENG = England, FR =France, 
GER=Germany, NL=the Netherlands; A composite of interview responses was formed to characterise each 
payment scheme, per country, as follows: ++ =strongly agree; +=agree; ?=N/A or unknown; – = disagree; 
–– = strongly disagree
2.5.3.1	 Pay-for-coordination
The implementation of PFC was perceived by the interviewees as successful with 
relatively high uptake in Germany and France while in Austria, it was perceived more 
troublesome, as actors did not respond to the incentives with which they were provided. 
In Austria, the uptake of the DMP implementation was low because GPs considered the 
imposed administrative burden high [74] as well as because care groups that applied 
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for funding integrated programs between primary and secondary care were established 
prior to, and independently of, financial pools reform (A.A).
Moreover, as the interviewees stated, PFC resulted in change toward enabling an 
improved financing structure for chronic care (Germany, France) (G.A.; G.B.; G.C.; F.C.), 
increased provider cooperation (Austria, France) (A.A.:F.B), introduced new collaboration 
agreements between care sectors (Austria,) (A.A.), promoted integrated financing of dif-
ferent care sectors (Austria) (A.A.; A.B.), and introduced budgetary constraints (A.A.:F.B). 
In Germany, interviewees stated that PFC did not promote provider cooperation, 
collaboration agreements between care sectors, and integrated financing of different 
care sectors (G.A.; G.B.; G.C.). These failures were also reported in the literature [82]. The 
perceived impact of PFC on the growth of chronic care expenditure was doubtful in 
France and Germany while, it was considered to be negative in Austria (A.A.).
2.5.3.2	 Pay-for-performance
The uptake of PFP was 100% in England [88], 30% during its infant stage in France (F.A.; 
F.C.), which climbed to 90% within 3 years (F.A.; F.B.; F.C.) [86]. According to the inter-
viewees, PFP led to positive structural changes in chronic care financing and chronic 
care delivery (England, France), and increased provider cooperation within primary care 
(France). However, in both countries it was not designed to lead to new collaboration 
agreements or promote integrated financing between primary and secondary care (E.A.; 
E.B; F.A.;F.B.; F.C.).
2.5.3.3	 Bundled	payment
In the Netherlands, the bundled payment scheme was perceived as having a positive 
structural impact on financing and process delivery of chronic care, increased provider 
cooperation within the primary care sector, and promoted the integration of financing 
of different care sectors (N.A.; N.B.). However, the interviewees stated that the bundled 
payment introduced new financial constraints in the health care system and failed to 
decrease the growth of health care expenditure up till now. It was also believed that it 
improved protocol adherence and record keeping, and promoted competition between 
care health care providers, [91,93] (N.A.; N.B.). According to the interviewees, the impact 
on new collaboration agreements between care sectors remained inconclusive.
2.6 Discussion
After providing an overview of payment schemes introduced in Austria, France, Ger-
many, England, and the Netherlands, several discussion points come to light. First and 
foremost is that is some countries, the payment reforms were accompanied by financial 
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arrangements targeting different stakeholders. PFC was introduced together with the 
financial pooling in Austria and the risk structure compensation in Germany, provided 
financial incentives and means to financial poolers and payers. On the other hand, the 
implementation of PFP in France and England targeted the financial reward of primary 
care physicians only. In the Netherlands however, the implementation of bundled pay-
ment provided financial incentives to health insurers and health care providers. These 
differences imply that reforming payment schemes in chronic care depends strongly 
on the structure of a health care system. Therefore, financial incentives targeted to key 
stakeholders may enable the successful implementation of payment reforms.
Furthermore, amongst the countries explored, with the exception of England, PFC 
was originally implemented as the primary mechanism to achieve integration. Explicit 
integrated care programs, most commonly DMPs, are particularly appealing as they are 
specifically outlining and incentivizing responsibilities per stakeholder. GP opposition 
was a barrier to implementing PFC in Austria and France. This opposition was largely 
attributable to concerns about reduced medical autonomy, and increased educational 
and administrative requirements rather than the means of financing. Eventually, a clear-
cut link between responsibility and reward appeared to mobilize stakeholders toward 
implementation. As a result, collaboration was stimulated between providers and across 
care sectors. This collaboration is necessary in achieving integrated chronic care delivery 
systems [68]. Considering that PFC was limited to increased collaboration, it becomes 
apparent that the addition or combination with other payment schemes would be more 
successful in attaining additional policy goals, such as reduced growth of chronic care 
expenditure.
Other combinations of payment schemes could include PFP with bundled pay-
ment, such that the amount of the case-mix payment fluctuates partially according to 
performance indicators. This combination might enhance quality of care by providing 
strong financial incentives to payers and/or health care providers. In the Netherlands, 
there is such an implicit combination, as performance indicators are taken into account 
when health insurers and care groups negotiate about the prices of the bundled care 
packages [88]. However, the use of performance indicators is limited without a concrete 
agreement on how exactly they determine the bundled payment [47,93].
The introduction of performance indicators in payment schemes must be encour-
aged cautiously because they might reduce the intrinsic motivation of health care pro-
viders to provide the utmost quality of care. Shortcuts and pitfalls of the PFP system are 
continuously being evaluated in England, and the indicators reconsidered to optimize 
desired results [44,94]. This reconsideration is currently manifesting itself as a gradual 
shift from process indicators to including and expanding relevant outcome indicators.
The suspicion of gaming and evidence of misaligned incentives in all payment 
schemes suggests a vulnerability of the healthcare system. As healthcare budgets be-
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come rigid and stakeholders are increasingly responsible for their individual budget, it 
is inevitable that gaming might occur to secure and protect these budgets. Therefore, it 
is interesting to consider shared-savings schemes for aligning stakeholders to enhance 
integration of chronic care. There are many examples of shared-savings programs in the 
U.S. [71] to provide European decision makers with inspiration and experience toward 
experimenting with such schemes. In the Netherlands, there are currently pilots of pay-
ment schemes that incorporate shared-savings set-up by health insurers and health care 
providers in primary and secondary care [93]. However, they are still in an infant phase 
and no evidence about their impact is available.
The strengths of this study include the combination of literature and expert opinion to 
provide an overview of payment schemes implemented in European countries, explore 
the facilitators and barriers to their implementation, and discuss their perceived impact. 
However, it has several limitations. First, it includes a limited number of interviewees 
that precludes the generalizability of the findings regarding the perceived impact of 
each payment scheme. However, the interviewees were predominantly well-known 
researchers with hands-on experience with DMPs on European level. This could mitigate 
any biases in their perceptions about the impact of the payment schemes. Second, it 
discusses only the payment schemes strictly related to integrated chronic care, as other 
policies or the wider health care system in each country are not investigated. We ac-
knowledge the relevance of these aspects to fully understand a payment scheme but 
such complicated issues cannot be addressed in the scope of this explorative paper. Our 
overview can be the base for further in-depth investigation of each payment scheme 
in each country. Third, all interviewees stated that the payment schemes had a struc-
tural impact on chronic care financing but their opinions did not converge about the 
decrease of healthcare expenditure growth after implementation. Therefore, we cannot 
draw a consistent conclusion on this issue from our results presenting a limitation of the 
qualitative character of this study. We are currently conducting quantitative research 
that focuses on the impact of the introduced payment schemes on health care expen-
diture.
2.7 Conclusions
Payment schemes are valuable tools in stimulating the integration of chronic care deliv-
ery. The development of such payment schemes in Europe targeted those stakeholders 
who were expected to adjust their behavior, and provided them with adequate financial 
incentives. All payment reforms appeared to have changed the structure of chronic care 
delivery. PFC, as it was implemented in Austria, France and Germany, was perceived to 
be the most successful in increasing collaboration within and across healthcare sectors, 
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whereas PFP, as it was implemented in England and France, was perceived most suc-
cessful in improving other indicators of the quality of the care process. Interviewees 
stated that the impact of the payment reforms on healthcare expenditures remained 
questionable.
Our findings suggest that initiating collaborations in chronic care can be stimulated 
with PFC payments and further integration of care can be facilitated by adding other 
payment schemes such as bundled payments. Elements of performance based pay-
ments are definitely important for stimulating competition and improving quality of 
care. Other payment agreements, such as shared savings, should also be considered to 
overcome gaming and misaligned incentives between stakeholders. All this informa-
tion can help decision makers to further improve the (re)design of payment schemes in 
Europe toward a blended payment scheme that facilitates integration of chronic care.
40 Chapter 2
Appendix 1 Interview template
Interview Part 1:
Core Policy:
Policy title
Date
What is the aim of the policy?
What did this policy change 
with regard to financing and 
managing chronic conditions 
in country	name?
Who initiated this policy?
What is the target audience of 
this policy?
How widely implemented is 
this policy?
Are there any plans to update/
alter this policy? Why & in 
which way?
How do governmental 
agencies, healthcare providers, 
insurers, and/or patients view 
this policy?
How successful do you believe 
this policy is up until now?
How successful do you believe 
this policy will be in the future?
Are there perceived barriers 
or obstacles to this policy 
functioning as intended?
On the other hand, are there 
facilitating factors?
Interview Part 2:
Please indicate below the degree to which you agree/disagree with the following statements, with regard 
to the core policy indicated in part 1. If you feel there is another core policy, we would greatly appreciate it if 
you could indicate which policy it is, and complete the following form a second time, for that policy as well.
Statements	related	to	success	of	implementation:
1. The policy changed positively the financing structure of chronic care.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
2. The level of commitment of policy makers is high.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
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3. The level of commitment of healthcare providers is high.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
4. The level of commitment of health insurers is high.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
5. The level of commitment of patients is high.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
6. The policy implementation was met with resistance.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
7. No additional training was required for the health care providers to implement the policy.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
8. The policy has had structural or systematic impact on the delivery and/or financing of chronic disease 
management.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
9. Previously implemented policies facilitated the implementation of this policy.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
10. The ICT systems of chronic care was a barrier for implementation.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
Statements	related	to	Integration	of	Care:
1. The policy led to more cooperation between providers.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
2. As a result of policy implementation, chronic patients became more involved in their care.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
3. Chronically ill patients are free to choose whether they engage in policy provisions.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
4. As a result of policy implementation, new collaboration agreements have been made between care sec-
tors (e.g. between primary, secondary, and/or home care).
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
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5. For the coordination of chronic care, the integration of ICT systems of the care sectors involved increased 
quality in care provided.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
Financing	Scheme:
1. The policy increases efficiency in chronic care.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
2. There are adequate financial incentives for the stakeholders (e.g. patients, providers, insurers) to partici-
pate/adopt the policy.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
3. The policy imposes budgetary constraints on the healthcare system.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
4. The policy promotes the integration of financing of different care sectors involved in chronic care.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
5. Risk selection of financially “unattractive” chronic patients to health insurers is decreased following the 
implementation of this policy.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
6. The growth of the chronic care expenditure decreased after the introduction of this policy.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
Policy	Evaluation:
1. Ongoing national evaluation of the policy is lacking.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
2. Sufficient data is available to evaluate the impact of the policy.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
3. There is political interest regarding the impact of the policy.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
4. Public visibility/Transparency exists regarding policy impact.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕ ⎕
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Appendix 2 List of interviewees
Country Interviewee
code
Gender Interview
date
Profession
Austria A.A. Female 4 May 2012 Researcher Health Economics and Health Policy
A.B. Male 23 May 2012 Researcher Health Economics and Health Policy
Denmark D.A. Male 4 April 2012 Researcher and Consultant Public Health
D.B. Female 25 April 2012 Researcher Health Services and Chronic Care 
Management
D.C. Female 2 May 2012 Researcher Integrated Care
France F.A. Female 15 April 2012 Researcher Health Economics
F.B. Male 18 April 2012 Researcher Health Economics and Health 
Services
F.C. Male 12 July 2012 Researcher and Consultant Health Economics 
and Policy
Germany G.A. Male 11 April 2012 Researcher Health Economics and Health 
Services
G.B. Male 10 May 2012 Director of Sickness Fund
G.C. Female 14 May 2012 Researcher Health Policy
Netherlands N.A. Male 14 May 2012 Manager in Patient Organization
N.B. Male 18 May 2012 Researcher Public Health
England E.A. Male 1 May 2012 Researcher Health Services Management
E.B. Female 9 July 2012 Researcher Health Policy and Financing Health 
Systems
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Abstract
Chronic non-communicable diseases are a major threat to population health and have 
a major economic impact on health care systems. Worldwide, integrated chronic care 
delivery systems have been developed to tackle this challenge. In the Netherlands, 
the recently introduced integrated payment system – the chain-DTC – is seen as the 
cornerstone of a policy stimulating the development of a well-functioning integrated 
chronic care system.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the recent attempts in the Netherlands to 
stimulate the delivery of integrated chronic care, focusing specifically on the new inte-
grated payment scheme and the barriers to introducing this scheme. We also highlight 
possible threats and identify necessary conditions to the success of the system. This pa-
per is based on a combination of methods and sources including literature, government 
documents, personal communications and site visits to disease management programs 
(DMPs).
The most important conditions for the success of the new payment system are: 
complete care protocols describing both general (e.g. smoking cessation, physical 
activity) and disease-specific chronic care modules, coverage of all components of a 
DMP by basic health care insurance, adequate information systems that facilitate com-
munication between caregivers, explicit links between the quality and the price of a 
DMP, expansion of the amount of specialized care included in the chain-DTC, inclusion 
of a multi-morbidity factor in the risk equalization formula of insurers, and thorough 
economic evaluation of DMPs.
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3.1 Introduction
Chronic non-communicable diseases are a major threat to population health and an 
increasing challenge to health care. Worldwide, chronic conditions cause about 60% of 
all deaths [3], a number that is expected to increase by 17% in the next 10 years [10]. 
Parallel to the increasing prevalence of chronic diseases, there is growing recognition 
that chronic care delivery requires an integrated, multidisciplinary package of well-
coordinated care that includes prevention, monitoring and maintenance treatment 
while empowering chronically ill patients to participate actively in their treatment [68]. 
Both the need to contain the costs of chronic care treatment and the recognition that 
currently, health care systems are ill-equipped to provide integrated care has led many 
health care authorities worldwide to redesign chronic care delivery.
During the 1980s, the first structured integrated care or disease management pro-
grams were developed in the United States. At that time, disease management was 
mainly seen as an instrument of cost controllers to reduce hospital (re)admissions and 
hospital days. During the 1990s the nature and scope of these programs was widened 
and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Medicare, Medicaid and other pay-
ers now offer a wide variety of disease management programs for conditions such 
as diabetes, congestive health failure and asthma. The American experience with the 
identification of chronic conditions and providing care according to the patients’ needs 
have been influential in Europe and elsewhere [17-19]. It has been the basis of the intro-
duction of case management in all Primary Care Trusts in the United Kingdom National 
Health System in 2007, which aimed to improve the quality and accessibility of care for 
people with chronic conditions and contain associated costs. At the same time many 
other European countries have experimented with various forms of integrated care 
delivery. In Germany large numbers of patients with a chronic disease were enrolled in 
disease management programs that were introduced on a large scale. Until 2009, there 
was a strong incentive to enroll patients because these programs were a separate com-
ponent of the risk structure compensation schemes for sick funds. In turn, the sick funds 
provided strong incentives to doctors to enroll patients [2]. In Sweden, many county 
councils offer chains of care for diabetes, dementia, and rheumatoid arthritis [20]. In 
France, the formation of local provider networks for ambulatory patients was stimulated 
through the 2002 Patients’ Rights and Quality of Care Act [21]. Likewise, in the province 
of Ontario in Canada networks of family doctors and local health integration networks 
were formed [22]. Most countries implement a spectrum of parallel policies targeting 
specific elements of the chronic care continuum (e.g. The Netherlands, France, Germany, 
Sweden, Canada) and some countries have developed a national vision on chronic 
disease control with nationwide integrated care strategies covering the entire care 
continuum from health promotion to care for complex chronic disease patients (e.g. 
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Australia, Denmark, England) [2,12]. There is no single approach that fits all countries, 
and new initiatives to provide integrated care need to be embedded in national and 
provincial structures for the delivery and financing of care [2,31].
As a result of these different approaches across the globe, many different definitions 
of disease management exist. A frequently cited definition is the definition of the Dis-
ease Management Association of America (DMAA), which defines a DMP as ‘a system of 
coordinated health care interventions and communications for populations with condi-
tions in which patient self-care efforts are significant’ [67]. In most cases, the disease 
management programs are based on Wagner’s Chronic Care Model (CCM), which pro-
vides a framework of elements that must be considered when developing improvement 
strategies for providing care for people with chronic diseases, originally including: (a) 
self-management support, (b) decision support, (c) delivery system design, (d) clinical 
information systems, (e) health care organization, and (f ) community resources and 
policies [25]. The CCM was later extended to put more emphasis on patient safety, care 
coordination and case management [11].
In the Netherlands, recently developed disease management programs (DMPs) [28] 
built further upon earlier successful shared care or transmural care projects [19,29,95] 
supported by a strong primary care sector [31]. However, due to the lack of coordination 
between the Dutch policies to put the CCM components in place [96], true integration in 
the care for chronic diseases is still far from having been achieved in the Netherlands [31]. 
Therefore, further improvements are envisioned, especially in the areas of self-manage-
ment support, clinical information systems, and decision support. As a result, the delivery 
systems for chronic care are currently undergoing a re-design, having the introduction 
of integrated payment system in 2010 as the cornerstone policy to develop a well-
functioning and sustainable integrated care system for people with chronic conditions.
So far, there is little information available about the new payment system and its 
position in the spectrum of other Dutch policies to stimulate integrated chronic care. 
This information would enable patient representatives, insurers and care providers to 
better understand and prepare for their (potential) role in the transformation of chronic 
care. This information is also necessary for researchers studying the (cost-)effectiveness 
of disease management programs to position their findings in the policy context of 
chronic care. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to describe the recent attempts in the 
Netherlands to stimulate the delivery of integrated chronic care, focusing specifically 
on the new integrated payment scheme and the facilitators and barriers to introducing 
this scheme. A review of relevant literature and government documents is the first core 
research method adopted to achieve the aim of the paper. Keywords, such as ‘integrated 
care’, ‘disease management programs’, ‘transmural care’, ‘chronic care’, ‘The Netherlands’ 
were used to identify relevant literature, whereas the websites of governmental organi-
zations and institutions involved or influencing chronic care were searched for relevant 
Towards integrated care for chronic conditions: Dutch policy developments to overcome the (financial) barriers 49
information. The second core research method, that provides information directly from 
the work floor, is a series of ongoing personal communications with project leaders 
and care providers of 22 different DMPs that participate in a government program to 
stimulate disease management for diabetes, cardiovascular risk management, COPD, 
and anxiety/depression. In addition, we participated in workshops and symposia in the 
Netherlands, where stakeholders of chronic care discussed concerns for and advantages 
of the new developments in this field.
Following the introduction (Section 1), the current policies (Section 2) and barriers 
(Section 3) for achieving integrated care are outlined. By current policies we mean the 
policies up until 2009. Thereafter, we describe the integrated payment scheme that was 
introduced in 2010, including its intended incentives (Section 4), followed by its poten-
tial benefits (Section 5) and possible threats to its success (Section 6). We further discuss 
the necessary conditions for the new integrated payment scheme to work (Section 7) 
and the final section concludes with a call for evaluation (Section 8).
3.2 Current policy influencing integration of care
During the last two decades, Dutch authorities have aimed to increase efficiency in the 
health care system by introducing regulated competition [97,98]. To achieve that, a se-
ries of health care reforms was gradually undertaken towards a market oriented health 
care and a national health insurance system [97,98]. The most important reform was the 
introduction of the Health Insurance Act (Zvw) in 2006, which set the foundations for a 
regulated market in the Dutch health care system. The goal of this reform was to increase 
efficiency of health care provision by encouraging health insurers to act as purchasers 
on behalf of health care consumers. Consumers and patients are seen as important play-
ers who make rational choices between insurers, benefit packages and providers based 
on information about volume, price and quality [98]. Full implementation of this Act is 
still in progress [99].
3.2.1 Health care insurance
Under the Health Insurance Act, the distinction was abandoned between the compulsory 
public sickness funds for persons with less than a defined income, and private, mostly 
voluntary health insurance for private entrepreneurs and people with higher incomes 
[18,97]. Health insurers are now required to offer a standard package of basic health 
care insurance to every applicant, regardless of pre-existing condition. It is mandatory 
for every citizen to have this basic benefit package. In addition, the insurers offer volun-
tary supplementary insurance packages at additional cost. Patient choice is enhanced 
by allowing consumers to change health care insurer every year, thereby giving them 
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the opportunity to express the (dis-)satisfaction with the insurer’s policy. The standard 
package is financed by a nominal premium paid directly by the insured and additional 
income-related premiums collected through a payroll tax. The latter premiums are 
distributed to health insurers based on a risk-equalization scheme to compensate for 
diff erences in the risk profiles of the insured population [18,100].
The standard insurance package is described in terms of health care functions (e.g. re-
habilitation) and not providers (e.g. rehabilitation institute). In other words, the package 
is described in terms of ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ but not in terms of ‘by whom’ or ‘where’. 
This is intended to stimulate managed care as insurance companies can purchase a 
particular type of care from any provider(s) able to deliver the care at good quality and 
a competing price (e.g. rehabilitation in physiotherapy practices) [101]. Health insurers 
are free to contract with providers that are registered according to the Individual Health 
Care Professionals Act (BIG). They negotiate with providers on price, volume, and qual-
ity of care. Insurers are also allowed to implement incentives to consumers to promote 
preferred providers, e.g. by off ering premium rebates to patients who visit the preferred 
providers. This applies to both outpatient and inpatient care where health insurers can 
Figure 1 Schematic overview of integrated payment in the Netherlands
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negotiate freely with hospitals regarding prices of a range of products called Diagnosis 
Treatment Combinations (DTCs). The DTCs were introduced in 2005 and are the Dutch 
version of the American Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) [76,102,103]. The percentage 
of hospital services off ered to patients through DTCs for which the price is freely negoti-
ated has increased from 10% to 34% in the last 4 years, denoting the eff ort of the Dutch 
authorities to promote regulated competition in the health care system [99].
3.2.2 Quality measures
To facilitate further regulated competition, the Dutch authorities have taken measures 
to improve information on quality of health care to support negotiations between 
health care purchasers and providers. These measures include the development of 
multidisciplinary evidence-based guidelines, process protocols and performance indi-
cators. Patient involvement was substantial in the development of these measures in 
order to secure patient empowerment within the regulated competition [98]. Based on 
the guidelines and protocols, the Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ) develops indicators to 
measure health care quality in terms of structure, process and outcome performance 
[104,105] similar to the performance indicators developed by the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) in the U.K. [16]. A representative selection of the performance indica-
tors is provided in Appendix 1.
Figure 2 Generic and disease-specifi c modules of the care standards
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3.2.3 Financial incentives
There are also specific financial incentives to stimulate the development of appropriate 
structures and processes for the delivery of chronic care. Primary care providers can 
apply for additional reimbursement, categorized in three major modules, known as 
‘Innovation’, ‘Integrated Outpatient Care’, and ‘Modernizing and Innovation’ [101]. These 
modules are granted to general practitioners who perform innovative interventions for 
chronic patients, promote multidisciplinary care teams in outpatient care, and set up 
DMPs. However, these incentives are segmented and do not ensure financial stability for 
sustained integration into the chronic care delivery system. Therefore, they will largely 
be replaced in 2010 by the new integrated payment system [106].
3.3 Barriers of the current policy
Although the current policies provide a framework to stimulate the integration of 
chronic care in the Netherlands, the success is still obscured by obstacles, mainly of a 
financial nature.
3.3.1 Segmentation of health insurance
Chronic care in the Netherlands is reimbursed through different health insurance 
schemes, depending on the type of care required: the Health Insurance Act (Zvw), 
the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) and the Social Support Act (Wmo) 
[18,76,98,107]. For example, curative health care providers in primary care, outpatient 
and inpatient hospital care are financed by the Health Insurance Act; some types of home 
care are reimbursed by the Social Support Act (e.g. household help, transport support) 
and other types of home care by the Health Insurance Act (e.g. nursing care at home). 
Long term care (e.g. nursing home care, rehabilitation after cerebrovascular event) and 
social participation support are covered by the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act. As a 
result, from the patient’s perspective, they have to knock on several different doors to 
get the care they need, and from the provider’s perspective, multidisciplinary teamwork 
is hampered and an additional administrative burden is generated [108].
Furthermore, chronic care reimbursement is segmented not only across different 
health insurance schemes but also within a scheme. Some types of care for chronically 
ill patients that are recommended in the treatment guidelines are not included in the 
obligatory standard insurance package, only in the voluntary supplementary package. 
For example, preventive interventions such as pharmacological smoking cessation 
support or physical activity programs, are entirely excluded from the standard insur-
ance package, while care provided by physiotherapists, and specialized nurses is only 
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partially included [108]. Consequently, the integration of care is dependent on whether 
or not a patient has voluntary supplementary insurance.
3.3.2 Suboptimal substitution between inpatient and outpatient care
In the current situation, health insurers have an (perverse) incentive to substitute out-
patient care with inpatient care. The risk equalization scheme provides compensation 
retrospectively to health insurers for inpatient care only; thus, their financial risks related 
to inpatient care are reduced [105]. This differentiation in financial risks between the 
outpatient and inpatient care jeopardizes integration by reducing the attractiveness of 
the outpatient care market to health insurers. Considering the severity of this obstacle 
to integration, the Ministry of Health announced that the ex-post compensation will be 
gradually eliminated in the coming years [101].
3.3.3 Inadequate provider payment methods
In the Netherlands, the reimbursement of the general practitioners (GPs) is based on a 
mixed system consisting mainly of fee-for-service and capitation payment, while two 
thirds of all medical specialists are paid solely on (capped) fee-for-service basis [76]. 
However, it is argued that fee-for service is a fragmented payment method and is not 
suitable to integrated care [16].
Furthermore, the cooperation between care providers in outpatient care is not 
optimally reimbursed. The main contractor of a multidisciplinary team in outpatient 
care is eligible to receive further reimbursement through the additional reimbursement 
modules described in Section 2.3. In contrast, the sub-contracted providers, of the same 
multidisciplinary team, are not entitled to additional reimbursement and thus, the 
cooperation of providers is at stake. The main contractor might also receive a second 
payment for the same intervention because there is overlap between the interventions 
reimbursed on a consultation or capitation basis and the interventions that are listed on 
the modernizing and innovation modules [109].
3.3.4 Lack of information technology
The absence of an integrated Information Communication Technology (ICT) system is 
another obstacle to integrated chronic care in the Netherlands [31,110]. Although clini-
cal information systems are partially implemented, the communication of information 
among them on a regional level is underdeveloped. With regard to outpatient care, 
there is no synchronization of information about what is delivered by the specialized 
providers for a chronic condition and what by general practitioners. Insufficient informa-
tion flow exists also between the outpatient and inpatient care as well as between the 
different health insurance schemes (i.e. Zvw, Wmo, and AWBZ). Therefore, inefficiencies 
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such as unnecessary interventions and double payments for the same intervention are 
unavoidable and optimal cooperation of care providers is doubtful [101].
3.4 Introducing an integrated payment scheme
The Dutch Ministry of Health has introduced a new integrated payment system for 
chronic care in 2010 facing the most important (financial) barriers to integration of 
chronic care and realizing that sustainable funding of DMPs is still a challenge for inte-
gration in the Netherlands [31].
The Minister of Health has introduced a ‘programmatic approach’ towards chronic 
care in a series of letters to the Dutch parliament [101,106,111,112]. These letters de-
scribe the new payment system for integrated chronic care in detail. The new system 
is a prospective reimbursement system offering an ‘all-inclusive’ payment for people 
with chronic conditions to multidisciplinary teams of caregivers. Drugs, diagnostics and 
medical devices are not included in the payment yet, but this may change in the future. 
The new payment system is initially applied to four chronic conditions namely, diabetes, 
COPD, heart failure and management of cardiovascular risk factors (CVR). The relatively 
high prevalence of these chronic conditions and the feasibility of implementation were 
the main reasons for making this selection. The implementation started in January 2010 
with diabetes and CVR and is planned to continue with the other two conditions later 
this year.
Under the new payment system, chronic care is coordinated by groups of providers 
(hereafter called care groups) that implement DMPs organized in integrated centers in 
primary care or in groups of cooperating general practices, paramedical care givers and/
or hospitals [113]. Based on their structure, their legal form can be limited liability private 
company (BV), partnership, foundation, or limited partnership (CV) [114]. A schematic 
overview of the integrated payment system is presented in Fig. 1.
As Fig. 1 illustrates, health insurers purchase integrated care from care groups on the 
health care provider market by negotiating a fixed price per patient per year. This price is 
based on the expected case-mix of patients with a chronic disease. This price is called the 
chain-DTC because it combines costs of multiple professions mainly working in general 
or primary care and – to a limited extend – in specialized or hospital-based outpatient 
care. The care groups can deliver care themselves or sub-contract other providers on the 
health care provider submarket. The sub-contracting prices are subject to negotiation 
between the care groups and individual health care providers, such as general practices 
(see the bottom left branch in Fig. 1), primary care health centers specialists, nurses, 
and labs operating from hospitals (bottom middle branch), and/or individual providers 
(such as the dietician in Fig. 1). It should be noted that, up to now, the specialist has 
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been included in the chain-DTC only on a consultation basis. Specialized care provided 
in outpatient clinics and hospital wards is not part of the chain-DTC agreement. The 
chain-DTC primarily stimulates the cooperation between different providers of curative 
interventions in the primary care setting (e.g. GPs, GP practice assistants, physiothera-
pists, dieticians), but it does not intent to integrate the cure and the care sector, nor the 
hospital and primary care sector [113]. The price that is negotiated for a chain-DTC is not 
restricted by a minimum or maximum, although it is closely monitored by the National 
Health Care Authority (NZa), which is one of the two institutions through which the Min-
istry of Health (VWS) can control the chronic care market. The second institution is the 
Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ) which determines the insurance benefits included 
in the basic insurance package and therefore, indirectly influences the content of care 
negotiated between the care groups and the health insurers [101,114].
The negotiations on the content of care that is included in the chain-DTC are driven 
by the care as described in the ‘care standards’. These care standards have been devel-
oped and authorized by caregiver organizations, patient associations, and public health 
authorities. Insurers are consulted during the development process of the standards. 
The care standards are mainly based on the existing medical guidelines, protocols, and 
performance indicators. The interventions described in the care standards are catego-
rized into general and disease-specific modules as illustrated in Fig. 2. The general mod-
ules include interventions applicable to all chronic conditions, such as physical activity 
programs and smoking cessation support. The disease-specific modules are additions 
to the general modules, specifically targeted to each chronic condition. These disease-
specific modules are sub-grouped along the four phases of care (see Fig. 2). The separa-
tion of interventions in these two types of modules prevents overlap of interventions for 
people with multi-morbidity since a person with two chronic conditions is offered the 
general modules only once. Performance indicators are attached to both general and 
specific modules to enable the monitoring of the delivered care. The recently introduced 
Minimum Data Set (MDS) by the Visible Care program (ZiZo) describes the set of perfor-
mance indicators that must be collected anyway (see Appendix 1) [115]. As a result, the 
price of a chain-DTC may be driven by performance achieved and may differ according 
to the local agreements to stimulate improvement in these indicators.
Moreover, the integrated payment system aims to set a range of financial and non-
financial incentives in place. First and foremost, the chain-DTC is a financial incentive for 
health care providers to improve the quality of care for patients with a chronic disease. 
By choosing from the different modules and adapting the modules to the specific 
patient needs, they can provide tailored care programs. Because self-management 
support is an important element of these programs, the integrated payment system 
contributes to the empowerment of patients with a chronic disease. Health insurers, 
by purchasing integrated care from care groups, can reduce financial risk, avoid double 
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payments, negotiate about prices within a trans-parent framework, and save costs due 
to the substitution of expensive inpatient care by less expensive outpatient care. Care 
groups, on the other hand, can generate more income by negotiating favorable prices 
with insurers, by increasing efficiency in care delivery, and by capturing a market share 
of chronic care that previously belonged to hospitals. Moreover, individual health care 
providers can reduce administrative costs because instead of negotiating with multiple 
health insurers they now negotiate with the care group only. Overall, care providers 
can improve their market position by providing attractive integrated care packages to 
people with chronic conditions and by scoring higher on performance indicators.
The new integrated payment system for chronic care in the Netherlands has some 
elements in common with payment systems for chronic care in other countries. In 
particular, it shares elements with payment for complete packages of chronic disease 
management care existing in the U.K. and Denmark. It also has similarities with the 
Medicare pay-for-performance initiatives in the U.S. where multidisciplinary practices are 
encouraged and financed based on performance indicators. Another similarity regards 
the German risk equalization formula, which since 2009 includes individual morbidity 
criteria [16]. However, none of these systems has promoted managed competition be-
tween insurers and among care groups by dividing the insurance purchase market into 
two submarkets, one in which insurers contract care groups and a second in which care 
groups contract providers.
3.5 Potential benefits
Although patient information on quality of care (i.e. quality consumer indices) is already 
provided by the National Institute for Public Health and Environment online (see www.
kiesbeter.nl), the type of quality information published on this site depends on the 
availability of data and therefore differs per provider and health insurer [98]. In the new 
integrated payment system for chronic care, the care standards are positioned in the 
middle of the chronic care market and via the Minimum Data Set important quality 
information may be collected. As a result, quality may become more measurable and 
transparent not only for health insurers and care providers but also for patients. This 
may facilitate a better-informed choice of insurer and providers, which is expected to 
contribute to improvement of the quality of chronic care.
On the efficiency side, transparency of care budgeting through chain-DTCs enables 
health insurers to monitor their expenditures. Double payments are expected to decline 
because when a chain-DTC is assigned to a patient, then neither a ‘hospital-outpatient’ 
DTC nor a DTC for a related disease can be assigned to the same patient. For example, 
when a cardiovascular risk factors management (CVR) chain-DTC is assigned to a patient, 
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then a diabetes DTC or a heart failure DTC cannot be assigned to that patient any longer. 
There is no need to assign multiple DTCs, because the patient and provider can compile 
a package of care from the modules that is tailored to his or her specific needs.
Health care expenditures may further decrease by directly substituting care delivered 
in outpatient hospital clinics with primary care delivered through chain-DTCs. Hospital 
care may also be substituted indirectly when integrated care reduces the number of 
complications and hospital admissions. Moreover, efficient care substitution is an-
ticipated to take place in the primary care setting too, because in chain-DTCs, physician 
assistants, specialist nurses and paramedical caregivers are given a more prominent role 
in performing tasks that have been traditionally performed by GPs. In the new payment 
system, GPs have agreed a pre-specified price with the insurers for the provision of 
chronic care and it is therefore, financially wise to delegate tasks to less expensive medi-
cal personnel. This might prevent situations similar to those found in Australia, Denmark 
and France where inadequate financial incentives to GPs for participating in multidisci-
plinary teams often hinder the delegation of tasks from GPs to other professionals [12].
Finally, the new payment system requires the development of ICT applications, such 
as integrated information systems and the minimum database, that are expected to 
improve the collaboration and coordination between care providers. This expectation is 
in line with the experience in England where a high level of computerization in general 
practices has improved the quality of care by providing individual care givers with the 
patient’s entire treatment plan and facilitating case management [12].
3.6 Possible threats
The implementation of a major reform, such as the integrated payment scheme, is 
subject to potential threats to its success. It is important to identify and address these 
threats in order to avoid potential failures of the new payment system. The most impor-
tant threats are presented below.
3.6.1 Limited choice of care
The patients’ freedom of choice of insurer and provider has been extended over the 
last years through the promotion of managed competition [98]. This freedom might 
be jeopardized if a DMP contracts only a small number of providers, thus limiting the 
choice between different caregivers. It may also be jeopardized if a large DMP contracts 
with virtually all care providers in a region, thus limiting the patient’s freedom not to 
participate in a DMP.
Limitations in the choice of care might also occur on the delivery side. Care providers 
might have limited freedom to provide treatments that are not agreed with the care 
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group. That could have a negative effect on the provision of tailored care to an individual 
patient with specific or exceptional needs.
3.6.2 Segmented integration
Although the recent policy developments in the Netherlands aim to integrate chronic 
care, there are risks for the contrary. First, Fabbricotti argued that DMPs might, in some 
cases, lead to fragmentation of care between contracted and non-contracted health 
care providers [116]. For instance, the continuity of care for people with chronic condi-
tions depends on whether their current GP participates in the DMP contracted by their 
insurer. If that is not the case, the individual has to distinguish between general and 
disease-specific demand for care in order to seek care delivered by their current GP or 
by the DMP. Second, there might be fragmentation between different chain-DTCs or 
different DMPs. Considering that more than 50% of the Dutch population older than 
55 has multi-morbidity [117], this risk of so called horizontal fragmentation is present, 
especially if DMPs address a single chronic disease. Third, there may be fragmentation 
between care included in the standard benefit package and care that is not. Some as-
pects of prevention, self-management, paramedical care and nursing care that are part 
of the care standard are not included in some DMPs because they are not reimbursed as 
part of the standard benefit package. Consequently, these forms of care get less priority 
than recommended in the care standards. This risk has been recognized by the Ministry 
of Health which has for example decided to include integrated smoking cessation sup-
port (pharmacotherapy in combination with counseling) into the standard package as 
of January 2010.
3.6.3 Market power misuse
Under the new payment system, care groups play a leading role in the chronic care 
market that might enable them to marginalize the role of non-contracted providers (see 
provider x in Fig. 1). Considering their weak bargaining power, non-contracted provid-
ers might face insufficient reimbursement from health insurers. The financial viability 
of non-contracted providers might further deteriorate if they are requested to help the 
high-risk population in case care groups would be able to exclude this population from 
the DMPs. Care groups might also use their market power to increase the price of chain-
DTCs. For instance, health insurers might be prepared to pay a higher price in return 
for being the exclusive provider of a DMP that dominates a local market. If, however, 
exclusivity is prohibited, then DMPs might select patients from health insurers that pay 
the highest price.
Eventually, health insurers might attempt to overcome any excessive market power of 
care groups by developing their own DMPs similar to an U.S. HMO. This trend of vertical 
integration of health insurance and care provision has already increased during recent 
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years in the Netherlands [118,119]. Although, it is not yet clear what the results would 
be for the market position of the care groups and the individual providers, it could be 
expected that their market position would deteriorate.
3.6.4 Risk selection
Because the chronically ill are a substantial and increasing proportion of the population, 
health insurance companies may try to capture a larger share of this market. They can 
distinguish themselves from their competitors by contracting disease management 
programs on a large scale. However, if this distinction increases health insurers’ popu-
larity with the chronically ill too much, they risk disproportionally attracting patients 
in bad health conditions who have high health care costs. Hence, the development 
of disease management programs stresses the need to include a morbidity factor in 
the risk equalization formula for the allocation of funds to payers as it was introduced 
in 2009 in Germany [2]. The Dutch authorities have only now begun to develop this 
formula [16,100]. However, even when a morbidity factor is included in this formula, 
multi-morbidity is still not taken into account. Hence, insurers will still have an incentive 
for cream-skimming healthier persons and a disincentive to invest in chronic disease 
management for patients with multiple morbidities.
The risk of adverse selection is reinforced by the fact that health insurers can refuse 
to provide premium discounting to groups of people with chronic conditions that 
purchase health insurance collectively [100]. As long as some components of chronic 
care are not part of the standard health insurance package, there will be risk selection 
through the supplementary insurance package where health insurers can refuse cover-
age to applicants.
3.6.5 Organizational and management failure
Keeping in mind that care groups are involved in complex management tasks, potentially 
inadequate management competencies could hamper the successful implementation 
of integrated care. In addition, the negotiation-capability of care groups is the driving 
factor of price variation of chain-DTCs [120]. Therefore, the inabilities of a care group to 
negotiate adequately could distort the linkage between the price of a chain-DTC and 
the delivered quality (via the performance indicators).
Furthermore, care groups act both as purchasers (in the chronic care sub-market) 
and as suppliers (in the insurance market). This is likely to increase their administrative 
burden and to transfer bureaucracy from health insurers to care groups, which is a bar-
rier to integration of care [121].
There are also concerns that delays in the implementation phase of DMPs will lead 
to reduction in the ambition to improve the content of care according to the chronic 
care model. Ambitions to develop new strategies to actively detect patients at risk, new 
60 Chapter 3
self-management strategies, new lifestyle interventions, and effective collaboration 
between providers might decline during a long implementation period. If these new 
interventions are not reimbursed or not developed because there is insufficient time, 
the chain-DTC will be nothing more than an alternative way of paying for the care that 
is already provided currently.
3.6.6 Costs and inefficiencies
Furthermore, double payments might still be present in the new payment scheme since 
partially contracted care providers are able to deliver services via both DMPs and indi-
vidual practices at the same time. Consequently, these providers could be reimbursed 
twice for same care provision, once by the care group and once by the insurer.
There is also a risk in financing the registration of performance scores instead of the 
actual performance per se. As in pay-for-performance systems, care providers could 
‘game the system’ and instead of providing better quality of care, they could focus on 
increasing the performance indicator scores [122]. This could be the case especially for 
providers with poor performance [28].
Finally, evidence suggests that disease management project leaders are not fully 
aware of the implementation costs of a DMP [123] and fail to anticipate them [23]. Con-
sequently, the risk to underestimate these costs in the negotiated chain-DTC price might 
bring care groups in financial difficulties. Taking into account the considerable variation 
in the size of DMPs [114], this risk is higher for small DMPs that have relatively higher 
overhead and contract costs compared to large DMPs.
3.7 Necessary conditions for success
In the previous sections, we have outlined the urgency for success of the new payment 
system to put integrated chronic care in place and addressed the possible threats for 
failure. Based on these findings, we define a set of conditions necessary to fulfill the aim 
of the new payment system, which is listed as follows:
• To develop complete and adequate care standards with well-defined performance 
indicators necessary to secure high quality of care.
• To have written liabilities and responsibilities between health insurers, care groups, 
and individual providers that are linked to the standards of care.
• To include all components of integrated care provided by DMPs into the basic insur-
ance package in order to avoid segmentation of care and risk selection of health 
insurers. For the entire programs to become part of the basic insurance package we 
need cost-effectiveness studies to support this.
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• To make clear whether the total demand of a chronic patient is included in a disease 
specific chain-DTC or whether there are separate payment schemes for general and 
disease-specific care [124].
• To make the chronic care market attractive to health insurers in order to trigger them 
to act as purchasers of DMPs and develop the functionality of that market.
• To establish a transparent relationship between performance indicators and the 
price of the chain-DTC, to allow for differentiation in price based on the quality of 
care provided.
• To develop adequate information systems necessary to the success of disease 
management [17,125]. Adequate information is necessary to monitor the delivery of 
care, record performance indicators on an ongoing basis, facilitate the contracting 
between purchasers and providers and the coordination between providers. Infor-
mation technology could also support the development of decision support systems 
available to health professionals and managers and provide patients and consumers 
with information necessary for rational purchasing in the chronic care market.
• To further stimulate the integration between primary care and specialist care pro-
vided in outpatient hospital clinics, the latter should become a more substantial part 
of the chain-DTC.
• To provide tailored care to patients with multiple chronic diseases by making a 
selection from general modules and disease-specific modules defined in the care 
standards. This calls for chain-DTCs for multiple morbidities, that can vary in price, 
depending on the selection of care modules. Desirably, that would be applicable for 
all chronic conditions and not only for close related diseases as diabetes, CVR, and 
heart failure. Hence, the segmentation between chronic diseases could be overcome.
• To introduce a (multi-)morbidity factor in the risk equalization formula might elimi-
nate risk selection from health insurers.
• To have sufficient control and close monitoring of the chain-DTC prices and contracts 
between purchasers and providers by the Dutch authorities to secure adequate 
market functioning and avoid market failures.
• To evaluate the effects and costs of DMPs in order to provide information about the 
quality of care delivered and the costs attached to its provision to prevent inefficient 
care being included in the insurance package.
3.8 Call for evaluation
The last condition is crucial not only to the successful implementation of the new 
payment scheme but also to assess whether the adoption and promotion of DMPs as 
means to integration of care in the Netherlands is meaningful in the first place. There 
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is some evidence about the (cost-)effectiveness of DMPs. An example is the ELSID 
study in Germany, which concluded that DMPs improve the chronic care delivery to 
patients with diabetes according to the CCM [126]. Similarly, the INTERCOM trial in the 
Netherlands estimated that a community-based DMP for COPD patients can have an 
acceptable incremental cost-effectiveness ratio [127]. However this evidence is limited 
and inconclusive to support decision making on a large scale [2]. An economic evalu-
ation of DMPs demonstrating cost-effectiveness could provide decision makers with 
hard evidence about the clinical and economic consequences of the new market model 
imposed on the chronic care market. Such an analysis could also support an optimal 
inclusion of treatments in the basic insurance package and it could enlighten health 
insurers about the short and long-term investment opportunities in chronic care and 
attract their attention to sustainably support DMPs. However, it should be recognized 
that the net return on investment in DMPs rarely occurs before 5 years of implementa-
tion [16]. An economic evaluation of DMPs would also inform care groups about the 
potential costs of the development and implementation of DMPs and the generated 
effects and therefore, could strengthen their negotiation with health insurers. Finally, 
people with chronic conditions would be ensured that the care they receive is of best 
qualitative and economic value.
The Dutch Organization for Health Research and Development (ZonMw) initiated 
and funded a large program for the development, implementation and evaluation of 
22 DMPs in order to provide evidence about the (cost-)effectiveness of DMPs. These 
DMPs address a variety of chronic conditions such as diabetes, COPD, CVR, depression, 
anorexia, and psychosis and is the first nationwide attempt to evaluate DMPs in terms 
of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. The economic evaluation is being conducted by 
the authors who are developing a standard framework for the evaluation and are using 
both program-specific outcomes as well as generic outcomes that enable comparison 
of results across the different DMPs [128]. The results will be available within three years.
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Appendix 1 Representative selection of performance indicators included in 
the Minimum Data Set
Disease Measurement 
category
Process indicator Type of
indicator
Diabetes II HbA1c % patients with a yearly HbA1c control P
% patients with HbA1c<7% O
BMI % patients of which the BMI is measured in the last year P
%patients with BMI<25 O
Ophthalmological 
examination
% patients that have a yearly ophthalmological 
examination
P
%patients that received fundus control in the last 2 years P
% patients with retinopathy O
Feet examination % patients that received a foot examination in the last 12 
months
P
% patients with foot impediment during the last 
examination
O
% patients with measured Sims-score P
Blood pressure % patients with a yearly blood pressure control P
% patients with SBP<140 mmHg O
Cholesterol % patients with measured lipid profile P
% patients with total cholesterol <4,5 mmol/l O
Kidney function % patients with a creatine measurement in the last 12 
months
P
% patients with creatine levels <60 and 30 mmol/l O
% patients with urine examination of albumine or 
albumine/creatine ratio in the last 12 months
P
% patients with microalbuminurie O
Smoking % patients with known smoking status P
% patients that are smokers O
Treatment % patients with complete risk profile (hbac1, blood 
pressure, BMI, etc.)
P
% newly diagnosed patients with a dietician consultation 
in the last year
P
% patients with a dietician consultation in the last year P
Available expertise S
Availability of a specialized internist S
Quality of 
integrated care
% patients with an individual care plan S
% patients assigned to a central health care provider S
Other % deaths in the last year (including age and death cause) P
% new patients with heart failure O
Total number of diabetic patients S
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Disease Measurement 
category
Process indicator Type of
indicator
COPD BMI % patients of which the BMI is measured in the last year P
Treatment & 
monitoring
% patients with a spirometry test in the last year P
% patients with a known GOLD classification in the last year P
% patients with a known risk status (GOLD-score plus 
function status)
P
% patients with a given inhalation instruction in the last 
year
P
% patients with monitored CCQ or NCSI P
% patients vaccinated against influenza in the last year P
% patients with inhalation technique controlled in the last 
year
P
Smoking % patients with known smoking status P
% patients that are smokers O
Quality of 
integrated care
% patients with an individual care plan S
% patients assigned to a central health care provider S
Cardiovascular 
risk
Blood pressure % patients with a yearly blood pressure control P
% patients with SBP<140 mmHg O
% patients with SBP≥140 mmHg in the general practice 
population
S
Cholesterol % patients with measured LDL-cholesterol P
% patients with LDL-cholesterol,2,5 mmol/l O
% patients with total cholesterol ≥6,5 mmol/l in the general 
practice population
S
% possible high-risk patients with a LDL measured in the 
last 5 years
P
% patients with hypercholesterolemia in the general 
practice population
O
BMI % patients of which the BMI is measured in the last year P
%patients with BMI<25 O
% high-risk patients with a measured BMI in the last year P
Smoking % patients with known smoking status P
% patients that are smokers O
% patients male, older than 49 and smokers in the general 
practice population
S
% patients female, older than 54 and smokers in the 
general practice population
S
Alcohol % high-risk patients with registered alcohol misuse 
behavior
P
Quality of 
integrated care
% patients with an individual care plan S
% patients assigned to a central health care provider S
Other % patients with glucose measured in the last 5 years P
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Disease Measurement 
category
Process indicator Type of
indicator
% high-risk patients in the age between 40-65 P
% patients vaccinated against influenza in the last year P
% patients administered with anticoagulant medicine P
% patients with LDL-cholesterol ≥2,5 mmol/l administered 
with lipid lowering medicine
P+O
% patients with basic risk-profile (smoking-status, SBP, LDL) P
Source: Zichtbare Zorg (Visible Care), http://www.zichtbarezorg.nl/page/Eerstelijnszorg/Chronische-zorg; 
Note 1: P= Process, O= Outcome, S= Structure; Note 2: There are indicators common to multiple diseases; 
Note 3: BMI: Body Mass Index, Hba1c: Glycosylated Hemoglobin, SBP: Systolic Blood Pressure, GOLD: Global 
Initiative for Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease, CCQ: Clinical OPD Questionnaire, NCIS: Nijmegen Clinical 
Screening Instrument, LDL: Low-density Lipoprotein.
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Abstract
Various types of financial agreements have been implemented in Europe to reduce 
health care expenditure by stimulating integrated chronic care. This study used differ-
ence-in-differences (DID) models to estimate differences in health care expenditure 
trends before and after the introduction of a financial agreement between 9 interven-
tion countries and 16 control countries. Intervention countries included countries with 
pay-for-coordination (PFC), pay-for-performance (PFP), and/or all inclusive agreements 
(bundled and global payment) for integrated chronic care. OECD and WHO data from 
1996 to 2013 was used. The results from the main DID models showed that the annual 
growth of outpatient expenditure was decreased in countries with PFC (by 21.28 US$ 
per capita) and in countries with all-inclusive agreements (by 216.60 US$ per capita). The 
growth of hospital and administrative expenditure was decreased in countries with PFP 
by 64.50 US$ per capita and 5.74 US$ per capita, respectively. When modeling impact 
as a non-linear function of time during the total 4-year period after implementation, 
PFP decreased the growth of hospital and administrative expenditure and all-inclusive 
agreements reduced the growth of outpatient expenditure. Financial agreements are 
potentially powerful tools to stimulate integrated care and influence health care expen-
diture. A blended payment scheme that combines elements of PFC, PFP, and all-inclusive 
payments is likely to provide the strongest financial incentives to control health care 
expenditure.
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4.1 Introduction
Chronic diseases account largely for the increase in health care expenditure due to their 
rising prevalence [8]. This impacts the overall economy because the direct and indirect 
costs of chronic diseases in health care are a sizeable share of a country’s GDP [9]. As a 
result, chronic diseases constitute a great challenge to economies worldwide. This chal-
lenge is even greater when considering that chronic diseases may jeopardize economic 
growth through their impact on consumption, savings, labour productivity, labour sup-
ply, education, and life expectancy [2].
Improvements in chronic care management, coordination, and integration are seen 
as means to tackle increasing chronic care expenditure because of their potential to re-
duce costs while improving quality for people with complex health care needs [129,130]. 
Adequate financial flows and incentives are prerequisites to improving chronic care 
[28]. Thus, different financial agreements have been developed to provide appropriate 
incentives to the chronic care stakeholders. Similar to the US [43], adaptations of pay-
for-coordination (PFC) (e.g. Austria, Denmark, France), pay-for-performance (PFP) (e.g. 
England, France), bundled payments (e.g. the Netherlands), and global payments (e.g. 
Germany) targeting different stakeholders (mainly health care providers and payers) 
have been introduced the last decade in Europe [16]. While these financial agreements 
and subsequent implemented policies have been described in the literature [16], their 
impact on health care expenditure has been poorly investigated.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of different financial agreements of 
chronic care in Europe on national health care expenditures.
4.2 Methods
We used a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis to estimate differences, before and 
after (pre-post) introduction of a payment scheme, between countries that had financial 
agreements for improved chronic care (intervention countries) and countries that did 
not have any reforms in chronic care financing and/or payment (control countries). The 
DID analysis is used in econometrics to analyse panel data on country level to evalu-
ate the impact of a certain event or policy [131]. Previous applications of DID in health 
care investigated the impact of medicine reimbursement [132] and hospital payment 
[133] reforms. We investigated the effect of financial policies that merely targeted the 
outpatient sector but, in some cases could involve hospital care as well.
We followed a three-step strategy to distinguish between intervention and control 
countries. We first searched in the literature to identify which European countries have 
taken large-scale initiatives towards providing financial incentives to stakeholders for 
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improvements in chronic care delivery. Second, we used published literature and WHO 
reports to ensure that control countries had not introduced financial agreements in 
chronic care [74,134]. Third, we conducted interviews in the intervention countries to 
gather more information about the financial agreements and to ensure that no other 
financial agreements on national level were implemented in the same year and country 
as the financial agreements of interest. A detailed description of these interviews and 
their results can be found elsewhere [42].
4.3 Data
We collected panel data from 1996 to 2013 for 25 European countries from the databases 
of WHO and OECD [135,136]. We used health care expenditure per capita corrected 
for purchasing power using current (August 2014) US$PPP. Our dataset consists of a) 
independent variables of interest, which are the chronic care financial agreements, b) 
outcome variables, and c) other covariates that control for cyclical and structural trends 
in each country.
4.3.1 Financial agreements
Traditional financial agreements, such as fee-for-service (FFS), capitation, and salary, 
are not designed to facilitate improvements in disease management, coordination of 
health care delivery and ultimately, integration of chronic care [16]. Therefore, countries 
with such agreements were considered as control countries in our analysis. We defined 
intervention countries as countries having one or more of the following financial agree-
ments to support the improvement of chronic care delivery. These financial agreements 
could target individual care providers, a group of care providers in ambulatory care and/
or secondary care, health insurers, and/or local authorities depending on the structure 
of a health care system. The first is pay-for-coordination (PFC), which involves payment 
to coordinate care provided by different types of providers for specified care services 
[70]. The second agreement is pay-for-performance (PFP), defined as the payment or 
financial incentive (e.g. a bonus) associated with achieving defined and measurable 
goals related to improvements in the process and outcomes of care for chronic diseases 
(e.g. patient experience, resource use, and other risk factors) [72]. The third category 
is the all-inclusive payment scheme. This category includes a) the bundled payment, 
which is a single payment for a group of services related to a specific condition that may 
involve multiple providers in multiple settings [73], and b) the global payment that is a 
single payment for the full range (i.e. not only disease-specific) of health care services 
needed by a specified group of people with chronic disease for a fixed period of time 
[43]. All-inclusive payments are commonly risk-adjusted.
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4.3.2 Outcome variables
Similar to previous studies on payment reforms [132,133], we included a set of health 
care expenditure variables which we expected to be impacted by the payment reforms 
in chronic care. These outcome variables include total, outpatient, hospital, medication, 
and administrative expenditure per capita in health care. Outpatient expenditures in-
clude both primary care and outpatient hospital care. The administrative expenditures 
included expenditures for planning, management, regulation, collection of funds, and 
handling the claims of the delivery system.
4.3.3 Additional covariates
We added GDP per capita (expressed in August 2014 US$PPP) in our DID models to 
control for general economic trends per country. We also controlled for the total em-
ployment in the health care sector per thousand inhabitants to account for changes in 
the supply of health care per country.
4.4 Analytic modelling
We followed the work of Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff [133] and related literature [131,132] 
to specify our DID models. As suggested in the literature, our basic model was a simple 
DID model assuming that the trends in health care expenditure between countries and 
between intervention and control countries are parallel. This parallel trends (PT) model 
was estimated by taking the first differences (i.e. Xt − Xt−1 denoted as Δ) of all variables 
included in our analysis and is expressed as follows:
 Δyit = βΔXit + γΔPFCit + δΔPFPit + θΔALLit + λt + Δεit (1)
where yit is the outcome variable, xit is a vector of additional covariates (i.e. GDP per 
capita, number of total employees in health care per 1000 inhabitants), and PFCit, PFPit, 
and ALLit are dummy variables taking the value 1 when a country i at time t implements 
PFC, PFP, and ALL respectively. A period specific intercept is denoted as λt and εit is an 
idiosyncratic error term independent identically distributed over i and t.
The assumption of the basic model that the trends between the countries are parallel 
is relaxed in a random trends (RT) model, which is expressed as:
 Δyit = βΔXit + γΔPFCit + δΔPFPit + θΔALLit + λt + κi + Δεit (2)
72 Chapter 4
where κi is a country effect to allow for different trends among countries. The second as-
sumption of the basic model about the parallel trends between intervention and control 
countries is relaxed in the differential trends (DT) model written as:
 ∆yit = β∆Xit + γ∆PFCit + δ∆PFPit + θ∆ALLit + λt + ψi + Δεit (3)
where ψi is a group specific dummy indicating whether a country belongs to the inter-
vention or control group of countries. In this model we control for common features 
that the intervention countries share and could have led to the adoption of financial 
agreements to improve chronic care.
The introduction of a financial agreement might not be fully in place during the 
implementation year or it might take some time before it influences health care expen-
ditures. To test this assumption, we have also added time-lead variables in the three DID 
models for the three financial agreement variables. For example the dummy PFC1it takes 
the value 1 a year after the implementation of PFC in a country. Therefore, formula (1) 
becomes:
 ∆yit = (4)
  β∆Xit + γ∆PFCit + δ∆PFPit + θ∆ALLit + π∆PFC1it + τ∆PFP1it +
  φ∆ALL1it  + ψ∆PFC2it + κ∆PFP2it + ζ∆ALL2it + ν∆PFC3it + υ∆PFP3it + ω∆ALL3it +
  λt + Δεit
where ΔPFC(1,2,3)it, ΔPFP(1,2,3)it, ΔALL(1,2,3)it are the first differences of the financial 
agreement dummies in each of the 3 years after implementation of an agreement (e.g. 
ΔPFC1it = PFCit+1 − PFCt). In other words, the dummy ΔPFC1it takes the value 1 only the 
year after a PFC agreement was implemented. By adding these dummies a non-linear 
effect (i.e. an effect that is not equal in each year after the implementation) of a financial 
agreement can be captured. The linear combination of the differenced dummies (in-
cluding the time-lead dummies) for each financial agreement was estimated to provide 
the cumulative impact of a financial agreement in the course of 4 years (implementation 
year plus 3 years afterwards). For example, considering PFC, the cumulative impact 
was estimated by summing up the estimates γ, π, ψ, ν and calculating the confidence 
intervals of the combined estimates.
The selection between the three models (i.e. PT, RT, or DT model), was based on their 
goodness-of-fit indicated by the Bayesian Information criterion (BIC). This criterion was 
used because it takes into consideration the number of predictors in a model and it is 
not influenced by the estimation of variance. We also looked at the joint significance of 
the country dummies in the RT model denoted as κi in Equation 2. If they were jointly 
insignificant the PT model was preferred to the RT model. Even if κi were jointly signifi-
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cant but, uncorrelated with the financial agreement dummies then the PT model was 
still preferred. We tested this correlation using a generalised version of the Hausman 
test as demonstrated by Morenno-Serra and Wagstaff [133]. Further, if the group specific 
dummy ψi in Equation 3 was not significant then the PT model was preferred to the DT 
model.
A common problem in panel data is that the error term εit is potentially autocorrelated 
(i.e. correlated over t for a given i) and/or heteroscedastic. For these reason we used 
the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test to detect potential heteroscedasticity and the 
Langram-Multiplier test for autocorrelation. In case of heteroscedasticity we used robust 
estimation of variance and when autocorrelation was present we used cluster-robust 
estimation of variance [137]. We have also checked for multi-collinearity in the models 
using the variance inflation factor (VIF). The econometric analysis was performed in 
STATA 12.0 and was cross-checked using SAS 9.2.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Financial agreements in chronic care
We identified 9 countries that had implemented financial agreements to support inte-
grated chronic care, i.e. Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, England, 
Portugal, Hungary, and Estonia. A short description of these financial agreements based 
on the literature and the interviews is presented below.
In Austria, the Health Reform Act of 2005 was implemented by the Ministry of Health 
to promote integration and coordination of care, improve efficiency, resource allocation 
and funding by pooling financial resources and promoting DMPs [32,33]. This reform 
created financial pools at state level by combining 1-2% of the budget of social health 
insurers with that of regional governments. These pooled funds were available for 
integrated care projects between primary and secondary care [74]. This was expected 
to overcome segmentation between the social health insurance scheme to fund outpa-
tient care and the provincial health funds to fund inpatient care and to be economically 
beneficial for both schemes. The 2005 health reform act also promoted DMPs, funded 
by social health insurance, targeting general practitioners (GPs) and promoting their 
engagement in the coordination of integrated care efforts. On a national level, a DMP 
has only been implemented for diabetes, incorporating guidelines for cardiovascular 
risk assessment [75]. This was accompanied by a PFC payment scheme as physicians 
received an initial premium (€53) upon patient enrolment in DMP and a quarterly pay-
ment (€25) to supplement the traditional FFS. GPs qualified for providing DMPs if they 
participated in a basic training regarding care coordination, and attended refreshment 
courses. Additional courses on patient education were optional, for which physicians 
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would receive an additional remuneration. In Austria, there is no choice of insurer or 
competition among health insurance funds, as insurance is mandatory and contingent 
on place of residence or employer [32].
In Denmark, the Administrative Reform was initiated in 2007 to reallocate responsi-
bilities between state, regions, and municipalities regarding decisions, financing and 
tasks [138]. This broad reform included the reallocation of responsibilities in the health 
care sector between five newly established Danish regions (reduced from originally 
14 regions) and municipalities [23]. It was targeted at both regions and municipalities, 
promoting a PFC scheme on regional level. The idea was that a combination of re-
gional coordinators, (non-) financial incentives and interdisciplinary care teams would 
improve continuity and coordination of chronic care services thereby increasing cost-
effectiveness and quality of care provided [74]. Regions were provided with €70 million 
to improve chronic care by implementing comprehensive, well-evaluated programs, 
and municipalities were responsible for co-financing them [74]. Fifteen percent of 
each regional healthcare budget was allocated to integrated care activities, rewarding 
municipalities that successfully reduced the need for hospitalization through providing 
efficient preventive treatment and care [74,77,139]. Under the 2007 reform, municipali-
ties were co-financing hospital care for their citizens and therefore had a financial incen-
tive to promote preventive and integrated chronic care. There is no choice of insurer, 
and regions are responsible for organizing health services according to region specific 
demands and facilities [74].
In France, the Health Insurance Reform Act (2004) was an initiative targeting the pri-
mary care sector to promote the expanded use of DMPs. It was initiated as a negotiation 
between the social health insurance and the association of GPs. The aim of this program 
was to improve quality of care, patient monitoring, promote continuous medical educa-
tion to communicate treatment guidelines to care providers, alleviate financial burden 
associated with unnecessary procedures, and strengthen the role of the GP [23]. The GPs 
got a supplement of €40 per patient enrolled in a DMP for care coordination, received 
self-education and training programs and experienced reduced waiting times in their 
practices. Further, CAPI (roughly translated to contracts for the improvement of indi-
vidual practice) was launched as a voluntary pilot in 2009 and expanded in 2012 [84]. 
It was a PFP scheme in which GPs were rewarded financially for adequately registered 
patient records and for following evidence based guidelines. GPs could possibly get 
€6,000 annually (30% of their base salary), and 90% of them participated in the CAPI 
scheme in 2012.
In Germany, the Risk Structure Compensation Reform Act (2002) reaffirmed a global 
payment system targeting both primary and secondary care sectors. The wide implemen-
tation of DMPs in Germany began in 2003 when DMP registration became an additional 
risk adjuster [99]. This provided financial incentives to insurers to set-up as many DMPs 
Impact of financial agreements in European chronic care on health care expenditure 75
as possible and to contract as many physicians as possible because they could benefit 
up to €1,000 per patient by cutting down costs via the implementation of DMPs [80,82]. 
This risk-adjusted compensation aimed on one hand to avoid cream-skimming by the 
insurers at the expense of chronic ill patients and on the other hand to promote DMPs, 
which were believed to improve quality of chronic care [77,78]. Initially, DMPs existed 
for breast cancer, diabetes, coronary heart disease, asthma, and COPD and expanded 
to almost all chronic conditions [12]. Insurers who engaged chronically ill patients in 
DMPs were provided with additional remuneration for coordination costs (PFC) [77], in 
addition to the risk-adjusted compensation for health care coverage. The insurer could 
also reduce and/or waive co-payments to attract chronic patients to participate in DMPs 
[78]. Although this payment scheme targeted primarily health insurers with financial 
incentives and the remuneration of physicians did not change, care providers had an 
incentive to be contracted by insurers in order to increase their provided services. The 
Social Health Insurance-Competition Strengthening Act was implemented in 2007 to 
further strengthen and promote care integration [83]. It extended start-up financing for 
integrated care contracts until 2008, moved to include long-term care in integrated care 
contracts, and allowed non-medical healthcare professionals to contract with insurers 
[83]. In 2009, the risk adjustment scheme was updated to include morbidity indicators 
and thus, insurers receive higher remuneration for their chronically ill patients, regard-
less of DMP enrolment.
In the Netherlands, a bundled payment was piloted in 2007 with diabetes and ex-
panded in 2010 to include COPD and cardiovascular disease management [47,89,90]. 
The aim of these payment reforms was to improve coordination between providers, 
promote the use of DMPs, strengthen adherence to medical guidelines, and increase 
quality of patient records [91]. Under the new payment scheme, chronic care is coor-
dinated by groups of providers (called care groups) that implement DMPs organized 
in integrated centers in primary care or in groups of cooperating general practices, 
paramedical care givers and/or hospitals [47]. Insurers negotiated with care groups 
a predefined fee (bundled payment) that covered all care needed by a patient with a 
particular chronic disease for a year (excluding inpatient care, medication, medical de-
vices, and diagnostics). Then care groups negotiate with and subcontract individual care 
providers for the care delivery [91]. Negotiations generate significant price variations 
between care groups for a particular group of patients i.e. different prices for different 
diabetes DMPs, serving to promote competition-induced quality improvements, on the 
basis of, but not limited to, performance measures, which are described in national care 
standards [47,93]. Insurers are free to choose whether they contract care groups based 
on the bundled payment system, or instead provide care groups only with an additional 
payment for the organization, coordination, and transparency of care, while continuing 
to reimburse individual providers on basis of a blended payment (i.e. capitation and 
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FFS). Patients are free to choose their GP and can change insurance company annually, 
choosing the most relevant, but least costly package to suit their medical needs [91].
In England, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) was introduced in 2004 [85]. 
The QOF offered PFP contracts to GPs, by which GPs were rewarded additionally based 
on 146 performance indicators within four domains; clinical standards, organizational 
standards, patient experience, and additional services [86-88]. This aimed to enhance 
the quality of primary care provided according to national guidelines, and its imple-
mentation was justified by the success of various quality-improvement initiatives that 
had been introduced since 1991 [86]. In 2006, adjustments were made to the system, 
altering minimum and maximum payment thresholds, dropping, modifying, and intro-
ducing new indicators [88]. In 2009/10, further adjustments were made, adding new 
indicators for heart failure, chronic kidney disease, depression, and diabetes, removing 
two indicators from the patient experience domain, and adjusting the point values of 
several indicators [87]. Initially, £1.8 billion was designated to reward GPs by a possible 
25% salary increase, which was later increased to 30% [88]. Exception reports, through 
which GPs can decide to exclude patients from the calculation of certain irrelevant 
performance indicators, ensured a focus on relevant and appropriate targets [87,88]. 
Patients can use information, published by the NHS information center, to compare and 
choose a GP practice in which to enroll [88].
In Portugal, a 2006 reform updated the organization and funding mechanisms of 
primary care by introducing performance compensations (PFP), contracted annually 
and focused on vulnerable and high-risk patients [140]. Multidisciplinary teams (called 
USFs) rather than independent GPs were eligible, with targets relating to preventive care 
and chronic disease [141] . Their introduction aimed to improve care access, quality and 
continuity of care, satisfaction of care providers and patients and it was expected to lead 
to cost cuttings.
Moreover, in Hungary, the 1998 Act of Social Health Insurance Funds’ Budget (effec-
tively in place from 1999) reformed the payment system by introducing care coordina-
tion programs. In these programs, a coordinator (care organization, GPs, or hospital) 
was provided with financial incentives in the form of capitation fees (funded by social 
health insurance) to effectively manage the primary, secondary, and tertiary care for a 
specified population (initially up to 200,000 people) living in a specified area. This initia-
tive was aborted in 2008 [74]. In 2009, performance and quality based indicators were 
used to employ a bonus payment system for family physicians. Initially €1.1 million were 
invested for GP bonuses, however this was increased nearly tenfold to €10.9 million by 
2012 [142].
In Estonia, a PFP payment for ambulatory care was introduced in 2006, at which point 
there was 60% participation rate by GPs, which had increased to 80% by 2008 due to less 
stringent criteria for participation and increased financial incentives. The aim of this pay-
Impact of financial agreements in European chronic care on health care expenditure 77
ment scheme was to increase the quality and effectiveness of preventive services and to 
improve the monitoring of chronic diseases. The PFP system targeted GP performance 
in three main areas; disease prevention, monitoring chronic conditions, and increased 
professional competency. GPs could get up to €255 per month on top of their usual per 
capita payment [143] for meeting the performance indicators [144].
Table 1 includes 25 European OECD countries classified as intervention countries if 
they employed PFC, PFP, and/or all-inclusive payments or control countries if they did 
not adopt any of these financial agreements. The year of payment scheme adoption re-
fers to the year it became effective and not necessarily when the law was passed. When 
there was no information available about a country in the last years of our sample, we 
assumed that there was no change in the payment scheme considering that it would 
have been reported in the literature otherwise.
4.5.2 Impact of chronic payment reforms on health care expenditure
The results from the specification tests to determine the preferred model per outcome 
variable are presented in Table 2. The second column of this table shows that there 
is strong evidence for heteroscedasticity in almost all models, except for medication 
expenditure, indicating that robust estimations were necessary to be adopted in the 
analysis. In one model (outpatient expenditure) there was autocorrelation detected and 
therefore, cluster robust estimation was used. The BIC scores of each model are pre-
sented in the right half of the table. For the RT model the joint significances of the coun-
try dummies and the significance of the generalized Hausman test are also presented. 
The significance of the intervention group dummy is presented for the DT model. Based 
primarily on the BIC scores and cross-checked with the significance test, we selected the 
model (last column) that best fits each outcome variable (first column). The first panel 
of Table 2 presents the specification tests of the models without the time-lead variables 
and the second panel including them, as described in section 4.
The results from the different DID models are presented in Table 3 showing the im-
pact of the introduction of a financial agreement on health care expenditure in the first 
year of implementation. The first column of the table shows the categories of health 
care expenditure per capita and their mean growth (for both control and intervention 
countries). None of the financial agreements did significantly reduce the growth in total 
health care expenditure. Countries with a PFC agreements had 21.28 US$ or 30% (= 
-21.28/70.861) lower growth in outpatient expenditure. Moreover, countries which had 
introduced a PFP agreement had 64.50 US$ (87%) and 5.74 US$ (138%) less increase in 
hospital and administrative expenditure, respectively. The adoption of an all-inclusive 
agreement decreased the growth of outpatient expenditure by 216.60 US$ per capita 
1. 70.86 is the mean increase in outpatient expenditure per capita per year in US$ in all countries
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(306%). The model statistics in Table 3 point out that the preferred models explained 
58% of the variance in total health care expenditure per capita, 33% in outpatient 
expenditure, 18% in hospital expenditure, 26% in medication expenditure and 8% in 
administrative expenditure in health care. There was no indication of strong multi-
collinearity since the mean VIF was close to 2 (>1.00) in almost alle models, but the VIF 
for each covariate was far below10.
Table 3 Results from the main DID models
PFC PFP All-inclusive
N R2adj VIFEstimate Impact Estimate Impact Estimate Impact
Expenditure:
Total (μ=116.98) 1.63 1% -32.38 -28% 30.20 26% 335 0.58 1.81
Outpatient (μ= 70.86) -21.28* -30% 0.27 1% -216.60*** -306% 173 0.33 3.63
Hospital (μ=62.75) -17.68 -28% -64.50*** -87% -27.15 -43% 245 0.18 2.07
Medication (μ=15.43) -10.92 -71% 3.88 36% 4.43 29% 304 0.26 1.83
Administrative (μ=4.16) -0.40 -10% -5.74*** -138% 2.33 56% 254 0.08 2.11
* p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01; ***p-value<0.001; other covariates included in the model were: GDP, total 
employment in health care; the impact is calculated dividing the respective coefficient by the mean (de-
noted as μ) of the respective outcome variable
Table 4 Results from the time-lead DID models
Expenditure: Total Outpatient Hospital Medication Administrative
Estimate Impact Estimate Impact Estimate Impact Estimate Impact Estimate Impact
PFCt 4.43 4% -22.74* -32% -20.61 -33% -7.81 -51% -0.29 -7%
PFPt -33.37 -29% 1.38 2% -62.79*** -100% 4.35 28% -6.15*** -148%
ALLt 27.42 23% -215.15*** -304% -24.11 -38% 1.33 9% 2.23 54%
PFC1t -2.03 -2% 5.20 7% 9.24 15% 8.29*** 54% -2.87 -69%
PFP1t 24.98 21% 2.21 3% -40.10*** -64% -5.61 -36% -3.61*** -87%
ALL1t -70.53* -60% -19.55* -28% -12.51 -20% -40.04*** -259% 0.45 11%
PFC2t 38.90 33% 25.47 36% -14.56 -23% 81.88 531% 0.25 6%
PFP2t -8.30 -7% -17.44 -25% -72.74*** -116% 21.55 140% -5.10** -123%
ALL2t 30.30 26% -83.37** -118% -37.80 -60% -47.64 -309% 8.75*** 210%
PFC3t -11.21 -10% -27.70*** -39% -18.36 -29% 11.86 77% 1.29 31%
PFP3t -43.56 -37% -26.02 -37% -37.67*** -60% 15.91 103% -3.07** -74%
ALL3t 29.35 25% 40.17*** 57% 37.71 60% -13.86 -90% -2.70 -65%
N 335 173 245 304 254
R2adj 0.57 0.29 0.15 0.25 0.05
VIF 1.68 3.02 1.88 1.70 1.91
* p-value<0.05; **p-value<0.01; ***p-value<0.001; other covariates included in the model were: GDP, total 
employment in health care; the impact is calculated dividing the respective coefficient by the mean of the 
respective outcome variable; ALL: all-inclusive
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The results from the DID models including the time-lead variables for the three finan-
cial agreements are presented in Table 4. PFP financial agreements had a sustainable 
negative impact on (i.e. reduced) the growth of hospital and administrative expendi-
ture, while all-inclusive financial agreements had a sustainable negative impact on the 
growth of outpatient expenditure. Moreover, the growth of medication expenditure 
was increased (by 8.29 US$ per capita) in countries with PFC agreements and decreased 
(by 40.04 US$ per capita) in countries with all-inclusive agreements in the year after 
implementation.
The combined effect of each financial agreement on the different expenditure cat-
egories during the four year after implementation is presented in Table 5. The cumula-
tive effect of PFP during the four years after implementation on the growth of hospital 
and administrative expenditure was -213.30 and -17.92 US$ per capita, respectively. 
Moreover, the cumulative effect of all-inclusive payments on the growth of outpatient 
expenditure was a decrease of 277.90 US$ per capita.
Table 5 Linear combined effect of each payment after 4 years of implementation
Expenditure Payment Combined
estimate
Standard error p-value 95% CI
Total PFC 30.10 60.19 0.624 -97.49 157.69
Total PFP -60.25 45.32 0.202 -156.33 35.83
Total ALL 16.55 62.73 0.795 -116.43 149.53
Outpatient PFC -19.77 23.97 0.422 -70.58 31.04
Outpatient PFP -39.88 23.73 0.112 -90.20 10.44
Outpatient ALL -277.90 23.08 0.000 -326.83 -228.98
Hospital PFC -44.29 68.08 0.525 -188.61 100.03
Hospital PFP -213.30 14.61 0.000 -244.27 -182.33
Hospital ALL -36.71 66.34 0.588 -177.34 103.92
Medication PFC 94.21 71.26 0.205 -56.84 245.26
Medication PFP 36.20 18.97 0.074 -4.02 76.43
Medication ALL -100.21 71.51 0.180 -251.80 51.37
Administrative PFC -1.62 7.35 0.828 -17.20 13.96
Administrative PFP -17.92 1.90 0.000 -21.95 -13.90
Administrative ALL 8.73 7.35 0.252 -6.85 24.31
ALL: all-inclusive
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4.6 Discussion
This paper has identified European countries that have implemented financial agree-
ments to facilitated integrated chronic care and provided tangible evidence of their 
impact on health care expenditure.
The results from the main DID models showed that at the year of implementation, 
PFC decreased the growth of outpatient expenditure while PFP decreased the growth 
of hospital and administrative expenditure. Further, countries with all-inclusive financial 
agreements had a decreased growth of outpatient expenditure. Considering the cumu-
lative impact of the financial agreements on all expenditure categories in the four years 
following their implementation, PFP decreased hospital and administrative expenditure 
while all-inclusive agreements decreased outpatient expenditure.
It is noteworthy that the three types of financial agreements had an immediate im-
pact on outpatient, hospital or administrative expenditure and in many cases this impact 
continued in the following three years after implementation. In contrast, the impact of 
financial agreements on total and medication expenditure was delayed. However, in the 
case of all-inclusive agreements the impact in the first three years was not in the same 
direction as the impact in the fourth year after implementation. This indicates that it 
takes more than a year for the effects to become fully apparent and that the effects may 
decrease over time. This may also raise questions about actions taken by insurers or 
health care providers to compensate for any intended cost reduction.
Moreover, PFC appeared to substantially decrease outpatient expenditure (by 30%) 
at the year of implementation. This is in accordance with the literature that found care 
coordination programs cost-saving [145]. In contrast, PFC increased the medication 
expenditure a year after the implementation year. This might be explained by optimiza-
tion of drug treatment and improved adherence due to early diagnosis and monitoring 
of chronic patients achieved by better coordination of care providers. Furthermore, PFC 
agreements were in many cases combined with all-inclusive or PFP agreements. These 
combinations might be interesting to take into consideration when reforms in chronic 
care are designed because one financial agreement might compensate for the potential 
adverse incentives of another financial agreement.
Furthermore, PFP appears to have the strongest ability to tackle the growth of hospi-
tal. This might be attributed to direct financial incentives that PFP provides to providers 
to improve quality of care delivered, enhance efficiency, and encourage collaboration 
between primary and secondary care [70]. Walker et al. [94] demonstrated that the 
PFP agreements implemented in the UK was cost-effective in terms of cost per quality 
adjusted life years. However, a systematic literature review of PFP agreements in chronic 
care only showed small positive effects on quality of care but, there was no evidence 
available for the effects on health care costs [146]. Previous experiences with such finan-
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cial agreements in the US might raise some concerns about the full reliance on PFP and 
therefore, it is suggested to be implemented as a valuable component of a more global 
payment model [43,147] such as bundled payments [72].
The all-inclusive financial agreements appear to decrease the growth of outpatient 
expenditure substantially. It should be explicitly mentioned that the bundled payment 
in the Netherlands targeted health care providers, while the global payment in Ger-
many primarily provided financial incentives to health insurers. Although, there were 
concerns about the implementation of global payment in Germany with regards to 
supply induced demand [82], distorted competition between health insurers [80], and 
its volatile implementation [81], a recent empirical study found cost-savings after its 
implementation [148]. Concerning the recent implementation of bundled payments in 
the Netherlands, there is little evidence about its impact on health care expenditure and 
a debate about moving to a global payment system with shared-saving incentives is in 
process [93] following recent examples from the US [149].
This study investigated the impact of financial agreements on health care expenditure 
only three years after their implementation. This time-window was selected based on 
the data availability after the last implemented agreement of interest (i.e. bundled pay-
ment in the Netherlands was introduced in 2010 and the dataset extends up to 2013). 
However, the effects of integrated care in terms of reduced hospitalizations and compli-
cations are expected to increase in the longer term. Adequate financial agreements are 
necessary to provide the right incentives to achieve integration of chronic care [74] and 
therefore, the cost-reducing potential of integrated chronic care will not spread widely 
in the health care system without substantial change in financial arrangements [129].
The strengths of this study include the innovative character of analysing empirically 
the impact of financial agreements for integrated chronic care on health care expen-
diture, the adoption of DID models that are suitable for evaluating policies on country 
level, and the combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods that give 
a comprehensive understanding of the financial agreements and their impact. Never-
theless, this study has also limitations. First, we could not control for the non-financial 
policies but we assumed that these policies would be equally probable to have been 
implemented in the intervention and control countries. This assumption is supported 
by the fact that the DT model, which distinguished the health care expenditure trends 
between intervention and control countries, did not have a better fit. Second, it was not 
possible to distinguish between the impact of the bundled payment system and the 
global payment system because there was only one country that had implemented each 
one of them and in the case of the bundled payment, the observations were limited to 
only the last three years of the dataset. Third, we did not assess the impact of financial 
agreements on other outcomes, such as health outcomes, continuation of care, and 
implementation of guidelines, due to the lack of data. Fourth, we did not include an age-
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structure variable in our models to control for healthcare demand because the missing 
observations in the variable “percentage of population older than 65 years” reduced the 
sample size used in the regressions too much. However, we run the models including 
this variable and the results remained the same.
Future research may investigate the impact of financial agreements on a wider range 
of outcomes in the longer term using a larger dataset with more observations after 
implementation of a payment scheme.
4.7 Conclusions
Financial agreements are potentially powerful tools to stimulate the delivery of 
integrated care and influence health care expenditure. PFP and all-inclusive financial 
agreements have the potential to reduce substantially the growth of health care ex-
penditure. It also appears that PFC has the potential to reduce outpatient health care 
expenditure. Therefore, a blended payment scheme that combines elements of PFC, 
PFP, and all-inclusive payments is likely to provide the strongest financial incentives to 
control health care expenditure. Such a payment could follow examples from the US 
where payments include a yearly risk-adjusted tariff for the costs of chronic patients 
in primary and secondary care (as in global payments), cover the costs of coordination 
between care providers (as in PFC), and depend on performance indicators (as in PFP) 
following the footsteps of initiatives in the U.S [150].
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Abstract
Disease management programs include a wide variation of patients with different 
chronic diseases and different health care utilization. The aim of this article was to iden-
tify factors on patient-level and organizational-level that explain the variability in costs 
of patients with different chronic diseases enrolled in a DMP by employing a rigorous 
analytical model. A generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) was specified to perform a 
multi-level analysis of cross-sectional hierarchical data from 16 DMPs in the Netherlands. 
Multiple imputation, sub-group analysis per disease and analysis from both the health 
care and the societal perspectives were also performed. Our model showed that age, 
the presence of cardiovascular disease, multi-morbidity and payments on top of the 
payment for the usual care had positive relation with costs, while better quality of life 
was associated with lower health care costs. In the COPD sample, physical activity and 
employment were associated with health care costs. Our study showed that there is 
great variability in health care costs among patients included in DMPs and identified 
patient and organizational explanatory factors. The findings are relevant to the design 
of future DMPs and their payment schemes.
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5.1 Introduction
Many governments around the world have promoted the implementation of disease 
management programs (DMPs) as a means of improving the effectiveness and efficiency 
of health care for the growing number of patients with a chronic disease [23,47]. Schri-
jvers (2009) defines these programs as ‘a group of coherent interventions designed to 
prevent or manage one or more chronic conditions using a systematic, multidisciplinary 
approach and potentially employing multiple treatment modalities’ [24].
Many European countries have implemented payment schemes to support the 
development and implementation of DMPs [151]. In the Netherlands, a bundled pay-
ment scheme was introduced in 2010. Under this scheme, health care insurers purchase 
chronic care from DMP providers based on a predefined price for an expected case-mix 
of chronic patients. This price is negotiable between the two parties, it is paid on a yearly 
basis per patient included in a DMP, it is not risk-adjusted and it includes mainly primary 
care and coordination costs [47].
Apparently, apart from the intervention provided by a DMP, the case-mix of patients 
included in a DMP determines the financial viability of DMP providers. This is because 
the negotiated price could be lower than the actual costs, if the case-mix of patients is 
not correctly anticipated. In other words, the variation of participants in DMPs could 
cause large heterogeneity in health care costs of DMPs. Therefore, the relation patient 
case-mix with health care costs should be taken into account from DMP providers when 
negotiating a fixed price per patient. Although there are different strategies to identify 
the risk profiles of patients for enrolment in DMPs, using a combination of both clinical 
and economic criteria, applications in the literature can be barely found [152]. From an 
economic perspective, this is amplified by the weak statistical analysis of cost data in 
previous studies of DMPs. Most studies have only studied the impact of patient-level 
characteristics on costs [55,61] or they have not considered the usually skewed health 
care cost data [63,153].
The aim of this article is to identify factors on patient-level and organizational-level 
that explain the variability in costs of patients with different chronic diseases enrolled 
in a DMP by employing a rigorous analytical model. We focus on Dutch patients with 
an increased cardiovascular risk profile (CVR), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD) or diabetes mellitus (DM).
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5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Theoretical model of factors affecting health care costs
The selection of relevant covariates included in the analysis was based on the model 
developed by Andersen and Newman (2005), which was further adjusted for the pur-
pose of our analysis [154]. The model assumes that the level of health care utilization per 
person depends on (1) predisposing factors including demographic, social-structural 
and attitudinal-belief factors, (2) enabling conditions that make health service resources 
available to the individual and (3) (perceived) illness level.
As predisposing factors, we included age, gender, educational level, employment 
and marital status. We extended the predisposing factors by adding behavioural fac-
tors including level of physical activity, smoking status and self-efficacy [155]. Based on 
previous evidence, we hypothesized that older patients [156,157], females [158,159], 
current and former smokers [160], single persons [161,162] and individuals with lower 
educational level [163] have higher health care costs. In contrast, more physical activity 
[164], greater self-efficacy [165,166] and being employed [167] are negatively related to 
health care costs.
We also adjusted the enabling factors of Andersen and Newman’s framework to make 
them suitable for cost analysis in DMP’s keeping their original principles. Consequently, 
we defined enabling factors as elements that enable chronic patients to receive ad-
equate and high quality, multidisciplinary and integrated chronic care. These elements 
include the level of disease management and the presence of supplementary funding 
for providing integrated care. Level of disease management was measured by the Patient 
Assessment of Chronic Illness Care (PACIC) [168]. Additional funding is defined as pay-
ments that are received on top of the payment for the usual care to stimulate integration 
of care. There is no clear evidence about the impact of these aspects on health care 
costs [59]. However, we hypothesized that the enabling factors have a positive relation 
with health care costs, at least in the short term, as they enable the utilization of more 
comprehensive chronic care that was not provided previously.
As illness level factors we chose quality of life as measured by the EQ-5D using the 
Dutch utility values [169], multi-morbidity as measured by the updated Charlson co-
morbidity index [170], and the presence of a diagnosed cardiovascular disease (CVD). 
We hypothesized that quality of life has a negative relation with health care costs [171] 
while multi-morbidity and CVD have a positive relation with health care costs (Wolff et 
al., 2002). We also included the target population of a DMP and expected that patients 
in COPD-DMPs have higher health care costs than patients in CVR- or DM-DMPs. The 
definition, operationalization and range of scores of the covariates used in the analysis 
are presented in Table 1.
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5.2.2 Data and settings
The data was collected as part of a large evaluation study of 22 DMPs in the Netherlands 
[128]. It was a cross-sectional study of patients who have enrolled in DMPs. On the 
patient-level, a questionnaire was distributed to individuals recently enrolled in 9 CVR-, 
4 COPD- and 3 DM-DMPs. The remaining DMPs addressed other diseases not included 
in this study. The CVR-DMPs included patients who were at risk for developing CVD and 
patients who had already been diagnosed with CVD. The questionnaire asked about 
health care resource utilization (including healthcare provider contacts, hospitalization 
and medication) in the past 3 months, quality of life, quality of care, self-efficacy, physi-
cal activity and socio-demographic characteristics. In addition, questions about absence 
Table 1 Covariates used in the analysis: definition and measurement
Determinants Patient-level Organization-
level
Measurement and operationalization H1*
Predisposing Age Age of the respondent in years at the time of 
questionnaire completion
+
Smoking A series of three dummy variables for smoking 
(never smoker, current smoker and ex-smoker - 
reference group is never smoker)
+
Gender 0 male; 1 female +
Educational level 0 high education; 1 low education (defined as no or 
only primary education)
+
Physical activity Number of days per week physical active for more 
than 30 minutes
−
Employment 0 not employed; 1 employed −
Marital status 0 not single; 1 single (including never married, 
divorced, widow/er)
+
Self-efficacy Component of the Self-Management Ability Scale 
with 0 being worst and 100 being best score [155]
−
Enabling DM level (patient 
perspective)
PACIC measurement scale with 1 being worst and 5 
being best score [168]
+
Additional 
financing
0 no additional payment for integrated care and 1 
additional payment or bundled payment [47]
+
Illness level Quality of Life EQ-5D utility scale, -0.59 (lowest) to 1 (highest) [169] −
Multi-morbidity The Charlson comorbidity index, 0 (lowest) to 42 
(highest) [170]
+
Cardiovascular 
disease
0 without existence of diagnosed cardiovascular 
disease; 1 with existence of diagnosed 
cardiovascular disease
+
CVR/DM-DMP 0 not included in a CVR- or DM-DMP (thus included 
in a COPD-DMP); 1 included in a CVR- or DM-DMP
−
* Research hypothesis (H1): relation of covariates with health care costs is (+) positive or (−) negative.
DM: Disease Management, PACIC: Patient Assessment of Chronic Illness Care, EQ-5D: Euro-QoL 5 dimen-
sions
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from paid employment or reduced productivity due to illness while at work, and travel-
ling expenses of patients to the healthcare providers were asked. Information about the 
presence of additional funding to cover the specific elements of integrated care was 
collected separately during interviews with the head managers (project leaders) of the 
DMPs.
In our analysis, the health care costs from the health care perspective included the 
costs of (a) healthcare provider contacts including general practitioner (GP), nurse, 
assistant GP, specialist, physiotherapist, dietist, podotherapist, speech-therapist, ergo-
therapist, (b) hospitalization including intensive care units and (c) medication for CVR, 
COPD and DM. The costs of travelling to care providers born by patients and the costs of 
productivity loss due to illness estimated using the friction method [172] were added to 
estimate the costs from the societal perspective. All costs were inflated to 2012 values.
The 16 DMPs were spread across different regions of the Netherlands, but they were 
all managed by care groups in primary care or in outpatient clinics of hospitals [128]. 
Although the services included in the integrated care package differed between the 
DMPs, most programs included collaboration between different disciplines of health 
care professionals and a redesign of the care-giving process to improve chronic care 
management. They provided mostly interventions such as self-management educa-
tion and training directed at life-style improvement, support with implementation of 
guidelines and protocols, integration of information systems, training for health care 
providers, case management and reallocation of tasks between care providers [128].
5.2.3 Statistical analysis
Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) were used to perform a multi-level nonpara-
metric analysis. This analysis was performed to facilitate (a) covariates on patient and 
organizational-level, (b) correlated health care costs of patients clustered in a DMP and 
(c) traditionally right-skewed health care costs data. During the last decade, GLMMs have 
been increasingly used in health care literature [173-177]. GLMMs were also selected 
because they overcome limitations of OLS and two-stage models by avoiding with 
ad-hoc adjustments for skewed data and accommodating zero observations for costs 
simultaneously [157,178-180,180-183]. The GLMMs were specified using unstructured 
covariance matrix, lognormal distribution and identical link function. A detailed descrip-
tion of the model selection is provided in Appendix.
Three models were specified in the main analysis using the complete case sample (n 
= 1906). Model 1 consisted of the random intercepts without any covariates. In Model 
2 all covariates (as presented in Table 1) and the random intercepts were included to 
investigate their effects on health care costs simultaneously. Model 3 was specified 
starting from an empty model (only random intercepts) and then adding covariates 
one-after-the-other to get the model that best fits to the data. The inclusion of a covari-
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ate was based on the likelihood ratio (or deviance) test that is suitable to compare the 
goodness-of-fit of models with nested covariate structure and same covariance matrix, 
distribution function and link function [184]. We first included the covariates of Model 2 
that were not significantly related to health care costs. This was done to examine which 
of these covariates had a significant effect on health care costs and which had not, 
before adjusting for other covariates that were highly significant.
Furthermore, we performed a sub-group analysis by applying Model 2 to the three 
different disease populations included in the analysis, namely Model2-CVR, Model2-
COPD, Model2-DM. Model 2 is selected for the sub-group analysis by disease because 
we were interested in investigating the effects of all covariates on health care costs in 
the three patient groups. Similarly, we used Model 2 to investigate the differences in the 
effects of all covariates between the societal perspective and the health care perspec-
tive. The model for costs from the societal perspective was named Model2-SP.
Regarding missing data, we performed a descriptive analysis of the cost data for the 
covariates that had missing values to explore the potential bias, if the incomplete cases 
(n = 952) were excluded from the analysis. A multiple imputation using the Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method was used to impute the missing observations [185]. The 
imputation was performed separately for each type of disease and DMP and generated 
10 complete data sets. Then we fitted model 2 and 3 in our analysis to the 10 imputed 
data sets named Model 2-MI and Model 3-MI, respectively. All analyses were performed 
in SAS 9.2.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Sample characteristics
The sample characteristics by disease are presented in Table 2. The COPD sample includes 
proportionally more smokers and ex-smokers, patients with low educational level, un-
employed patients and single patients than the other two samples. COPD patients are 
older, have higher Charlson co-morbidity scores, lower quality of life and self-efficacy 
scores, and higher costs compared to the CVR and DM samples. Compared to the DM 
sample, the CVR sample contains more patients with a cardiovascular disease, but the 
Charlson co-morbidity scores and the costs are lower. On the organizational-level, all 
DM-DMPs receive some form of additional funding for integrated care.
Figure 1 presents the health care cost categories included in the analysis by DMP. 
There is large variability in the total health care costs of patients and the break-down of 
these costs into different categories.
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Table 2 Sample characteristics by disease
CVR COPD DM Total
(np=1538,rr=46%,
nDMP=9)
(np=909, rr=60%,
nDMP=4)
(np=411, rr=59%,
nDMP=3)
(np=2858, rr=52%,
nDMP=16)
Age** 64.0 (10.2) 66.1 (10.6) 64.6 (10.2) 64.7 (10.4)
Females 48 % 47% 44% 47%
Smokers** 20 % 39 % 21 % 26 %
Ex-smokers 46% 48 % 43 % 46 %
CVD** 24 % 13 % 10% 19 %
Charlson index** 1.6 (1.6) 2.6 (1.7) 2.5 (1.7) 2.1 (1.7)
Low educational level** 39 % 49 % 25 % 40 %
Employment** 42 % 33 % 40 % 39 %
Single* 26 % 33 % 30 % 29 %
Physical activity 4.9 (2.1) 4.7 (2.2) 4.7 (2.1) 4.8 (2.2)
EQ-5D** 0.81 (0.20) 0.77 (0.22) 0.81 (0.20) 0.80 (0.21)
PACIC** 2.8 (0.9) 2.9 (0.9) 3.2 (0.8) 2.9 (0.9)
Self-efficacy* 68.5 (16.3) 67.2 (17.8) 69.7 (17.0) 68.3 (16.9)
Additional financing 33% 75% 100% 56%
Total costs HC 585 (2485) 1008 (2874) 540 (851) 713 (2468)
Total costs SP 889 (3003) 1268 (3210) 766 (1635) 992 (2924)
* p< 0.05 **p< 0.01; The table presents the mean (SD) unless otherwise indicated; CVD: cardiovascular 
disease, SES: socio-economic status, PACIC: Patient Assessment of Chronic Illness Care, EQ-5D: Euro-QoL 5 
dimensions, HCP: health care perspective, SP: societal perspective, rr: response rate
Figure 1 Break-down of 3-month health care and total costs by DMP
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5.3.2 Descriptive statistics
The results from the descriptive analysis are summarized in Table 3 and show that males, 
smokers, patients with a cardiovascular disease, people with low educational level, un-
employed and single had significantly higher costs than their counter groups from the 
health care and societal perspective. In addition, age (only from the health care perspec-
tive), multi-morbidity had a significant positive association with health care utilization 
and total costs, while physical active days, EQ-5D and self-efficacy were negatively cor-
related with costs. PACIC scores were not significantly correlated with health care costs.
Table 3 Health care costs by sample characteristics and perspective
Health care
perspective
mean (sd)
Societal
perspective
mean (sd)
Health care 
perspective
Spearman correlation 
with costs
Societal perspective
Spearman 
correlation with 
costs
Gender #
 female 661 (1688) 870 (2092) Age 0.11** 0.16
 male 746 (2960) 1099 (3485)
Smoking** Physical activity -0.08** -0.09**
 never 591 (2016) 847 (2561)
 quit 704 (1858) 945 (2337) EQ-5D -0.41** -0.38**
 yes 890 (3680) 1287 (4117)
CVD** PACIC -0.01 0.02
 yes 1286 (4318) 1664 (4726)
 no 581 (1761) 837 (2288) Self-efficacy -0.14** -0.14**
Low educ. level**
 yes 779 (2177) 1032 (2687) Charlson index 0.47** 0.44**
 no 691 (2748) 993 (3171)
Employment ##
 yes 592 (1888) 1264 (3102)
 no 800 (2837) 847 (2887)
Single*
 yes 889 (3760) 1169 (4021)
 no 647 (1684) 928 (2344)
* p<0.05 ** p< 0.01 # p<0.05 from health care perspective and p<0.01 from SP ## p<0.01 only from 
health care perspective
5.3.3 Results from the GLMM using complete cases
5.3.3.1	 Main	GLMM	results.
The results from the analysis of the complete cases (np=1,906, nDMP=16) are presented 
in Table 4. Model 1, which is the model without covariates, had an intraclass correla-
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tion coefficient (ICC) of 7%, which means that 7% of the total variation in health care 
costs was due to variation in the mean costs of the 16 DMPs. In Model 2, which is the 
saturated model, the ICC had dropped to 0.3%, indicating that much of the variation 
in health care costs had been explained. The R12 of this model was 20%, indicating that 
20% of the variation in health care costs between individuals was explained. The R22 
was 85%, indicating that 85% of the variation in health care costs between the DMPs 
was explained. Age, the presence of a CVD, the Charlson co-morbidity score, the EQ-5D 
utility, additional funding for integrated care and CVR- or DM-DMPs were significantly 
related to health care costs. Specifically, an additional year of age increased costs by 1%, 
the presence of CVD by 43%, a unit increase in the Charlson co-mobidity index by 28%, 
while an increase of 0.1 in EQ-5D utility decreased health care costs by 7.4%. Moreover, 
the presence of additional funding in a DMP increased health care costs by 17%, and 
Table 4 Results from the complete case analysis
Fixed effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2-SP
exp(β) p exp(β) p exp(β) p exp(β) p
Intercept 290.67 <.001 571.58 <.001 355.49 <.001 676.61 <.001
Physical activity 1.01 0.640 1.01 0.501
Employment 0.94 0.364 0.93 0.312 1.29 0.001
Gender 1.06 0.511 1.04 0.597 0.98 0.798
Age 1.01 0.024 1.01 0.017 1.00 0.742
Smoker 0.95 0.496 0.99 0.926
ex-Smoker 1.04 0.550 1.04 0.646
CVD 1.43 <.001 1.43 <.001 1.48 <.001
Charlson index 1.28 <.001 1.28 <.001 1.29 <.001
Low educational level 0.94 0.156 0.93 0.285
Single 0.98 0.777 1.05 0.501
EQ-5D 0.26 <.001 0.27 <.001 0.26 <.001
PACIC 1.02 0.356 1.06 0.110
Self-efficacy 1.00 0.651 1.00 0.919 1.00 0.211
Additional financing 1.17 0.046 1.18 0.063 1.16 0.046
CVR/DM-DMP 0.69 0.001 0.73 0.008 0.72 <.001
Random effects
σ2e (residual) 1.7166 1.4674 1.4705 1.8269
σ2u0 (intercept) 0.1309 0.005081 0.007998 0.001716
ICC 7% 0.3% 1% 0%
R12 20% 20% 16%
R22 85% 83% 82%
AIC 6479.71 6181.76 6173.53 6597.2
Note: (np=1,906, nDMP=16); ICC = σ2u0 / σ2u0 + σ2e0
Exploring the variability of patient costs in disease management programs: a hierarchical modelling approach 99
patients who were included in CVR- or DM-DMPs had 21% lower costs that patients 
included in COPD-DMPs. The remaining covariates had no significant association with 
health care costs.
Model 3, which was the reduced model, fitted the data slightly better than Model 
2 because it had a smaller AIC, but it explained two percentage points of variance in 
costs between DMPs less than Model 2. Another interesting change in this model com-
pared to Model 2 was that additional funding for integrated care became statistically 
insignificant. However, the p-value of this covariate without using the robust estimator 
was 0.037, which leaves room for interpreting this covariate as of borderline significance.
Model2-SP shows that employment increased health care costs by 29%, which was 
as expected because only individuals with a paid job can have productivity loss due to 
illness absence. Another difference with the results from the health care perspective 
was that age is no longer significantly associated with health care costs. A similarity 
between the models from the two different perspectives was that additional funding for 
integrated care had almost the same effect size and p-value.
5.3.3.2	 Results	per	disease	and	from	a	societal	perspective.
The results from Model 2-CVR, Model 2-COPD and Model 2-DM are presented in Table 5. 
The presence of CVD, the Charlson co-morbidity score and the EQ-5D were significantly 
associated with health care costs in all three models. Additional funding of integrated 
care was independently associated with costs only in CVR patients. Physical activity had a 
minor but significant association with costs in COPD. Moreover, employment decreased 
health care costs by 23% in the COPD sample and was of borderline significance in the 
DM sample.
5.3.4 Results from descriptive analysis of missings
As Table 6 shows, 17% of the total sample had a missing observation in the physical ac-
tivity variable and less than 8% in all other covariates included in the analysis. Although 
the proportion of missing values was relatively low, the cases that had at least one miss-
ing observation in one of the covariates included in the analysis (noncomplete cases) 
seemed to be statistically different from the complete cases. In detail, the noncomplete 
cases were older, had lower quality of life scores and level of disease management, had 
less self-efficacy and included more females, more unemployed, more ex-smokers, more 
people with low educational level, and more singles compared to the complete cases. 
There were no missing values in costs as we assumed them to be 0 when no health care 
utilization was reported.
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Table 5 Results from the disease specific and from the societal perspective models
Fixed effects
Model 2-CVR
(np=1006, nDMP=9)
Model 2-COPD
(np=598, nDMP=4)
Model 2-DM
(np=302, nDMP=3)
exp(β) p exp(β) p exp(β) p
Intercept 277.05 <.001 474.23 0.017 120.78 0.099
Physical activity 1.02 0.230 0.98 0.044 1.01 0.815
Employment 0.98 0.839 0.77 0.025 1.26 0.062
Gender 0.95 0.579 1.16 0.163 1.16 0.222
Age 1.01 0.096 1.00 0.633 1.01 0.150
Smoker 1.05 0.713 0.78 0.148 1.07 0.647
ex-Smoker 0.99 0.932 1.05 0.770 1.12 0.344
CVD 1.41 <.001 1.45 0.019 1.47 0.040
Charlson index 1.28 <.001 1.21 <.001 1.28 <.001
Low educational level 1.01 0.936 0.87 0.173 0.95 0.565
Single 0.88 0.196 1.11 0.359 0.99 0.693
EQ-5D 0.14 <.001 0.51 0.009 0.26 <.001
PACIC 0.97 0.518 1.07 0.229 1.11 0.122
Self-efficacy 1.00 0.231 1.00 0.114 1.00 0.442
Additional financing 1.23 0.049 0.63 0.126 - -
CVR-DM
Random effects
σ2e (residual) 1.6246 1.4214 0.7611
σ2u0 (intercept) 2.96E-21 4.21E-19 4,1E-19
ICC 0% 0% 1%
R12 19% 15% 20%
R22 76% 65% 83%
AIC* 3389.67 1939.49 6173.53
* the AIC is not comparable between these 4 models because the sample population between the models 
is different
ICC = σ2u0 / σ2u0 + σ2e0
Table 6 Descriptive results from the incomplete case analysis
Covariate n missing % of N
complete cases
mean rank or %
non-complete cases
mean rank or % p value
Physical activity 486 17.0 1179 1217 0.27
PACIC 213 7.5 1337 1286 0.12
Age 176 6.2 1258 1545 0.00
Low educational level 167 5.8 34% low educ. level 55% low educ. level 0.00
Employment 130 4.5 59% unemployed 67% unemployed 0.00
Ex-smoker 91 3.2 51% non-ex-smokers 59% non-ex-smokers 0.00
Smoker 91 3.2 74% non-smoker 72% non-smoker 0.16
EQ-5D 78 2.7 1420 1326 0.03
Gender 76 2.7 44% women 54% women 0.00
Self-efficacy 40 1.4 1437 1352 0.01
Single 24 0.8 74% non-single 64% non-single 0.00
Note: N=2858; Higher mean rank indicates higher scores
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5.3.5 Analysis after imputation
Model 2-MI and Model 3-MI were fitted to the imputed dataset (np=28547, nDMP=16) as 
described in section ‘Results from the GLMM using complete cases’, and the results are 
presented in Table 7. Age, presence of a CVD, Charlson co-morbidity score, EQ-5D score 
and being included in a COPD-DMP instead of a CVR- or DM-DMP were significantly and 
similarly associated to costs as in the complete case analysis. Being an ex-smoker had a 
positive and almost significant association with costs in Model 2-MI. Additional funding 
of integrated care was not significantly related to health care costs.
Table 7 Results from the imputed data analysis
Fixed effects
Model 1-MI Model 2-MI Model 3-MI
exp(β) p exp(β) p exp(β) p
Intercept 267.62 <.001 381.35 <.001 363.52 <.001
Physical activity 1.01 0.544
Employment 0.95 0.442 0.95 0.384
Gender 0.96 0.552 0.94 0.239
Age 1.01 0.015 1.01 0.027
Smoker 1.01 0.908
ex-Smoker 1.12 0.064
CVD 1.37 <.001 1.37 <.001
Charlson index 1.30 <.001 1.31 <.001
Low educational level 1.00 0.968
Single 0.96 0.520
EQ-5D 0.25 <.001 0.26 <.001
PACIC 1.04 0.216
Self-efficacy 1.00 0.809 1.00 0.844
Additional financing 1.12 0.201 1.12 0.191
CVR/DM-DMP 0.70 0.001 0.71 0.001
Random effects
σ2e (residual) 1.9818-1.9855 1.6956-1.7058 1.7019-1.7119
σ2u0 (intercept) 0.1553-0.1554 0.01413-0.015680 0.0207-0.2266
ICC 7% 1% 1%
R12 20% 19%
R22 79-80% 75-77%
AIC* 9995.37-10118.17 9555.67-9683.95 1939.49
(np=28547, nDMP=16)
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5.4 Discussion
In this article, we have developed an appropriate model to incorporate skewed health 
care cost data in a multi-level analysis by employing a GLMM. Our results indicate that 
there is large variability in the health care and total costs per patient and the break-
down of these costs into different categories. This variation is present between DMPs 
but also within one DMP for a particular disease. In bivariate analyses, we found that 
each covariate was significantly associated with health care costs, except for the patient-
perceived level of disease management as measured with the PACIC. The latter is not 
surprising because patients completed the questionnaire shortly after they had been 
enrolled into the program.
In the multivariate analysis, we found that being older, the presence of CVD, scoring 
higher on the Charlson comorbidity index, the presence of additional financing of inte-
grated care and being included in a COPD-DMP instead of a CVR-DMP or DM-DMP was 
associated with an increase in health care costs, whereas scoring higher on the EQ-5D was 
associated with a reduction in health care costs. The higher costs in COPD-DMPs can be 
explained by the severity of the disease itself (reflected in a lower EQ-5D score and lower 
employment rate) in comparison with CVR and DM instead of differences in the DMPs. 
These findings were similar for the complete case analyses and the analyses after imputa-
tion of missing data, and they confirmed the hypotheses presented in section ‘Theoretical 
model of factors affecting health care costs’. Furthermore, there are no major changes in 
the effect sizes and significances of these covariates in the reduced model. The covariates 
employment, gender and self-efficacy contributed to the better fit of the reduced model, 
although they were not statistically significant in the final reduced model.
Surprisingly, the covariate for age is not significant in any of the disease-specific mod-
els, while the same covariate is significant in the overall sample. A possible explanation 
is that the age of the patients who are enrolled into one of the DMPs for a particular 
disease is more homogeneous than the age of the total sample. This is confirmed by 
the smaller coefficients and SEs of age in the three disease samples comparing to the 
total sample. Another support for this argument is that the statistical power for age is 
above 97% in all three disease populations, which rejects the possibility of having a 
nonsignificant age-covariate in the three samples due to small samples.
It is also interesting that physical activity and employment were independently as-
sociated with lower health care costs in the COPD sample only. This is probably related 
to the fact that, in the COPD sample, only 33% of the patients reported to have paid 
employment, whereas this was 40% and 42% in the diabetes and CVR sample.
The presence of CVD and the Charlson co-morbidity index had a strong positive 
association with health care costs in each of the disease groups. This was true also in 
the CVR group, where the Charlson co-morbidity Index was lower because this patient 
Exploring the variability of patient costs in disease management programs: a hierarchical modelling approach 103
population contains a considerable proportion of patients at risk of getting a CVD but 
without diagnosed CVD. This confirms that multi-morbidity is an important health care 
cost driver [157,170,186].
When the dependent variable is total costs from a societal perspective, employment 
becomes statistically significant, whereas the independent association between age 
and costs disappears. This can be explained by the fact that older patients with chronic 
diseases are less likely to have a paid job [167].
There were few differences in results between the complete case analysis and the 
analysis after imputation of missing data. Specifically, after multiple imputation, being 
an ex-smoker had a positive and almost significant association with costs, and addi-
tional funding of integrated care was no longer significantly related to health care costs. 
Although, these are not major differences, MI analysis is more statistically precise than 
the complete case analysis since the SEs are smaller than in the complete cases. How-
ever, imputing observations in a data set derived from a 52% response rate of a survey, 
as in this case, might be not enough to avoid biases. The relative low response rate is 
explained by the observational nature of the current study design and is a common 
phenomenon among cost and evaluation studies of DMPs [152]. Nevertheless, the mean 
age and percentage females included in each disease sample are similar to the overall 
Dutch population with the respective diseases.
Considering the predictive power of our models, a 20% value of R12 is in line with the 
per cent that health care cost models usually predict (i.e. ≤20%) [187]. Perhaps we could 
have explained more variance in health care costs between patients and DMPs, if clinical 
data on disease severity would have been included, but these were not available. In ad-
dition, we did not expect large differences in estimated mean costs per patient between 
the DMPs after adjusting for all covariates included in our model. This is confirmed by the 
R22 of about 85%, which could get even higher if more covariates on organizational-level 
were included. The 3 months recall period of the patient questionnaire is not considered 
as a limitation of this study since there is little association between the length of follow-
up and the variability in annualized health care costs [187].
The relatively small number of DMPs included in the analysis and the small variability 
in the type of financing between DMPs are considered as limitations of this study, which 
may become problematic when sub-group analyses are performed. However, the 16 
DMPs are considered to be representative of the DMPs that have been implemented the 
last 3 years in the Netherlands because (a) they cover all diseases for which DMPs have 
been implemented, (b) they include DMPs in primary and/or secondary care, (c) they 
cover a wide variety of different regions and geographic areas with different popula-
tion density and (d) they vary in disease management interventions and structure of 
multidisciplinary teams [128]. The study population per disease is also representative of 
the overall disease population in the Netherlands with respect to age and gender.
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Despite these limitations, our study presents reliable results and demonstrates a mod-
elling process of health care costs that can be followed in similar studies in the future. 
Further research can investigate whether other factors have a relation with health care 
costs of patients included in DMPs. Such factor could include, on the DMP level, the size 
of a DMP, the number and type of care providers involved in a DMP and the intensity (i.e. 
frequency and type of interventions) of DMPs. On patient-level, they may include prior 
health care utilization, disease perceptions and self-management behaviour. An inves-
tigation of cost patterns in patients with and without multi-morbidity focusing on the 
combination of morbidities could also be an interesting topic for further investigation.
5.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
There are four main concluding points emerging from this article.
• First, the variability in health care costs of chronic patients within and between DMPs 
found in this study urges for identifying its causes on patient and organizational-
level. This variation means that there is a sub-group of patients with high costs for 
which the potential cost savings due to DMPs may be higher. The causes of variability 
should be carefully considered when policies towards integration of chronic care by 
means of DMPs are being designed.
• Second, care providers and payers (e.g. health insurers) should seriously consider 
the variability in the target population of a DMP when negotiating about the price 
of care included in a DMP [47]. For instance, the significantly higher health care costs 
related to multi-morbidity and/or CVD should be adequately anticipated.
• Third, predictive modelling to identify the ‘most suitable’ potential enrolees in a DMP 
can improve the (cost) effectiveness of these programs. For instance, the inclusion 
of physical activity interventions in COPD-DMPs and the support of COPD patients 
to get or remain in employment can be potentially linked with reduced health care 
costs of these patients.
• Last, we found that providing additional funding to support integrated care may 
increase health care costs at least in the short term, which is in accordance with 
recent evidence in the Netherlands [93]. This relation should be further investigated 
and included in the process of redesigning the payment scheme of chronic care.
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Appendix 1 Specifying the generalised linear mixed models
In GLMMs the mean of the outcome variable (in our case costs) for the ith patient in the 
jth DMP is estimated as:
 E[Yij|bi] = μijSS
where the expected outcome Yij is conditional on a latent vector for subject specific 
deviation from the overall mean of the intercept or slope bi which equals the expected 
(subject specific) mean value μijSS. The expected mean value is estimated as
 g(μijSS) = XTijβ + ZTijbi, Yij|bi ~ F
where g is the link function that describes the scale on which covariates in the model 
are related to the outcome and F is the distribution function for the observed outcome 
(in this case costs) given bi. In the fixed part of the GLMM, XTij is a covariate vector (includ-
ing X0 for the ith patient in the jth DMP) and β is a vector of regression coefficients. The 
random part, consists of a vector of random effects ZTij and the vector for subject-specific 
deviation bi and has a normal distribution with zero mean and q × q covariance matrix G. 
In other words, the variance of the outcome Yij is given by
 COV(Yij|bi) = φ ν (μijSS)
where φ is the dispersion (or scale parameter) and ν is a known variance function.
Taking these formulas into account, the distribution function, the link function, the 
covariance matrix, the fixed and random effects should be specified in order to build 
a GLMM [184,185,188-192]. We followed this process and performed the econometric 
analysis by using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS 9.2.
We first specified a saturated model in the fixed part including all available covari-
ates in the analysis and then we specified the random part of the model. Choosing the 
variance function (ν) was the first step in building the model. We chose an unstructured 
covariance matrix because we specified a random intercepts model (not random 
slopes), which incorporates only the variance of the intercept [184]. Furthermore, we 
used marginal likelihood based on Gauss-Hermitte quadrature because the maximum 
likelihood estimation in the model should express the uncertainty about the bi, which 
is unobserved. This maximum likelihood estimation method works well for situations 
including one or two random effects and two to three clusters [189].
Moreover, the distribution and link function were specified. The literature suggests 
the gamma, inverse Gaussian, Weibull, lognormal, Poisson and exponential distributions 
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as possibly suitable distributions for costs, while identity, logarithmic, reciprocal, inverse 
square, and power are suggested as possible link functions [181,183]. Combinations of 
these distributions and link functions were made in order to choose the combination 
that fits the model most adequately to the data. Similar to previous studies [190], we 
compared the goodness-of-fit of models with the same fixed effects part (i.e. satu-
rated model) and different combinations of distribution and link functions by using the 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
The results from the combinations of link and distribution functions are presented 
below. It is clear that the combination of a lognormal distribution and an identity link 
function had the best fit, because it had the lowest AIC and BIC values. The residual 
diagnostics (e.g. normal and deviance plots of studentized residuals) were also best for 
this combination of distribution and link function. Hence, this combination was used in 
the GLMM analysis.
Goodness-of-Fit tests for combinations of distributions and links
Link Info criteria Gaussian Gamma Lognormal Expo
Identity (ID) AIC 35349.81 - 6181.76 -
BIC 35364.49 - 6196.44 -
Log AIC 33798.09 27889.51 6200.43 27901.12
BIC 33803.77 27904.19 6215.11 27915.03
note: the models with Inverse Gaussian, Poisson, and Weibull distributions did not converge in any in-
stance, thus they are not presented in this table
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Abstract
Background: In the Netherlands, disease management programs (DMPs) are used to 
treat chronic diseases. Their aim is to improve care and to control the rising expendi-
tures related to chronic diseases. A bundled payment was introduced to facilitate the 
implementation of DMPs. This payment is an all-inclusive price per patient per year for a 
pre-specified care package. However, it is unclear to which extent the costs of develop-
ing and implementing DMPs are included in this price. Consequently, the organizations 
providing DMPs bear financial risk because the development and implementation (D&I) 
costs may be substantial. The aim of this paper is to investigate the variability in and 
drivers of D&I costs among 22 DMPs and highlight characteristics that impact these.
Methods: The data was analyzed using a mixed methods approach. Descriptive statisti-
cal analysis explored the variability in D&I costs as measured by a self-developed costing 
instrument and investigated the drivers. In addition, qualitative research, including 
document analysis and interviews, was conducted to explain the possible underlying 
reasons of cost variability.
Results: The development costs varied from €5,891 to €274,783 and the implementa-
tion costs varied from €7,278 to €387,879 across DMPs. Personnel costs were the main 
component of development. Development costs were strongly correlated with the 
implementation costs (ρ = 0.55), development duration (ρ = 0.74), and number of FTEs 
dedicated DMP development. Organizations with large size and high level of care prior 
to the implementation of a DMP had relatively low development costs. These findings 
were in line with the cross-case qualitative comparison where programs with a longer 
history, more experienced project leadership, previously established ICT systems, and 
less complex patient populations had lower D&I costs.
Conclusions: There is wide variation in D&I costs of DMPs, which is driven primarily by 
the duration of the development phase and the staff needed to develop and imple-
ment a DMP. These drivers are influenced by the attributes of the DMP, characteristics 
of the target population, project leadership, and ICT involved. There are indications of 
economies of scale and economies of scope, which may reduce D&I costs.
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6.1 Background
In recent years, the healthcare community has been struggling to identify strategies 
to better manage the rise in the number of patients with chronic diseases. In the 
Netherlands, there has been a 17% growth in diagnoses of chronic disease and a 26% 
growth of patients with multiple chronic disease diagnoses in the past 8 years [193]. One 
possible method of managing the changes in healthcare that result from the increased 
diagnosis of chronic diseases is the D&I of disease management programs (DMPs), as has 
happened in the Netherlands. The Netherlands Organization for Health Research and 
Development (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Gezondheidsonderzoek en Zorginnovatie 
(ZonMw)) funded a research project to stimulate the implementation of DMPs and study 
their impact. Twenty-two healthcare delivery sites were awarded funding to participate 
in the study by developing and implementing a DMP; the majority of the sites were pri-
mary care cooperatives. In exchange for funding and support, each of the sites agreed 
to participate in research and put a DMP into place. Disease management was defined 
by the funding organization as:
 a broad programmatic approach to chronic diseases, and a comprehensive care chain 
of diagnosis, treatment and counseling, as well as prevention, early detection and 
self-management. The approach is based on multidisciplinary care standards and is 
organized around the patient and his condition, as much as possible, in conjunction 
with his surroundings. (Call for proposals, page 7)
In the programs proposed by the care delivery organizations and in the literature about 
DMPs, patients’ participation in the treatment and management of their condition is a 
key component of DMPs [194], as is the involvement of multiple medical professionals 
in care planning and delivery [25], and the development and implementation of infor-
mation systems (most frequently computer-based systems) to support chronic disease 
treatment and management [195]. The development of the DMPs at the selected sites 
included interventions altering the existing organization of healthcare delivery (e.g. 
regular multidisciplinary meetings and regular monitoring of patients) and interventions 
that were implemented as new processes (e.g. case management, self-management 
support, ICT). A more detailed description of the interventions is given in elsewhere 
[128].
In addition to funding for research on DMPs, the Netherlands has implemented a 
new financing system that impacted care for those with common chronic diseases (an 
overview of the Dutch healthcare system is provided in Appendix 1). In 2010, a bundled 
payment scheme was introduced in the Netherlands [47]. Bundled payment is a single 
payment that covers the multidisciplinary care required by a patient for one particular 
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chronic disease during a predefined period of time [42]. The aim of this payment scheme 
was to improve the access, comprehensiveness, continuity, and other aspects of quality 
of care for chronic patients and to control the increasing expenditures for healthcare for 
patients with a chronic disease. In the first year of this funding reform, only care for dia-
betes mellitus (DM), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and cardiovascular 
risk (CVR) could be contracted in a bundled payment. Under the new payment scheme, 
chronic care is coordinated by groups of healthcare providers (called ‘care groups’). The 
bundled payment is negotiated between care groups and health insurers and includes 
1) the costs of multiple caregivers in primary care (e.g. general practitioners, practice 
nurses, dieticians, physiotherapists, lifestyle counselor but not medicines, diagnostics 
and medical devices) as well as 2) the costs of care coordination, 3) information and 
communication technology (ICT), and 4) professional training and courses for health-
care providers. The latter three groups of costs can be seen as costs for the development 
and implementation (D&I) of DMPs.
Since DMPs involve a significant reorganization of healthcare delivery, they require 
substantial development costs (including but not limited to training costs, ICT costs, and 
costs of redesigning the care delivery process) and implementation costs (such as mul-
tidisciplinary team meetings, the costs of coordination between care-givers, the costs of 
monitoring and feedback). These costs are commonly carried by the organization that 
implements the program (i.e. care groups). To which extent the D&I costs of DMPs are 
included in the bundled payment is often unclear. This is despite recommendations to 
report these costs separately from the healthcare utilization costs and to include them 
in the price of implementing a DMP [48].
However, some insurers, including the largest one in the Netherlands, are not con-
vinced about the benefits of bundled payment and do not provide this type of funding. 
Rather, these health insurers provide an add-on payment to cover the D&I costs, whereas 
the cost of healthcare is funded as before. It is not clear how this add-on payment is 
defined and to what extent it covers the D&I costs [196]. Considering this uncertainty 
and taking into account the substantial D&I costs of a DMP, care groups need to be able 
to correctly anticipate the D&I costs. Failing to do so could be financially disastrous for 
the providers of DMPs and serves as a disincentive for the implementation of DMPs.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the variability in and drivers of D&I costs among 
various DMPs and highlight characteristics of the DMPs that may explain the variability 
in costs during the project period.
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6.2 Study setting
The research for this paper was conducted as part of an evaluation of 22 Dutch DMPs 
spread across different regions of the Netherlands [128]. The DMPs were categorized 
in CVR (n=9), COPD (n=4), DM (n=3), mental diseases (n=3), and other (n=3). The ‘other’ 
disease category includes DMPs for stroke, heart failure, and mix of CVR, COPD and DM. 
The Ethics Board of Erasmus University approved the data collection. All content has 
been anonymized.
6.3 Methods
We used a mixed-methods approach to analyze data on D&I costs. To this end, we used 
descriptive statistical analysis to explore the variability in D&I costs, as well document 
analysis and interviews with project leaders, managers, and professional care givers.
6.3.1 Quantitative methods
All development and implementation costs associated with the 22 DMPs were system-
atically collected. We developed a template that was based on the CostIt instrument 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) [197]. This template was completed during 
face-to-face interviews with DMP managers. During these interviews we also asked 
managers whether they had additional financing to cover the specific elements of 
disease management. The development costs included all costs made during the prepa-
ration phase of DMPs, e.g. labor costs for brainstorming sessions, training costs, and 
ICT support costs. The implementation costs included costs of multidisciplinary team 
meetings, coordination between care-givers, monitoring and feedback that occurred 
the year after the DMP implementation. We collected the development and implemen-
tation costs regardless of the budget holder for their financing; the budget holders 
could include care groups, health insurers, and/or government. The labor costs were 
calculated using the full-time equivalents (FTEs), duration of involvement in the project 
and the gross salary of medical, administrative, ICT, management and other personnel. 
Operating costs (including costs of professional courses, information/ communication, 
licenses, and materials) were calculated based on volumes and unit prices as stated in 
the template. Capital costs (such as building and purchase of ICT) were calculated based 
on their volume (for buildings that was square meters) and unit prices (for buildings that 
was Euro per square meter) and they were amortized over their lifespan as suggested by 
the WHO [197]. In the analysis, we included the development costs during the develop-
ment phase, the annualized development costs, and the implementation costs in the 
year after implementation.
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In addition to D&I costs, we also collected data about the duration of the develop-
ment phase (in months), the number of patients participating in a DMP, the total FTEs 
available to the organization providing a DMP, and the FTEs dedicated to developing 
and implementing the DMP. The level of chronic care integration was also measured at 
the start of providing a DMP and a year later by using the Dutch translation of the Patient 
Assessment of Chronic Illness Care (PACIC) [168]. This questionnaire was distributed to 
participants of 19 DMPs (no data for the 3 mental disease DMPs was available). The mean 
PACIC value of the participants in each DMP was used in the analysis.
Descriptive statistics were used to investigate the variability in D&I costs among 
22 DMPs. Pearson correlation coefficients and Spearman correlation coefficients were 
calculated for normally distributed and non-normally distributed variables, respectively. 
The normality was tested based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test. We also performed 
an analysis of variance based on ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis estimates to explore differ-
ences in the development and implementation costs among disease categories. We also 
performed an analysis of variance to investigate differences in D&I costs among different 
payment methods during the development and implementation phases. The payments 
were categorized in normal (e.g. for GPs this is a mixture of fee-for-service and capitation 
payment), normal plus add-on payment for D&I costs, and bundled payment. Consider-
ing the small number of observations (n=22) we also looked into various associations 
using scatter plots and graphs.
6.3.2 Qualitative methods
In order to understand how various characteristics may influence the costs associated 
with the D&I of DMPs, we examined how program plans ‘travel’ from the grant proposal 
to the D&I of the DMPs [9], as well as what actually happened during the D&I phases of 
the program by exploring and analyzing the multiplicity of D&I in practice [198]. This 
approach enabled us to gain a deeper knowledge of the activities implicit in DMPs, 
including activities that influence how programs develop, how programs use the pro-
vided finances, and how project teams overcame (or not) difficulties in the early stages 
of programs.
Document analysis was the first step of the qualitative data collection. The documents 
analyzed included the grant applications and project plans submitted by project leaders, 
the call for proposals (Diseasemanagement chronische ziekten), and care organization 
websites. The documents were analyzed inductively to gain a better understanding of 
the DMPs, project leaders, and care providers. The content of the documents informed 
the development of the interview guide, which focused on D&I of DMPs in practice.
Two in-depth case studies were selected for this paper, which highlight the different 
D&I costs in the DMPs; 15 interviews with project leaders and clinicians were conducted 
and used in the case studies presented in this manuscript. Questions about the history 
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and contexts of the DMPs were asked. Interviews were digitally recorded and detailed 
notes and observations were also made during the interviews. Interviews were con-
ducted in Dutch or English and ranged from 30 minutes to 90 minutes. Interviews were 
transcribed and coded into themes. Quotes were translated by a native English speaker; 
the translations were later confirmed by a native Dutch speaker.
To better understand the variability in costs from a mixed methods perspective, the 
primary economic researcher (AT) and the primary qualitative researcher (BHW) met 
regularly and jointly reviewed the data. The economic and qualitative data have been 
integrated iteratively, after consensus by all authors. This was done through frequent 
meetings between the first two authors and the rest of the authorship team.
6.3.3 Ethics statement
The study protocol was approved by the ethics committee of the Erasmus University 
Medical Centre of Rotterdam (September 2009). For more details see Lemmens et al., 
2011 [128].
6.4 Results
Adequate understanding of complex policy structures and the impact of their change 
requires multiple types of information. Mixed-methods research facilitates this by com-
bining qualitative and quantitative research methods in order to identify, decompose, 
analyze, and understand complexities in healthcare [199]. Our research found a large 
variability in D&I costs between the researched DMPs. We uncovered three common 
characteristics of the studied DMPs that may explain the variability in costs between 
programs. These characteristics include attributes of the interventions, ICT systems, and 
the experience of the project leaders. The history of the programs, including personnel 
time invested and ICT systems already in place, may also play an important role in the 
variability in costs and is an underlying characteristic.
6.4.1 Variability in D&I costs and cost drivers
As Figure 1 shows, the development costs varied from €5,891 to €274,783 across DMPs 
and the implementation costs varied from €7,278 to €387,879 across DMPs. There was 
also large variation in D&I costs across DMPs in the same disease category. In some cases 
the development costs were higher than the implementation costs and in some other 
cases not. In addition, the four DMPs with the highest development costs among all 
DMPs also had the highest implementation costs. When annualized, the development 
costs varied also largely between and within disease categories and were also positively 
associated with the implementation costs.
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Personnel costs were the primary component of development costs across 18 of 22 
DMPs, accounting for more than 60% of total development costs (Figure 2). They were 
followed by ICT costs (maintenance and licensing) and the costs of professional courses 
as the main cost components of development costs.
The results from the descriptive statistical analysis are presented in Table 1. This table 
shows that our sample consisted of DMPs varying in the duration of the development 
phase (range: 3; 25 months), number of patients participating in the DMP (range 75; 
3,400), total number of FTEs in an organization (range 1; 2,850), and number of FTEs in-
volved in developing a DMP (range: 0.1; 2.5). The mean development costs were €75,832, 
the mean annualized development costs were €69,749 and the mean implementation 
costs were €100,827 across all 22 DMPs. The mean PACIC at implementation was 2.88 and 
a year later was 2.95. The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test showed that the variables ‘number 
Figure 1 Development and implementation costs per DMP
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of DMP participants, ‘organization FTEs’, ‘development costs’ and ‘PACIC at implementa-
tion’ and ‘PACIC a year later’ were not normally distributed.
The correlations between the D&I costs and potential cost drivers are presented 
in Table 2. Total development costs were strongly correlated with implementation 
costs (ρ=0.55), development duration (ρ=0.74), and number of FTEs dedicated to the 
development of a DMP (ρ=0.54). The latter was found to be correlated also with the 
development duration (ρ=0.49). The annualized development costs were correlated 
with the implementation costs (ρ=0.65) and number of FTEs for the development of a 
DMP (ρ=0.52). The results also showed a negative correlation between PACIC a year after 
implementation and development (ρ=-0.27) and implementation (ρ=-0.24) costs.
The relation between development costs and the total number of FTEs in the orga-
nization that provides a DMP is illustrated in Figure 3. This figure shows that large orga-
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Median Min Max IQR
Development duration (months) 12 6 12 3 25 6
Patients participating in DMP# 801 986 300 75 3,400 957
Organization FTEs# 433 841 33 1 2,850 256
DMP FTEs 0.76 0.58 0.60 0.10 2.50 0.63
Development costs# 75,832 72,727 49,972 5,891 274,783 85,917
Annualized development costs 69,749 47,807 48,141 7,855 198,188 66,704
Implementation costs 100,827 86,776 74,836 7,278 387,879 117,079
PACIC at baseline# (1-5 best) 2.88 0.29 2.81 2.25 3.60 0.35
PACIC at year 1# (1-5 best) 2.95 0.28 2.99 2.44 3.62 0.40
# The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test rejected the assumption of normally distributed data; SD: standard devia-
tion; min: minimum; max: maximum; IQR: interquartile range (Quartile 3-Quartile 1); FTE: full-time equiva-
lent; implementation costs accrued within the first calendar year of DMP implementation
Figure 3 Association between development costs and total number of FTEs in the organization
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nizations had relatively low development costs compared to small organizations. This 
relation remained between the annualized development costs and the total number of 
FTEs in the organization that provides a DMP (see Figure 4 in Appendix 2).
Figure 4 illustrates the relation between implementation costs and the number of 
patients participating in a DMP. We see that there might be a small negative relation 
between the two variables.
The results of the analysis of variance of D&I costs comparing different payment 
methods as well as different disease categories were not statistically significant. Figures 
illustrating these variances are presented in Appendix 2.
6.4.2 Characteristics of the disease management programs
While each of the practice sites had a different method of addressing chronic disease 
through the funded DMP, the qualitative research uncovered characteristics that help 
to understand the differences in D&I costs. These characteristics include attributes of 
the DMP, ICT systems, and the experience of the project leadership teams. Qualitative 
data from two case studies will illustrate these characteristics. The diabetes case (DMP 
number 17) had relatively low D&I costs, while the CVRM case (DMP number 10) had 
high D&I costs.
6.4.2.1	 Case	study:	Diabetes	(DMP	number	17)
One of the project sites with a focus on adult-onset diabetes developed a DMP for clini-
cians and patients. The clinicians and project leaders at the site have invested time and 
Figure 4 Association between implementation costs and number of patients participating in a DMP
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effort in improving diabetes care for patients since 1999 by working in cooperation with 
the hospital and specialists, developing care protocols, and contracting with providers. 
Around 2006, the changes in diabetes care were formalised into an early form of disease 
management. The studied program was a continuation of a previously funded program. 
This site had two project leaders, the first of which was hired for the previously funded 
program to assist with the development of an electronic medical record and stayed on 
through most of the funded DMP. The first project leader was a professional healthcare 
consultant with a background in economics. The second (and current) project leader 
was the assistant of the first and took over the project leadership when the first project 
leader left, after a period of mentored transition.
Program attributes
For the disease management study, the project leaders worked with healthcare pro-
fessionals to change how they thought about care and creating multidisciplinary care 
teams, implemented an updated networked electronic medical record system with a 
patient portal, and oversaw self-management education for patients.
The multidisciplinary care teams included nurse specialists, dieticians, general practi-
tioners, nurses, chronic disease specialist assistants, ophthalmologists, podiatrists, and/
or internists; members of the care team were located in multiple GP and specialist offices 
throughout the region. The care team worked together, communicating with each other 
frequently.
	 I	think	that	working	closely	with	the	dietitian	especially...	We	sit	together,	we	discuss	a	lot,	
and	we	can	call	the	GP	or	practice	nurse,	and	yes,	several	people	are	looking	[at	the	case]. 
(Interview with diabetes specialist nurse)
Communication was seen as key to coordinating care. It was common for the staff, such 
as doctors, nurses, dieticians, and other clinical professionals, of disease management 
teams to sit together in a shared office and communicate about patients and care; how-
ever, this was not the only way that communication happened. The diabetes program 
had regular meetings with clinical professionals from multiples GP offices with the 
project leader overseeing the meetings. The project leader also sent out emails, reports, 
and posted information about the DMP online. Clinicians also communicated with one 
another through the networked electronic medical record. This system of coordinated 
care has been developed by investing in time for the project leader and clinician stake-
holders over the years of the program.
One of the efforts of this disease management project focused on self-management 
through educating patients about diabetes. There were a variety of formal and informal 
educational opportunities for patients: group classes, clinical visits, and online. Patients 
could participate in voluntary classes, which were led by a nurse, doctor, and/or non-
physician chronic disease specialist assistant. Clinicians were trained to lead by experts 
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in diabetes education, an additional D&I cost-item which was hoped to be recouped in a 
reduced need for individual education sessions with patients. However, the classes were 
no longer offered as a result of lack of patient interest and attendance.
Internet-based	communication	systems
For the diabetes project, as is the case for many medical practices, the full development 
and use of an electronic medical record (EMR) was a complicated process. The GP of-
fices involved in the diabetes project began working with software developers in 2006 
to develop a more-limited version of an EMR. The project leaders, especially the first 
project leader, worked with clinicians and software developers to enhance the record. 
The newly enhanced record allowed for viewing the record by multiple clinicians (and 
the project leaders) at different physical locations, electronic referrals, and messaging 
between clinicians and between clinicians and patients.
Internet-based communication (ICT) systems, such as the EMR, have been seen as a 
remedy for the many predicaments in healthcare delivery and quality, one that promises 
more than is realized in most cases [200]. The implementation of ICT systems in health-
care delivery has been a lengthy process for project leaders and clinicians involved 
in the DMP, requiring planning, developing, implementing, and tailoring the system 
before the system can begin to meet the needs of clinicians and patients. At this site, 
the development of the ICT system began well before the program was funded as part 
of the study. By working with a previously developed system, this project leader and 
leadership team had the opportunity to gain the needed support from stakeholders, 
as well as work through the inevitable bugs and challenges in the system before the 
funded DMP officially began. These challenges included:
	 The	fact	that	the	software	builder	couldn’t	deliver	what	they	said	they	would	deliver.	And	
still	now	we	do	not	really	have	the	perfect	system	and	the	perfect	system	does	not	exist,	I	
know.	But	there	are	too	many	things	that	we	want.	But,	there	is	no	other	software	builder	
at	 this	moment	 that	DOES	have	 it.	 The	 software	builder	 itself	has	been	 in	bankruptcy	
2	times,	once	 in	2007	and	2	months	ago	for	the	second	time.	Fortunately	they	worked	
together	with	another	department	who	had	been	able	to	go	on	with	the	system,	so	that	
we	were	not	cut	off. (Interview 1 with project leader 1)
As noted in the quote above, the investment of staff time and the hurdles that frequently 
occur in the early development phases of a networked electronic medical record oc-
curred, in part, before the study and in the early phases of the study. Since the computer 
program had already been chosen, the time and effort needed to select a computer 
program and coordinate the program with existing record systems were not part of the 
study. As a result, much of the development work and growing pains of implementing 
an ICT system were not seen in the D&I costs for this aspect of the DMP.
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One of the goals of the funded portion of the DMP was the D&I of a patient portal for 
the networked electronic medical record. While the project team was able to develop 
a patient portal in a timely manner, the development of the portal does not guarantee 
usage.
	 Yes,	we	do	have	that	but	no-one	uses	it.	We	have	talked	and	talked	to	get	people	to	look,	
[telling	patients]	you	have	your	own	care	dossier,	your	own	plan,	we	can	agree	on	goals	
there,	you	can	report on	how	it	is	going,	you	can	also	tell	us	what	does	not	go	well,	or	if	
you	have	questions.	Really easy,	you	can	do	that	from	your	chair	at	home,	you	don’t	have	
to	come	here	if	you	don’t	want	to.	But	people	don’t	want	that.	It	has	cost	money,	because	
in	order	to	offer	the	portal we	had	to	expand	our	software	package.	Of	the	current	2700	
people	with	diabetes	I	believe 15	now	have	a	care	plan. (Interview 1 with second project 
leader, diabetes project)
While rates of patient participation in the portal were low, the numbers were expected to 
increase in the future as more internet-friendly patients are diagnosed. Though the usage 
remains low, this D&I cost is expected to have lasting impact well after the project period.
The networked electronic medical record has travelled from plan to action success-
fully in principle, in that the portal was developed in a timely and cost-effective manner, 
but not in the current day-to-day reality of the program, as very few patients used the 
portal at the time of the interview. This investment in future patients via a patient portal 
can be seen as a D&I cost. While the patient portal was successfully developed from 
a technical point of view, the implementation in practice will still require much effort 
on the part of the clinician, the project leader, and the expected future patients, who 
too must learn how to use the new system and whose time is frequently overlooked in 
accountings of D&I costs.
Project	leadership
The cooperation hired an experienced project leader to oversee the diabetes DMP. Much 
like the groundwork done with the ICT system, the hiring of this first project leader oc-
curred before the funding of the study. The project leader saw her role as giving support, 
both material and strategic:
	 And	I	think	that	a	unique	thing	is	that	what	I	do	is	I’m	able	to	give	support	on	the	stra-
tegic	thinking…	where	do	you	want	to	go	to,	what	are	the	goals,	what’s	your	mission,	
what’s	the	gain	of	it.	And	the	second	is	how	can	we	achieve	that.	So	it’s	not	a	consultant	
with	only	the	advice	but	also	what	does	it	take	to	get	there. (Interview 1 with project 
leader 1)
The first and second project leaders led meetings, created reports from data extracted 
from the networked electronic medical record, and coordinated the efforts of the study 
team, such as sending out surveys. When the project leader resigned, she passed the 
role on to her assistant.
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Effective leadership is crucial for bringing projects to life. In fact, in their seminal ar-
ticle on DMPs, Wagner et al. (2001) point out that making the change needed for DMPs is 
“difficult, if not impossible, without strong leadership” [25]. Leadership support was (and, 
in general, is) needed for multiple aspects of the DMP: for the successful implementation 
of a health ICT system [201], to guide the vision of the improvements in chronic care 
treatment and management [35,194], and to facilitate change in the healthcare delivery 
[202]. Yet project leadership skills and efficiency grow over time, as the project leader 
gains the trust of the clinicians, as the project leader is better able to understand the 
needs of the clinicians and patients, and as the project leader and the clinicians are able 
to adapt to one another.
6.4.2.2	 Case	study:	Risk	of	cardiovascular	disease	(DMP	number	10)
A DMP conducted in two GP offices focused on improving care for those with an el-
evated risk of cardiovascular disease. The project team consisted of two GP-researchers 
(one of which served as a part-time project leader) and a nurse manager, who did the 
day-to-management of the program and study. As written in the grant proposal, the key 
elements of the program were:
a)	 a	patient	choice	program	to	promote	a	commitment	to	the	formulated	treatment	goals
b)	 a	focus	on	reaching	people	with	a	low	socio-economic	status	(SES)
c)	 the	use	of	a	web-based	patient	record (Grant proposal)
This DMP was a newly formed project, developed by the project leader who had recently 
completed a Masters in Healthcare Management from a nearby university.
Program	attributes
The disease management project focused on providing coordinated care with multiple 
clinicians to a challenging population: patients with an elevated cardiovascular risk and 
a lower SES.
	 We	have	many	patients,	about	20%	of	 the	patients	 in	 the	GPs	practices	are	known	 to	
the	GP	as	having	one	form	of	elevated	cardiovascular	risk.	That’s	a	very	big	number	of	
patients.	Of	those	patients,	about	8	or	9%	are	under	regular	control	of	the	GP.	And	from	
those,	a	small	part	has	a	low	SES.	Especially	patients	at	low	SES	do	not	follow	our	advice;	
you	can	see	that	as	you	look	at	the	numbers.	Most	people,	more	people	at	low	SES,	dying	
of	cardiovascular	diseases,	more	people	smoking…	That’s	the	most	 important	start	of	
our	project.	And	we	don’t	reach	people	with	low	SES,	so	we	are	looking	at	new	methods	
of	treatment	of	people	with	low	SES. (Interview 1 with project leader)
The patients with a lower SES were, and commonly are in healthcare, seen as a tricky 
population with multiple problems, less access to resources, and lower rates of literacy. 
Providing care and self-management education to this population was expected to be 
(and was) challenging for the project leadership team and clinicians, requiring a signifi-
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cant time investment. To be overcome, these challenges required effort on the part of 
the clinicians, patients, and project leaders.
Much of the investment of time for project leaders, in general, comes in the early 
stages of the DMPs. As time goes on in the course of programs, project leaders develop 
a better sense of the population and are better able to tailor attributes of the DMP for 
the needs of specific populations. This was the case in the CVRM program, as the project 
leader noted below:
	 Then	we	ask	the	patient,	do	you	want	to	look	at	your	own	patient	file	on	the	internet?	And	
when	he	says	yes,	he	can	open	his	own	file	and	see	his	own	cardiovascular	risk	profile	on	
the	internet.	Because	we	suppose	that	not	every	patient	with	low	SES	has	a	computer	at	
home	or	can	look	at	his	file	on	the	internet.	So	that’s	why	we	ask	this	to	every	patient. 
(Interview 1 with project leader)
This patient population required (more) time and effort from project leaders, clinicians, 
and medical office staff, as the patient population may not have had internet access, 
may have spoken limited Dutch, and may have had fewer economic and social resources 
for support. Accommodating this population to ensure good care required time during 
the clinical visit and, for the project leaders, time during the D&I of the DMP.
However, the challenges with the patient population were not the only challenges 
that the project leadership faced.
	 Well,	you’ve	got	to	separate	the	problems:	content	level	and	organizational	level.	Content,	
I	think,	it	actually	runs	smoothly.	We	must,	of	course,	continue	to	develop,	but	that	is	go-
ing	the	way	we	want.	Organizationally	we	have	some	problems.	[Primary	care]	practices	
are	(…)	very	large	organizations	now.	So	before	we	begin,	we	have	to	convince	everyone	
of	the	importance	of	the	research.	That	takes	a	lot	of	effort.	Plus	the	implementation	of	
such	a	project,	in	practice	is	not	simple	because	practices	are	large	organizations	where	
30	people	work.	Plus	there	are	other	members	of	the	care	group	that	need	to	be	involved:	
the	physiotherapist,	the	dietician. (Interview with the project leadership team)
Effort and accommodation, in the form of meetings, telephone support, and emails, was 
needed to assist the clinicians in implementing the changes needed for implementing a 
DMP and for conducting research on the program.
Internet-based	communication	systems
As was seen in many other projects, the D&I of the networked electronic medical record 
required much time and effort over the course of years; this effort included working with 
outside vendors, outside educators, and outside funding agencies, as well as working 
with clinicians and GP office staff. The effort did not stop; changes and further tailoring 
continued after the record was in place. The project leaders and manager were key in 
these activities.
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	 And	for	the	development	of	cardiovascular	risk	management,	this	is	how	far	we	are	now:	
we	have	funding.	We	are	now	working	with	contract	negotiations.	And	then	we	can	start	
developing	and	the	ICT	supplier,	if	they	are	fast,	can	get	us	a	beta	version	in	three	months’	
time.	We	hope	that	we	can	really	start	with	ICT	in	March,	February…	well,	of	course	it	is	
a	problem	to	get	financing.	A	negotiation	problem.	Yes,	but	we	are	happy	that	we	have	
had	luck. (Interview with the project leadership team)
Because health insurers provided some of the financing needed for the D&I of the net-
worked electronic medical record, there was much coordination work needed. Health 
insurers required extensive plans, budgets and presentations before financing was 
awarded. This was in addition to the work needed to develop the record, such as working 
with the developers and clinicians. Patient portals were included in the development of 
the networked electronic medical record, allowing patients to go online and access their 
record.
	 You	can	see	here,	patients	with	active	 risk.	This	 is	what	patients	can	see	at	home.	The	
treatment	goal	of	 this	patient	was	weight	reduction	of	6	kg	 in	3	months.	And	you	can	
see	at	this	point,	he	has	reached	a	risk	reduction	of	80%	of	his	goal.	…	Here	is	the	plan	
and	what	he	or	she	still	has	to	do	is	treating	hypertension	and	becoming	more	adher-
ent	 for	medication.	But	 this	patient	has	 chosen	 for	weight	 reduction	 in	a	first	 step	 for	
cardiovascular	risk	treatment. (Interview 1 with project leader)
While project leaders hoped that the implementation of clinical information systems 
would improve care for those with a chronic illness, the D&I of the system to this point has 
come at a significant time-cost in both sites. As Wears and Berg noted, while electronic 
medical records are often thought of as a panacea for the ills of medical documentation, 
this is often more dream than reality [200]. To meet the goal of including patients into 
the patient portal of the new record system, additional time on the part of the clinician 
and of the project leader was needed, time to tinker with the system, to tailor the system 
to the needs of the clinicians and of the individual patient, who may or may not have 
had computer access.
Project	leadership
For this two-practice project, project leadership took the form of a team of two GPs and 
a nurse manager. The nurse’s duties included interacting directly with staff at the prac-
tices, coordinating the research efforts, and aiding the practice staff as they adopted 
disease management principles. The work of the project leadership team started:
	 by	organizing	meetings.	That’s	why	we	start	with	4	meetings	and	why	we	start	at	practice	
level.	Speak	with	the	GPs	and	the	nurses.	And	we	have	learned	to	start	slowly,	go	slowly.	I	
will	not	tell	my	GPs	to	start	with	100	patients	but	will	tell	my	GPs	we	will	start	very	slowly.	
…	But	if	it	works,	we	have	to	change	the	practice.	I	hope	it	works.	But	we	have	to	wait	for	
it	still. (Interview 1 with project leader)
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Changing the practice was seen to need to begin slowly in order to gain support from 
clinicians and staff at the two GP offices. The project leader saw this coordination and back-
ground work as necessary before large-scale changes in patient care were implemented. 
While this work can be seen as an investment, it was likely a notable source of D&I costs.
Another significant challenge for the project leadership team was to work to procure 
additional funding for the DMP.
	 Step	by	step,	we	write	down	[the	plan]	for	the	insurance	company.	Because	they	will	first	
look	at	the	plan.	After	they	will	decide	whether	to	give	us	some	money.	And	when	you	are	
going	to	visit	your	GP,	the	GP	will	receive	9	Euros.	But	when	you	do	the	visit	according	to	
our	rules	of	cardiovascular	risk	management,	we	think	that	the	consult	will	take	half	an	
hour	so	we	have	asked	to	the	insurance	company	not	9	Euros	but	25	Euros. (Interview 1 
with project leader)
The complete implementation of the program goals cost more time at the patient care 
level as well as the time and effort invested at the project leader level to procure more 
funding.
6.5 Discussion
The findings of this study show that large variation exists in the D&I costs of DMPs 
implemented in the Netherlands. This variation can be explained by the large variability 
in DMP development duration, size of DMP providing organization, and the level of care 
in the providing organization prior to the implementation of a DMP. The qualitative 
analysis showed that these characteristics were associated with the attributes of the 
interventions, project leadership, and the history of the ICT systems used in a DMP.
The DMP development duration is positively related to the labor intensiveness dur-
ing the development phase and development costs. Considering that the development 
costs are highly positively correlated to the implementation costs, the length of the 
development phase is an important cost driver of D&I costs.
The research on the case studies and other qualitative research conducted in the 
remaining 19 sites highlighted that the D&I of an ICT system was an involved process. 
While previous literature shows that a well-developed ICT system is one of the main 
preconditions of successful implementation of bundled payments and DMPs in the 
Netherlands [47], the work required to develop and implement ICT systems was, at the 
sites, time-consuming and costly. In the diabetes case study, the majority of the develop-
ment work involved in implementing the ICT system occurred before the study period, 
but nonetheless the work did happen; however, the cost for this work is not included in 
the financial data in the diabetes project. As the ICT work (and the costs associated) was 
included in the D&I period of the CVRM project, this may be an explanation for variation 
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in costs. The D&I of adequate ICT is important for all stakeholders in chronic care. It is 
important for care groups with the aim of achieving lower D&I costs, for health insur-
ers in order to contract chronic care at lower cost, and for public authorities with the 
purpose of controlling healthcare expenditure by supporting managed care for chronic 
diseases. As our data shows, this D&I requires time, financial support, and a flexibility of 
goals, targets, and timelines, no matter when it occurs or how the D&I is funded.
The qualitative research conducted at the sites revealed that the role of the project 
leader was an important one, with more established projects with experienced project 
leaders and managers spending less time on the early development of the programs. 
Project leaders were responsible for guiding the programs, working with clinicians, 
delegating responsibilities, and developing contacts with outside funders and vendors. 
In the studied sites, we saw that in projects with a longer history (and with a project 
leader with more experience in leading healthcare projects and in the DMP project in 
specific), the relationships needed for smooth, efficient project management were likely 
developed in the early years of the programs and the costs for these efforts have not 
been included in the D&I costs (as was seen in diabetes project). In the CVRM project, 
these relationships were in the process of being developed during the study in an incre-
mental manner through meetings, developing project plans, and the slow introduction 
of changes. Project leadership, in general, was especially relevant in that organizational 
and management failure threaten the successful implementation of disease managed 
care facilitated by bundled payment in the Netherlands [47].
Project leaders had a fluid role and flexibility within the project, as meeting project 
goals often requires adaptation. Whether by offering new tools online or printing for 
patients who have limited computer access at home, this constant adaptation by project 
leaders and clinicians can be seen as “persistent tinkering in a world full of complex 
ambivalence and shifting tensions” [203]. Through tinkering, project leaders worked to 
meet the changing needs of patients, of the healthcare system, and of themselves. Yet 
tinkering was a slow and often invisible process, as was much of the work of project 
leaders when tailoring interventions, applying for funding, or working with researchers. 
This tinkering was constant during the study and programs, but as our data shows, ap-
peared to be more prevalent in the D&I stages as the project leaders are working with 
new vendors, systems, and care plans. This prevalence of tinkering in the early stages of 
a DMP may have resulted in higher D&I costs.
The specific DMP populations, too, may have had a significant impact on the D&I of 
the DMPs. The CVRM DMP was working with patients with low SES, many of whom were 
reported to be complex patients with limited access to resources. Accommodating the 
needs of this population may have required more tinkering, more effort from project 
leaders, and more time from clinicians. These characteristics could have played a role in 
the higher D&I costs for this site.
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Our findings also suggest that large organizations providing DMPs are more likely to 
have lower D&I costs than smaller organizations. This indicates the existence of econo-
mies of scope where large organizations may have already established ICT systems, 
managerial knowledge, and available capital in other care (e.g. public health and pre-
vention) and disease areas that can be also used in the development of disease specific 
DMPs. This is supported also by the negative relation between the existing level of dis-
ease managed care (as measured by the PACIC) in the first phase of implementing a DMP 
with D&I costs. This unveils existing synergies between projects within organizations. 
The economies of scope may appeal financially attractive to DMP providers since they 
might increase the profit margin of providing DMPs for different diseases. The provision 
of DMPs that could address different disease areas and multi-morbidity could also tackle 
the criticism of the current DMPs that they are narrowly focused on a single disease 
while chronic patients need broader care because they often have one or more other 
diseases (55% of the patients in our sample have more than one chronic disease). Such 
a development could also tackle the hesitations of health insurers in contracting DMPs.
Moreover, the minor, though negative, relation between the number of DMP partici-
pants and the implementation costs, as illustrated in Figure 4, may indicate the presence 
of economies of scale. The more patients included in a DMP, the lower the marginal costs 
of implementation. This can be attributed to fixed costs that are divided by more DMP 
participants. Capital and operating costs, which are included in the implementation 
costs, are known cost components subject to economies of scale. This financial advan-
tage of large organizations may attract health insurers to purchase DMP from them hop-
ing for a lower bundled payment per DMP participant. However, as in all industries, the 
number of participants that lowers the marginal costs of DMP implementation should 
be investigated because further inclusion can lead to higher costs.
Furthermore, we found no evidence of relation between D&I costs and DMP payment 
method. Similar to case two, many DMPs reported challenges to get additional financing 
for the provision of a DMP. However, this did not lead in all cases to higher D&I costs. A 
previous study found a positive relation between additional funding for disease man-
aged care and healthcare utilization costs [204]. Therefore, care groups should be careful 
in setting the prices of DMPs when negotiating a bundled payment because that price 
should cover not only the costs of healthcare for the particular disease but also the D&I 
costs.
There was also no relation found between D&I costs and type of disease addressed 
by a DMP. That suggests that none of the diseases studied here can be characterized as 
“cherries” or “lemons” in the chronic care market with respect to D&I costs. This fact may 
enable the broadening of the scope of diseases that a DMP addresses by making every 
disease equally financial attractive to care groups.
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The 22 DMPs are considered to be representative of the DMPs that have been imple-
mented the last 3 years in the Netherlands because (a) they cover all diseases for which 
DMPs have been implemented, (b) they include DMPs in primary and/or secondary care 
(the most common settings for DMPs), (c) they cover a wide variety of diverse regions 
and geographic areas with different population density and (d) they differ in the at-
tributes of the DMPs put into place and in the structure of multidisciplinary teams [128]. 
The study population per disease is also representative of the overall disease population 
in the Netherlands with respect to age and gender.
The findings of this study are relevant to primary care practices in the Netherlands as 
well as to health policy makers and primary care practices in other European countries 
that have implemented or are planning to implement DMPs to achieve integration of 
chronic care. The programs in this study represent a diversity of chronic diseases that can 
be addressed by DMPs, ranging from common chronic diseases such as diabetes, CVRM, 
and COPD, to less frequently addressed chronic diseases such as depression, eating 
disorders, and mental illnesses. The programs, while diverse, had features in common 
with other DMPs outside of the Netherlands: addressing the issues of chronic illness 
through coordinated care, through the use of ICT systems, and through the promotion 
and implementation of self-management education. This research also provides unique 
insights into the role of project leaders and of the impact of the history of the programs 
on D&I costs. Policy makers, DMP designers, and primary care practices in the Nether-
lands and in Europe can explore the possibilities to contain D&I costs at a minimum level 
by enhancing leadership and ICT in DMPs as well as exploit existing economies of scope 
and economies of scale in the provision of DMPs.
6.6 Conclusions
The conclusions of this paper can be summarized into:
• There is wide variation in D&I costs of DMPs, which is driven primarily by the dura-
tion of the development phase and the labor intensiveness needed to develop and 
implement a DMP.
• The level of disease managed care in an organization prior to the provision of a DMP 
is negatively associated with the D&I costs of this DMP.
• Assisting care groups to develop adequate ICT systems for disease managed care is 
a win-win situation for all stakeholders.
• It is crucial to define the right mix of DMP interventions and target population and 
to incorporate these mixes in the planning and budgeting of the DMP development 
phase.
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• There are indications of existence of economies of scale and economies of scope, 
which may reduce D&I costs. Care groups and health insurers should explore the 
potentials in exploiting them in a mutually benefiting manner.
• The work done before the sites are awarded study funding, especially in relation to 
ICT systems, saves time and money during the program and study.
• The experience of project leaders may play a fundamental role in the development 
and early intervention efforts of the DMP.
• Programs with a longer history, more experienced project leadership, previously 
established ICT systems, and less complex patient populations had lower D&I costs
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Appendix 1 Background information about the Dutch health care system
Undoubtedly the dominant issue in the Dutch health care system at present is the 
fundamental reform that came into effect in 2006. With the introduction of a single 
compulsory health insurance scheme, the dual system of public and private insurance 
for curative care became history. Managed competition for providers and insurers be-
came a major driver in the health care system. This has meant fundamental changes in 
the roles of patients, insurers, providers and the government. Insurers now negotiate 
with providers on price and quality and patients choose the provider they prefer and 
join a health insurance policy which best fits their situation. To allow patients to make 
these choices, much effort has been made to make information on price and quality 
available to the public. The role of the national government has changed from directly 
steering the system to safeguarding the proper functioning of the health markets. With 
the introduction of market mechanisms in the health care sector and the privatization 
of former sickness funds, the Dutch system presents an innovative and unique variant 
of a social health insurance system. Since the stepwise realization of the blueprint of the 
system has not yet been completed, the health care system in the Netherlands should be 
characterized as being in transition. Many measures have been taken to move from the 
old to the new system as smoothly as possible. Financial measures intended to prevent 
sudden budgetary shocks and payment mechanisms have been (and are) continuously 
adjusted and optimized. Organizational measures aimed at creating room for all players 
to become accustomed to their new role in the regulated market. As the system is still 
a “work in progress”, it is too early to evaluate the effects and the consequences of the 
new system in terms of accessibility, affordability, efficiency and quality. Dutch primary 
care, with gatekeeping GPs at its core, is a strong foundation of the health care system. 
Gatekeeping GPs are a relatively unusual element in social health insurance systems. 
The strong position of primary care is considered to prevent unnecessary use of more 
expensive secondary care, and promote consistency and coordination of individual 
care. It continues to be a policy priority in the Netherlands. The position of the patient 
in the Netherlands is strongly anchored in several laws concerning their rights, their 
relation to providers and insurers, access to information, and possibilities to complain 
in case of maltreatment. In terms of quality and efficiency of the health care system, the 
Netherlands is, with some notable exceptions (e.g. implementation of innovations such 
as day surgery and electronic patient records), an average performer when compared 
to other wealthy countries. It is too early to tell whether efficiency and quality gains will 
occur as a result of the 2006 reform.
Text from “Schäfer W, Kroneman M, Boerma W, van den Berg M, Westert G, Devillé W 
and van Ginneken E. The Netherlands: Health system review. Health Systems in Transi-
tion, 2010; 12(1):1–229.”
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Appendix 2 Additional figures
Supplementary Figure 1 This is the relation between development costs and implementation year 1 costs.
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Supplementary Figure 2 Relation between the development costs and the duration of the development 
phase (in months).
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Supplementary Figure 3 Relation between development costs and the number of FTE’s dedicated to the 
development of each DMP
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Supplementary Figure 4 Relation between annualized development costs and total number of FTE’s in 
the organization
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Supplementary Figure 5 Relation between the development costs and PACIC at baseline
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Supplementary Figure 6 Relation between implementation costs and PACIC at year 1
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Supplementary Figure 7 Development costs by type of payment at the development phase
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Supplementary Figure 8 Implementation costs by payment method at implementation year 1
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Supplementary Figure 9 Development costs by disease category
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Abstract
Objectives: The aim of the study was to investigate the changes in costs and outcomes 
after the implementation of various disease management programs (DMPs), to identify 
their potential determinants, and to compare the costs and outcomes of different DMPs.
Methods: We investigated the 1-year changes in costs and effects of 1,322 patients in 16 
DMPs for cardiovascular risk (CVR), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and 
diabetes mellitus (DMII) in the Netherlands. We also explored the within-DMP predic-
tors of these changes. Finally, a cost-utility analysis was performed from the healthcare 
and societal perspective comparing the most and the least effective DMP within each 
disease category.
Results: This study showed wide variation in development and implementation costs be-
tween DMPs (range:€16;€1,709) and highlighted the importance of economies of scale. 
Changes in health care utilization costs were not statistically significant. DMPs were 
associated with improvements in integration of CVR care (0.10 PACIC units), physical 
activity (+0.34 week-days) and smoking cessation (8% less smokers) in all diseases. Since 
an increase in physical activity and in self-efficacy were predictive of an improvement 
in quality-of-life, DMPs that aim to improve these are more likely to be effective. When 
comparing the most with the least effective DMP in a disease category, the vast major-
ity of bootstrap replications (range:73%;97%) pointed to cost savings, except for COPD 
(21%). QALY gains were small (range:0.003;+0.013) and surrounded by great uncertainty.
Conclusions: After one year we have found indications of improvements in level of in-
tegrated care for CVR patients and lifestyle indicators for all diseases, but in none of the 
diseases we have found indications of cost savings due to DMPs. However, it is likely that 
it takes more time before the improvements in care lead to reductions in complications 
and hospitalizations.
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7.1 Background
Chronic diseases pose an increasing threat to population health, enlarge the burden of 
care giving, and constrain the financial viability of health care systems worldwide. Be-
cause these health care systems originate largely from an era where acute and infectious 
diseases were more prominent, their design is not optimal for chronic care [23]. This 
triggered many new approaches for providing continuous, integrated, pro-active and 
patient-centred care by a multidisciplinary team of care providers in order to improve 
health outcomes and reduce costs. There is evidence that these approaches improve 
the quality of the care as measured by process indicators like coordination of care, com-
munication between caregivers, patient satisfaction, provider adherence to guidelines, 
and patient adherence to treatment recommendations [205]. However, there is debate 
about the impact on health outcomes and efficiency improvements, a debate compli-
cated by large differences in study designs, outcome metrics and target populations 
across studies [206] as well as cultural and political barriers to evaluation [207].
In the Netherlands, a recently established regulation introduced a bundled payment 
system to promote disease management programs (DMPs) for patients with diabetes 
mellitus type two (DMII), chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD) or at risk for 
a cardiovascular disease (CVD) event [47]. Although, the wide-scale implementation of 
DMII-DMPs was smooth and successful, the uptake of DMPs for COPD and cardiovascu-
lar risk (CVR) is still troublesome. This is because health insurers, which contract DMPs 
from care groups, are yet to be convinced about the financial attractiveness of these 
programs [93]. Illustrative of this scepticism is that the largest Dutch health insurer does 
not contract CVR-DMPs and provides only a yearly add-on payment per patient with 
an elevated CVR to cover costs of coordination, provider training and additional ICT 
support. Another large health insurer contracts CVR-DMPs only for patients diagnosed 
with a CVD (secondary prevention) and not for individuals at risk to have CVD (primary 
prevention). In addition, the debate embeds the adequacy of the current single-disease 
DMPs for patients with multiple morbidities, which seems to be the norm rather than 
the exception [208].
Therefore, the provision of evidence about the variability in costs and effects of dif-
ferent implemented DMPs is eminent for the successful implementation of integrated 
chronic care in the Netherlands. This study aims to investigate the changes in costs and 
outcomes after the implementation of DMPs, to identify potential determinants of them, 
and to compare the costs and outcomes of different DMPs.
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7.2 Methods
7.2.1 Design and setting
In a prospective pre-post study, we compared 16 different DMPs spread across different 
regions of the Netherlands [128]: 9 CVR-, 4 COPD-, and 3 DMII-DMPs. Two CVR-DMPs 
included patients that were at risk for developing CVD (primary prevention), two CVR-
DMPs patients that had already been diagnosed with CVD (secondary prevention), and 
five CVR-DMPs included both patient groups. The implementation of the DMPs and their 
participation in the evaluation study was financially supported by the Netherlands Or-
ganization for Health Research and Development (ZonMw, project number 300030201). 
Outcomes and health care resource utilization were measured twice, once at the start 
of the DMP and once after approximately 12 months, using a patient-questionnaire. A 
detailed description of the design and setting is presented in Lemmens et al., 2011 [128].
7.2.2 Intervention
To describe the details of each DMP we read program documents and interviewed DMP 
managers using a check-list of possible interventions that may be included in such 
programs, grouped by the components of the chronic care model [151]. Although the 
services included in the integrated care package differed between the DMPs, most pro-
grams focused on improving the collaboration between different disciplines of health 
care professionals and redesigning the care-giving process to patient centred care more 
proactively. Most of them provided interventions such as self-management education 
and training directed at life-style improvement (physical reactivation, smoking ces-
sation, diet improvement), decision support to implement guidelines and protocols, 
integration of ICT systems, training for health care providers, case management, and 
reallocation of tasks between care providers [128,209]. A detailed presentation of the 
interventions provided by each DMP is provided by Appendix 1.
7.2.3 Outcomes
We investigated the impact of the DMPs on a broad range of outcomes including 
changes in care delivery process, patient life-style and self-management behaviour, 
and health-related quality of life (HR-QoL) [151]. More specifically, we investigated 
the impact of DMPs on: a) the level of chronic care integration using the Patient As-
sessment Chronic Illness (PACIC) questionnaire [210], b) patient life-style measured by 
self-reported smoking status (current, former or never smoker) and physical activity 
(expressed in the number of days per week that an individual had more than 30 minutes 
physical activity), c) self-efficacy using the respective subscale of the Self-Management 
Ability Scale-Shorter (SMAS-S) [211], and d) the 3-level EQ-5D utility scores which were 
based on the Dutch value set and used to estimate quality adjusted life years (QALYs) 
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[169]. The questionnaire designed to measure these outcomes also included questions 
about socio-demographic patient characteristics and a checklist of morbidities.
7.2.4 Costs
We estimated five categories of costs, i.e. 1) the development costs, 2) the implementa-
tion costs, 3) the costs of health care utilization, 4) the costs borne by patient for travel-
ling to receive care and 5) the costs of productivity loss due to absence from paid work. 
When calculating costs from a healthcare perspective cost categories 1, 2, and 3 were 
included; categories 4 and 5 were added when adopting the societal perspective.
The development costs included all costs made during the preparation phase of 
DMPs e.g. labour costs for brainstorming sessions, training costs, and ICT support costs. 
The implementation costs were costs that occurred after the provision of DMP interven-
tions to patients had started and included the costs for managing the DMP, the costs 
of multidisciplinary team meetings, the costs associated with collecting quality of care 
indicators for audit and feedback, the costs of materials used for patient education, 
and the costs of keeping the ICT operating. The development and implementation 
costs were systematically collected using a template based on the CostIt instrument 
of the World Health Organisation (WHO) [197]. This template was completed during 
face-to-face interviews with DMPs managers. During these interviews managers were 
also asked about the presence of additional funding to cover the specific elements of 
integrated care. Capital costs were amortized over their life span and allocated to the 
DMP based on square meters for the costs of buildings, full-time equivalents for the 
costs of ICT and medical technologies (e.g. spirometer). The sum of the capital costs and 
the operating costs of a DMP was then divided by the number of DMP participants. The 
costs of developing a DMP were amortized in 5 years assuming this period as the life 
span of a DMP since after this period changes in guidelines and governmental policies 
would probably affect the initial form of a DMP. The development and implementation 
costs per patient were consequently calculated by adding one fifth of the development 
costs to the annual implementation costs and dividing it by the number of DMP par-
ticipants.
The costs of health care utilization were based on a questionnaire asking patients 
about the number of caregiver contacts (GP, nurse practitioner, nurse, dietician, phys-
iotherapist, podiatrist, lifestyle coach, medical specialists in outpatient clinics etc.), 
hospital admissions and admission days, and medication use. The recall period for these 
questions was 3 months and we asked for all health care utilization, whether or not it 
was related to the disease targeted in the DMP. In addition to these costs, the travel costs 
of patients were calculated, using their self-reported distance to a health care provider. 
Finally, the costs of productivity loss due to illness were calculated, using the friction 
cost approach [172], based on questions about absence from paid employment due to 
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illness. Standard unit costs as reported by [212] were applied. All costs were inflated to 
2012 and reported on an annual basis per patient (see Appendix 2).
7.2.5 Statistical analysis to estimate changes within DMPs
We started with paired Wilcoxon tests and McNemar chi-square tests to investigate 
whether the differences in costs and effects between the baseline and follow-up mea-
surements were statistically significant. In addition, a multi-level analysis was performed 
to explore the determinants of change in costs and EQ-5D utilities of patients clustered 
in DMPs. Generalized linear mixed models were used to accommodate the skewness in 
the health care utilization cost and EQ-5D data as well as to include predictor variables 
on patient and DMP level. Predictor variables on patient level included: the EQ-5D or 
costs at baseline (depending which of the two was the outcome variable), age, physical 
activity at baseline and its change, the PACIC score at baseline and its change, the SMAS-
self-efficacy score at baseline and its change, smoking cessation during the follow-up 
period, and presence of multi-morbidity. Gender, socio-economic status, and marital 
status were not included in the final model after performing likelihood ratio tests. Pre-
dictor variables on the DMP level included the DMP target population and the existence 
of additional payments to cover overhead and management expenses provided on top 
of the usual payment per patient.
To explore the variance in the change in outcomes and costs between DMPs that 
targeted patients at risk for a first (primary prevention), or subsequent CVD event 
(secondary prevention), or both types of CVR prevention, we also estimated separate 
models for these sub-groups.
7.2.6 Statistical analysis to estimate differences between DMPs
In each disease category, we identified the DMP that was most effective and least ef-
fective in improving the patients’ generic health-related quality of life as measured in 
QALYs. In this manner we identified 5 pairs of DMPs (i.e. for primary CVR prevention, 
secondary CVR prevention, both types of CVR prevention, COPD, and DMII). For each of 
the 5 pairs, we calculated the cost-utility of the most effective versus the least effective 
DMP in terms of incremental costs per QALY gained. These calculations were performed 
from two perspectives, i.e. the health care perspective (cost category one to three) and 
the societal perspective (all five categories of costs).
We used inverse probability weighting to balance the two comparators in each pair 
with respect to age, gender, education, presence of multi-morbidity, marital status, and 
EQ-5D at baseline. Inverse probability weighting was chosen because it is the preferred 
propensity score matching technique for small samples [213]. We performed bootstrap-
ping to generate 5,000 samples from the original sample. For each bootstrapped sample 
we estimated a generalized linear model for each outcome variable (i.e. QALYs or costs) 
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using the inverse probability weights to get the coefficients adjusted for the propensity 
score of each observation as well as age, gender, education level, multi-morbidity, and 
marital status. We used inverse Gaussian distribution and power minus two link for the 
QALY estimation and gamma distribution and log link for the costs estimation. In this 
manner, 5,000 predicted incremental costs and 5,000 predicted incremental QALYs 
were generated. Each of the 5,000 ICERs was calculated as the mean of the predicted 
incremental costs divided by the mean of the incremental QALYs. These predicted ICERs 
were then plotted on a cost-effectiveness (CE) plane to show the uncertainty in the ICER.
7.2.7 Sensitivity analysis
The CUA was also performed excluding the development and implementation costs in 
order to investigate how sensitive the estimated ICERs are to these costs.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Sample
As Table 1 shows, there were 2,438 respondents at the baseline measurement and 1,974 
respondents at the follow-up measurement. One thousand three hundred twenty two 
individuals responded to both measurements (i.e. had complete data).
The sample characteristics by disease are presented in Table 2. The mean age of the 
total sample was 65.1 years and consisted of 47% females, 38% low educated, 38% 
employed, and 30% singles. The mean multi-morbidity among the respondents mea-
sured by the Charlson co-morbidity index [170] was 1.83. The COPD sample included 
proportionally more low-educated, unemployed, and single patients than the other two 
samples. COPD patients were also older and had higher Charlson co-morbidity scores.
Table 3 presents the baseline values of the outcome measures and their change after 
one year. The perceived level of chronic care integration was the highest at baseline 
among patients in DMII-DMPs (3.29) and the lowest in CVR-DMPs (2.80). Individuals in 
CVR-DMPs were the most physically active at baseline (5.00 days per week) while dia-
betic patients were the least physically active (4.74 days). In addition, the percentage of 
smokers was the highest in the COPD sample (39%) and the lowest in the CVR sample 
Table 1 Sample size per disease and measurement moment
Disease DMPs Baseline Follow-up Baseline & follow-up
Total 16 2,438 1,974 1,322
CVR 9 1,342 1,125 725
COPD 4 689 596 395
DMII 3 407 253 202
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(21%). Patients in DMII-DMPs had scored the highest in self-efficacy (4.56) and patients 
in COPD-DMPs the lowest (4.33). The mean EQ-5D utility score at baseline was 0.83 in the 
CVR sample and 0.84 in the DMII sample while for the COPD sample it was lower (0.79).
7.3.2 Changes in outcomes
Changes in PACIC scores were significantly positive (0.10) in the CVR sample (range 
across the 9 CVR DMPs from +0.02 to +0.26) and significantly negative (-0.23) in the DMII 
sample (range across the 3 DMII-DMPs from -0.27 to -0.18). In the CVR and COPD samples 
the change in the number of days per week with more than 30 minutes of physical activ-
ity was positive and statistically significant (0.33 and 0.37 respectively). The range in 
physical active days across the CVR and COPD-DMPs was quite large as Table 3 shows. 
The percentage of smokers decreased substantially in all samples (ranging across all 16 
DMPs from -13.7 percentage points to -2.5 percentage points) as well as the self-efficacy 
(ranging from -0.48 percentage points to 0.15 percentage points) and the HR-QoL (rang-
ing from -0.06 percentage points to +0.03 percentage points).
7.3.3 Changes in costs
The development and first year’s implementation costs per patient of the 16 DMPs are 
presented in Table 4. As this table shows, there is large variation in the implementation 
costs per patient between and within the three diseases ranging from €16 to €1,709. 
This is due to the variation in the total development and implementation costs and 
the number of participants per DMP. The largest share of these costs is for costs related 
to the time that personnel dedicates to the implementation of DMPs. Costs related to 
educational courses for caregivers and information brochures for patients were low in 
Table 2 Sample characteristics by disease at baseline
CVR COPD DMII Total sample
Mean (sd)
[DMP range]
Mean (sd)
[DMP range]
Mean (sd)
[DMP range]
Mean (sd)
[DMP range]
Age 64.1 (9.7)
[59.6; 67.8]
66.5 (10.0)
[65.4;69.3]
66.2 (9.7)
[64.2;67.1]
65.1** (9.9)
[59.6;69.3]
% Females 48 48 43 47
Charlson comorbidity 
index
1.48 (1.10) 2.26 (1.28) 2.22 (0.99) 1.83** (1.20)
[1.15;2.48]
% Low education 35 48 25 37**
% Employment 43 30 37 38**
% Single 26 36 30 30**
The table presents the mean (sd) unless otherwise indicated; in [ ] is given the range between DMPs i.e. 
lowest and highest values across DMPs in the same disease area; low education was defined as no or only 
primary education; The p-values show whether the values are statistically different between the diseases ** 
Statistically different at p< 0.01 between the diseases.
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almost all cases (except in DMII-DMP1). In some DMPs “other” costs such as ICT, energy, 
and accommodation costs were relatively high (e.g. 66% in DMII-DMP 2).
At baseline, patients in COPD-DMPs had the highest mean yearly hospital costs 
(€1,967), medication costs (€857), total health care costs (€4,368) and total costs (€5,320) 
while patients in CVR-DMPs had the highest mean yearly productivity loss (€1,648) (see 
Table 5). Patients in DMII-DMPs had the highest primary care costs (€941). However, 
almost all differences between baseline and follow-up were statistically insignificant 
and the standard deviations of the estimated means were large. Only the outpatient 
costs of patients with diabetes increased by €115. As Table 5 shows, the changes across 
DMPs within the same disease and between diseases varied largely. The cost change 
within each disease category ranged from negative to positive across DMPs except for 
the outpatient costs and inpatient costs of patients with diabetes.
In primary and mixed prevention CVR-DMPs, the PACIC was increased by 0.18 and 
0.10 and the number of days with at least 30 minutes of physical activity in a week 
increased by 0.43 and 0.37, respectively (Table 6). The decrease in the percentage of 
smokers ranged from 3% (primary prevention) to 8% (secondary prevention). As Table 
Table 4 Development and implementation costs by DMP
N Development phase* Total costs 
without 
amortiza-
tion #
Implementa-
tion Year 1*
Costs per pa-
tient without 
amortization
Costs per 
patient with 
amortization
Total costs 
without 
amortization #
Costs per pa-
tient without 
amortization
Costs per 
patient with 
amortization*
CVR-DMP 1 300 52,136 174 35 16,426 55 90
CVR-DMP 2 207 54,417 263 53 68,415 331 381
CVR-DMP 3 700 98,754 141 28 153,215 219 234
CVR-DMP 4 300 274,783 916 183 171,026 570 605
CVR-DMP 5 550 26,807 49 10 67,604 123 142
CVR-DMP 6 450 27,923 62 12 149,990 333 356
CVR-DMP 7 125 13,324 107 21 37,968 304 387
CVR-DMP 8 250 195,007 780 156 168,385 674 715
CVR-DMP 9 1,000 26,678 27 5 81,258 81 92
COPD-DMP 1 2,508 154,504 62 12 214,239 85 90
COPD-DMP 2 1,600 93,909 59 12 49,751 31 38
COPD-DMP 3 133 49,639 373 75 55,191 415 493
COPD-DMP 4 2,400 44,586 19 4 32,599 14 18
DMII-DMP 1 2,400 5,891 2 0 28,061 12 16
DMII-DMP 2 233 162,889 699 140 387,879 1,655 1,709
DMII-DMP 3 300 50,304 168 34 61,338 204 239
*We used 5 years as amortization period; # These costs are not per patient
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6 shows, self-efficacy was decreased in all three types of CVR prevention by about 0.28 
while the EQ-5D decreased in the mixed CVR prevention DMPs by 0.02.
Table 6 presents the yearly costs and outcomes of patients enrolled in CVR-DMPs 
that target different populations (i.e. primary prevention, secondary prevention, or 
both types of prevention). After 12 months, the hospital costs of patients included in 
DMPs targeting both types of CVR prevention increased by €819 within a year. Further, 
patients in DMPs for secondary prevention and for both types of prevention had €48 and 
€5 lower travelling costs, respectively. The travelling costs at baseline in these two types 
of DMPs were also higher compared to the primary prevention DMPs.
7.3.4 Determinants of changes in HR-QoL and costs within DMPs
The results from the generalized linear mixed models are presented in Table 7. Model 
one shows that a greater improvement in EQ-5D utility is significantly predicted by a 
lower baseline EQ-5D score, a higher baseline physical activity level, a greater increase 
in physical activity, and a greater increase in self-efficacy. One additional day with more 
than 30 minutes of physical activity leads to a 3% higher EQ-5D utility and 1 unit of in-
Table 6 Costs and outcomes by type of CVR prevention
Primary prevention Secondary prevention Mixed
Baseline Change Baseline Change Baseline Change
PACIC (1-5 highest) 2.64 (0.77) 0.18* (0.76) 2.52 (0.79) 0.09 (0.75) 2.92 (0.84) 0.10* (0.82)
Physically active days 
per week
5.25 (1.91) 0.43* (1.94) 5.15 (2.10) 0.12 (2.11) 4.91 (2.10) 0.37** (2.20)
% smokers 13 -3* 30 -8** 20 -6**
Self-efficacy (1-6 
highest)
4.44 (0.85) -0.29** (0.75) 4.32 (0.92) -0.30** (0.77) 4.48 (0.86) -0.27** (0.74)
EQ-5D 0.85 (0.17) -0.01 (0.15) 0.77 (0.22) 0.01 (0.19) 0.84 (0.17) -0.02* (0.15)
Primary care costs 555 (827) -16 (701) 810 (1,153) -149 (1,191) 565 (751) 97 (1,092)
Outpatient hospital 
care
326 (662) -104 (643) 725 (1,342) -34 (1,728) 269 (492) 76* (657)
Inpatient hospital 
care$
471 (3,009) -334 (3,120) 1,064 (5,012) 932 (9,807) 476 (3,085) 742 (10,225)
Medication costs 269 (275) 0 (248) 493 (423) 1 (289) 356 (351) 4 (255)
Total healthcare 
utilization costs
1,600 (3,665) -447 (3,663) 3052 (5,787) 754 (10,204) 1,653 (3,525) 918 (10,574)
Travelling costs 63 (145) 73 (571) 89 (221) -48* (185) 72 (226) -5* (312)
Productivity costs 3,542 (11,480) -1,685 (10,076) 1,119 (6,401) -86 (6,964) 1,405 (7,646) -368 (6,743)
Total costs 3,633 (10,091) -317 (11,593) 4,421 (10,657) 159 (13,876) 2,911 (8,201) 725 (13,874)
The table presents the mean (SD) and the mean difference (SD) between baseline and follow-up measure-
ments; $ inpatient hospital care costs include also emergency care costs; * (p< 0.05); ** (p<0.01); the dif-
ferences are calculated subtracting the costs at baseline from the costs at follow-up; primary care costs in-
cluded contacts with GP, nurse practitioner, nurse, dietician, physiotherapist, podiatrist, lifestyle coach, etc
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crease in self-efficacy score leads to a 4% higher EQ-5D utility. In contrast, patients with 
COPD had 7% less improvement in EQ-5D and patients with multi-morbidity 5% less.
The best predictors of change in health care utilization costs were health care utiliza-
tion costs at baseline and the presence of multi-morbidity (model 2). If costs were €1000 
higher at baseline, the increase was 5% less. In case of multi-morbidity, the cost increase 
was 6% higher. The variance in the dependent variables explained by models 1 and 2 at 
the DMP and the patient level was relatively high.
7.3.5 Comparing costs and effects between DMPs
The results from the cost-utility analysis taking the health care and societal perspective 
are presented in Table 8. This table shows that the most effective DMP for CVR primary 
prevention, combined primary and secondary CVR prevention, and DMII led to statisti-
cally significant cost savings when compared to the least effective DMP in the same 
disease category (i.e. more than 95% of bootstrap replications in the southern quad-
rants). It also shows there is large variation in incremental costs (ranging from €-721 to 
Table 7 Determinants of changes in HR-QoL and health care utilization costs
Model 1
Change in EQ-5D
Model 2
Change in health care utilization costs
e(b) p e(b) p
Intercept 1.04 0.744 104192.98 <0.001
EQ-5D/ 0.60 <0.001
Costs (in 000’s) baseline 0.95 <0.001
Age 1.00 0.408 1.00 0.130
Physical activity (1-7 highest) 1.02 0.023 1.00 0.777
Change in physical activity 1.03 0.001 1.00 0.639
PACIC (1-5 highest) 0.99 0.474 1.02 0.247
Change in PACIC 1.00 0.830 1.00 0.843
Self-efficacy (1-6 highest) 1.00 0.956 0.98 0.107
Change self-efficacy 1.04 0.032 1.01 0.730
Quit smoking (1= yes) 1.04 0.119 1.07 0.104
Multi-morbidity (1=yes) 0.95 0.019 1.06 <0.001
COPD* (1=yes) 0.93 <0.001 1.01 0.541
DMII* (1=yes) 0.99 0.576 1.02 0.460
Additional payment (1=yes) 0.99 0.468 0.99 0.491
N 820 843
R2 patient level 0.36 0.73
R2 DMP level 0.56 0.78
* the reference category is CVR-DMP; Note: the predictor variables COPD-DMP, DMII-DMP, and Additional 
payment are on the DMP level. All other variables are on the patient level.
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€1,716) and incremental QALYs (ranging from 0.003 to 0.013) between the best and the 
worst DMP within a disease category. Due to the very small incremental QALYs the ICERs 
are very large. The 5000 bootstrapped ICERs plotted on the CE plane showed that there 
is large uncertainty around the estimated mean ICER. Considering the CVR-primary 
prevention sample, 97% of the 5,000 simulated ICERs were in the southern half of the CE 
plane indicating lower incremental costs while the reverse was observed for the COPD 
sample (79% of the 5,000 bootstrapped ICERS were on the Northern CE plane).
From the societal perspective, the cost-utility results are similar to the results from 
the health care perspective except that for the secondary CVR prevention samples the 
uncertainty about the incremental costs became even larger.
Table 8 Results from the cost-utility analysis
Most effective 
VS least 
effective 
DMP *
Incremental
costs
Incremental
QALYs
Mean ICER % of 5000 simulated ICERs per 
quadrant in the CE plane
NW NE SW SE
Health care perspective
CVR-primary # 7 VS 4 -534
(297)
0.003
(0.021)
-178,539 1 3 41 56
CVR-secondary$ 1 VS 3 -671
(976)
0.012
(0.015)
-56,809 6 21 15 58
CVR-both 2 VS 8 -721
(416)
0.005
(0.016)
-148,480 2 2 35 61
COPD 1 VS 4 1,716
(2,000)
0.009
(0.053)
185,747 33 46 11 10
DMII 1 VS 3 -677
(398)
0.013
(0.013)
-50,234 1 3 14 82
Societal perspective
CVR-primary # 7 VS 4 -1,131
(1,334)
0.003
(0.021)
-377,991 5 12 37 46
CVR-secondary$ 1 VS 3 -153
(1,225)
0.012
(0.015)
-12,929 10 36 11 43
CVR-both 2 VS 8 -604
(554)
0.005
(0.016)
-124,457 6 8 31 55
COPD 1 VS 4 2,054
(2,371)
0.009
(0.053)
-222,314 34 47 11 9
DMII 1 VS 3 -1,735
(1,084)
0.013
(0.013)
-128,790 1 2 14 83
* most effective is defined based on the highest incremental QALY and the reverse; # primary prevention 
for CVD; $secondary prevention for CVD; ICER: incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; CE: cost-effective(ness); 
best is defined as most effective based on QALYs and worse as the least effective based on the same mea-
surement; the numbers correspond to the DMP numbers in Table 4.
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7.3.6 Sensitivity analysis
Table 9 shows the results from the CUA performed excluding the development and 
implementation costs. The most remarkable change in comparison to the main CUA is 
that 20% (instead of 4%) of the 5,000 bootstrapped ICERs regarding both CVR preven-
tion DMPs were located on the North quadrant of the CE plane. This change is a result 
from the higher development and implementation costs of the least effective DMP.
Table 9 Results from the cost-utility analysis from the health care perspective excluding the development 
and implementation costs
Best DMP VS 
worse DMP*
Incremental
costs
Incremental
QALYs
Mean ICER % of 5000 simulated ICERs per 
quadrant in the CE plane
NW NE SW SE
CVR-primary # 7 VS 4 -407
(330)
0.003
(0.021)
-136,077 3 7 39 51
CVR-secondary$ 1 VS 3 -863
(961)
0.012
(0.015)
-73,013 4 14 17 65
CVR-both 2 VS 8 -326
(388)
0.005
(0.016)
-67,145 10 10 28 52
COPD 1 VS 4 1,574
(1,985)
0.009
(0.053)
170,390 32 45 12 11
DMII 1 VS 3 -430
(402)
0.013
(0.013)
-31,942 3 11 12 74
* most effective is defined based on the highest incremental QALY and the reverse; # primary prevention 
for CVD; $secondary prevention for CVD; ICER: incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; CE: cost-effective(ness); 
best is defined as most effective based on QALYs and worse as the least effective based on the same mea-
surement; the numbers correspond to the DMP numbers in Table 4.
7.4 Discussion
In this study we have investigated the short-term changes in costs and effects after the 
implementation of 16 DMPs for three different chronic diseases, namely CVR, COPD, and 
DMII. We have also explored the within DMP predictors of these changes. Finally, a CUA 
was performed from the health care and societal perspective comparing each DMP to 
usual care and comparing the most effective and least effective DMP within five disease 
categories (i.e. CVR-primary prevention, CVR-secondary prevention, CVR-both types of 
prevention, COPD, DMII).
Our results show a significant improvement in the level of chronic care integration 
as measured by the PACIC, in the CVR population (0.10). It improved especially in the 
DMPs that were directed at primary prevention (0.18) or the combination of primary 
and secondary prevention (0.10) of cardiovascular diseases. This is promising because 
patients in these programs had the lowest PACIC scores of the three patient groups. For 
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patients who already had a cardiovascular disease it is probably harder to achieve im-
provements in integrating care because more (para-) medical disciplines and healthcare 
sectors become involved. An unexpected result was that the PACIC decreased by 0.23 
in the DMII-DMPs. This may be due to difficulties to maintain their high starting level of 
integrated care, which in turn may be caused by the attention that was paid to quality 
improvements in diabetes care for the last decade. It would be interesting to examine 
whether our findings would have been similar if another instrument, for example the 
Assessment of Chronic Illness Care (ACIC), would have been used to measure the level 
of chronic care integration. However, we did not include the ACIC in our analysis for 
two reasons. The first is because this paper focuses on intermediate and final outcomes 
in patients, not in professionals. The second is that although the two instruments are 
complementary [214], they both measure the level of integrated care and thus, they 
correlate [215].
Another interesting finding is that DMPs seem to improve the life-style of patients, 
in all three disease categories. Patients reported a higher level of physical activity, 
especially those in DMPs for COPD and CVR management. In addition, the percentage 
of smokers decreased by more than 5 percentage-point in all disease categories; the 
decrease was 11 percentage-point in COPD. This reduction is considerably higher as the 
cessation rate achieved by a physician-advice to stop smoking [216] or the impact of the 
recent ban on smoking in bars and restaurants [217].
Furthermore, our within-DMP analysis showed a reduction in self-efficacy and ge-
neric HR-QoL after the implementation of the DMPs. The slight deterioration (about 
0.03 EQ-5D units) in HR-QoL may be explained as a time effect rather than a treatment 
effect because the HR-QoL of chronic care patients generally tends to decrease over 
time [218]. Similarly, the decrease in self-efficacy may also be related to the decrease of 
HR-QoL because deterioration in HR-QoL may worsen self-efficacy [219,220]. Another 
explanation may be that HR-QoL and self-efficacy are both perceived values that are in-
fluenced by the information and knowledge a patient has. DMP interventions included 
educating patients about their disease, learning them to recognize the early signals of 
disease-worsening, learning them coping skills and stimulating them to improve their 
lifestyle. As a result, patients may have become more aware of their impaired health 
status and their reference point may have shifted.
Our study collected the costs of development and implementation of the DMPs in 
detail and showed that they can be an important driver of total costs. This is in line with 
the findings of the few previous studies that have incorporated them in their analysis 
[27,153,206]. The development and implementation costs per patient were largely driven 
by the personnel costs. Moreover, the 16 DMPs included in our sample were pioneers in 
experimenting with DMPs. Therefore, the number of enrolled patients was perhaps not 
as high in the first year of implementation as the capacity would allow. In the long(er) 
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term, we expect that more patients will be enrolled in the DMPs and caregivers will gain 
experience in managing and maintaining a DMP. That may lower the implementation 
costs per patient. Therefore, we would expect more favourable ICERs for the DMPs in the 
longer term. Within the one-year time frame of our study there are as yet few signals of 
important changes in the costs of healthcare utilization and productivity loss. But the 
heterogeneity in DMPs is large with all 3 DMII-DMPs showing a numerical reduction of 
hospital costs and total health care costs.
The regression analysis indicated that an increase in physical activity was predictive 
of an increase in HR-QoL. Given the observed increase in physical activity in almost all 
disease categories, we may expect DMPs to improve HR-QoL in the longer term. We also 
found that an improvement in self-efficacy was predictive of an improvement in HR-QoL. 
This creates an opportunity for DMPs to develop and implement strategies to improve 
the self-efficacy of the patients. Furthermore, patients with multiple morbidities seem 
to benefit less than patients with one disease. This may imply that the current disease-
specific DMPs do not address the needs that patients with multi-morbidity have, and 
therefore, are less effective for this population. The need for patient-tailored care to 
address the complex needs of patients with multi-morbidity is extensively addressed in 
the literature [221,222]. A horizontal integration of DMPs to simultaneously target CVR, 
COPD, and DMII might be appealing for several reasons. The first one is of course the 
desire to improve the care for these patients. The second reason is that some compo-
nents of the DMPs are largely similar, irrespective of the disease. For example, smoking 
cessation support and physical reactivation can be organized similarly, and adjusted to 
the specific needs of an individual patient. This avoids inefficiencies and double pay-
ments. Another reason is that the number of participants in such a multi-disease DMPs 
will increase, which will lower the implementation and overhead costs per participant.
We also performed a CUA comparing DMPs within a disease area, which is interesting 
for decision makers once they have decided to implement a DMP. Then the variability in 
costs and health outcomes is likely to drive the choice of program. When adopting the 
health care perspective the CUA showed that the majority of the bootstrapped ICERs in 
all types of CVR prevention and DMII comparison pairs were located on the South-East 
quadrant of the CE plane. This indicates that the most effective DMPs had lower costs 
and positive QALY gains compared to the least effective DMPs in these three disease 
groups. This finding remained also when the societal perspective was adopted. How-
ever, the results concerning the primary CVR prevention and COPD were more difficult 
to interpret because of the uncertainty about the QALY gains (health care and societal 
perspective).
As our results showed, the cost-effectiveness of DMPs varies considerably, most likely 
depending on the components of the program, the target population, the success of 
the implementation and the costs of managing and operating the program. These are 
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all factors that contractors of DMPs should consider in the negotiation phase. We are 
planning future analysis aiming to identify the factors that drive the cost-effectiveness 
of a DMP. These findings could contribute to the on-going debate in the Netherlands on 
whether the current bundled payment system for single-disease DMPs are an intermedi-
ate stage towards population-based financing [93]. Population based financing includes 
a risk-adjusted fixed budget (either per group of patients or region) to cover all health 
care provided by multiple professionals from different disciplines. Savings compared to 
a pre-defined benchmark are often shared between payer and provider. A large varia-
tion in the cost-effectiveness of DMPs due to the aforementioned factors, jeopardizes 
the successful implementation of DMPs as means to achieve integration of chronic care. 
Thus, a population-based financing with larger scope in terms of covered population 
and provided interventions, economies of scale that lower operating costs, and consen-
sus of all stakeholders that ensures successful implementation may appear attractive 
to Dutch policy makers. However, the preconditions to introduce a population-based 
financing are far from being reached [223] and therefore, the implementation of DMPs 
on more disease areas is still work in progress.
This study contributes to the growing body of international evidence on integrated 
care in several ways. First, it highlights the necessity to adopt a broad set of outcome 
measures and include the most important cost items from different perspectives in the 
evaluation of DMPs. Second, the findings of our study support the previous studies that 
concluded that DMPs are positively associated with improvements in patient lifestyle 
and quality of care [215,224,225]. Third, our finding that DMPs have the potential to 
become cost-effective in the long-term, and the identification of factors that drive that 
cost-effectiveness, could inform designers of integrated care programs in other Euro-
pean countries. Fourth, the limitation of disease-specific DMPs to address the needs 
of complex patients could urge collective initiatives on a European level to develop 
adequate models of integrated care for this population.
Our study is one of very few studies providing insight into health economic aspects 
of DMPs that includes such a broad range of outcome measures and cost categories. 
However, we fully acknowledge the limitations of the study design with respect to 
causality. At the start of this study there were multiple initiatives to provide integrated 
care across the entire country, stimulated by the introduction of the bundled payment 
system and other financial incentives. Therefore it was impossible to create a control 
group at regional level. It was also difficult to identify control groups within the same 
organization because of the high risk of contamination [152]. This risk is high because 
the implementation of a DMP requires changes at an organisational level. For example, 
redesigning the care-delivery process or training nurses in motivational interviewing 
affects the entire organisation and the entire target population. Therefore, we did not 
aim to compare the DMPs to usual care but rather compare different DMPs within a 
Changes in costs and effects after the implementation of disease management programs in the Netherlands 159
disease category. To optimize comparability, we applied inverse probability weighting 
and corrected for confounders in multivariate analysis. In addition, our results may be 
object to regression to the mean bias. However, this bias is probably limited because our 
sample size is relatively large and the diseases included in our analysis are chronic and 
progressive. These assumptions are supported by a previous study that found minimal 
evidence of regression to the mean in COPD-DMPs [226].
7.5 Conclusions
This study of the short-term effects of DMPs found that the implementation of DMPs 
was associated with improvements in integration of care and lifestyle behaviour, such 
as physical activity and smoking, of patients with CVR, diabetes and COPD. Since an 
increase in physical activity and an increase in self-efficacy were predictive of an im-
provement in HR-QoL, DMPs that aim to improve these are more likely to be effective. 
This study has also shown the wide variation in development and implementation costs 
between DMPs and pointed at the importance of economies of scale. On this short term 
we have not found statistically significant cost savings due to DMPs, but it is likely that 
it takes more time before the improvements in care lead to reductions in complications 
and hospitalizations.
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Appendix 1 Unit cost prices used in the costs analysis
2009 2010 2011 2012
Inflation rate - Dutch Statistics (CBS) 1,2 1,3 2,3 2,5
GP session 28 28 29 30
GP home visit 43 44 45 46
GP phone contact 14 14 15 15
Inpatient day 457 463 474 485
Day care treatment 251 254 260 267
Intensive care unit day 2,183 2,211 2,262 2,319
Outpatient visit 72 73 75 76
Emergency room visit 151 153 156 160
Physical therapy 36 36 37 38
Speech therapy (session) 33 33 34 35
Occupational therapy (hour) 22 22 23 23
Dietary advice (hour) 27 27 28 29
Home care (hour) 35 35 36 37
cost/km 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21
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Abstract
OBJECTIVES: Disease management programs (DMPs) for cardiovascular risk (CVR) and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) are increasingly implemented in the 
Netherlands to improve care and patient’s health behaviour. The aim of the study was 
to provide evidence about the (cost-)effectiveness of Dutch DMPs as implemented in 
daily practice.
METHODS: We compared the physical activity, smoking status, quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) and yearly costs per patient between the most and the least comprehensive 
DMP in four disease categories: primary CVR-prevention, secondary CVR-prevention, 
both types of CVR-prevention, and COPD (n:1,034). Propensity score matching increased 
comparability between DMPs. A two-year cost-utility analysis (CUA) was performed from 
the healthcare and societal perspective. Sensitivity analysis was performed to estimate 
the impact of DMP development and implementation costs on the cost-effectiveness.
RESULTS: Patients in the most comprehensive DMPs increased their physical activ-
ity more (except for the primary CVR-prevention) and had higher smoking cessation 
rates. The incremental QALYs ranged from -0.032 to 0.038 across all diseases. From a 
societal perspective, the most comprehensive DMP decreased costs in the primary CVR-
prevention (certainty: 57%), secondary CVR-prevention (certainty: 88%), and both types 
of CVR-prevention (certainty: 98%). Moreover, the implementation of comprehensive 
DMPs lead to QALY gains in secondary CVR-prevention (certainty: 92%) and COPD (cer-
tainty: 69%).
CONCLUSIONS: The most comprehensive DMPs for CVR and COPD have the potential to 
be cost-saving, effective, or cost-effective compared to the least comprehensive DMPs. 
The challenge for Dutch stakeholders is to find the optimal mixture of interventions that 
is most suited for each target group.
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8.1 Introduction
In the Netherlands, a bundled payment scheme was introduced in 2010 to promote 
disease management programs (DMPs) for patients with diabetes mellitus, chronic ob-
structive pulmonary disorder (COPD) or at risk for a cardiovascular disease event (CVR) 
[47]. The aim of this new scheme was to improve quality and efficiency in chronic care by 
providing continuous, integrated, pro-active, patient-centred, and comprehensive care. 
DMPs were seen as the means to achieve such improvements by including interven-
tions that target the organisation of health care delivery, health care professionals, and 
patients [227].
The wide-scale implementation of diabetes DMPs was smooth and successful. How-
ever, the uptake of DMPs for COPD and CVR is more troublesome. One of the reasons is 
that health insurers, which contract DMPs from care groups are not convinced about the 
financial attractiveness of these programs [93]. The wide variability in the number and 
type of interventions across the implemented DMPs [228] is another reason of scepti-
cism. Previous studies found that DMPs with more interventions are more likely to save 
costs in health care [37,39]. However, there is no clear distinction between DMPs in the 
Netherlands based on their comprehensiveness.
Illustrative of the reluctance among Dutch health care insurers is that the largest 
insurer does not contract CVR-DMPs and provides only a yearly add-on payment per 
patient with an elevated CVR to cover costs of coordination, provider training and ad-
ditional ICT support. Another large health insurer contracts CVR-DMPs only for patients 
diagnosed with a cardiovascular disease (CVD) (secondary prevention) and not for 
individuals at risk to have CVD (primary prevention).
Previous studies found there is evidence that CVR-DMPs and COPD-DMPs improve 
process indicators like coordination of care and communication between caregivers 
[205,225]. Whether this translates into better health outcomes for patients and less 
costs for the healthcare system needs to be investigated. This study aims to provide 
empirical evidence about the comparative (cost-) effectiveness of the most versus least 
comprehensive DMPs that have been implemented in a particular disease area. This 
evidence is required for the successful implementation of integrated chronic care in the 
Netherlands.
8.2 Methods
8.2.1 Design and setting
In a prospective two-year observational study, we compared 13 different DMPs provided 
by primary care groups spread across different regions of the Netherlands [128]: 9 CVR- 
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and 4 COPD-DMPs. Two CVR-DMPs included patients that were at risk for developing 
CVD (primary prevention), two CVR-DMPs patients that had already been diagnosed 
with CVD (secondary prevention), and five CVR-DMPs included both patient groups. The 
COPD-DMPs included patients with mild to moderate COPD severity (i.e. Global Initia-
tive for chronic Obstructive Lund Disease (GOLD) stage 1 and 2). The implementation of 
the DMPs and their participation in the evaluation study was financially supported by 
the Netherlands Organization for Health Research and Development (ZonMw, project 
number 300030201). Outcomes and health care resource utilization were measured at 
baseline (2010), 12 months (2011), and 24 (2012) months using a patient-questionnaire. 
A detailed description of the design and setting is presented in Lemmens et al., 2011 
[128].
8.2.2 Intervention
All DMPs were developed based on Wagner’s Chronic Care Model (CCM) [25,229]. To 
describe the details of each DMP we studied program documents and interviewed DMP 
managers using a check-list of possible interventions that may be included in such 
programs; these interventions were grouped by the components of the CCM [151]. 
Most programs focused on improving the collaboration between different disciplines 
of health care professionals and redesigning the care-giving process towards pro-active, 
patient-centred care. Most of them provided interventions such as self-management 
education and training directed at improving healthy behaviour (physical reactivation, 
smoking cessation, diet improvement, treatment adherence), decision support to 
implement guidelines and protocols, audit and feedback, integration of ICT systems, 
training for health care providers, case management, and reallocation of tasks between 
care providers [128,209,230,231]. However, the number of interventions included in 
the integrated care package differed considerably between the DMPs. We rank ordered 
all DMPs in the same disease area according to the number of different interventions 
included. The one with the highest number was defined as the most comprehensive 
and the one with the lowest number as the least comprehensive. This way we created 4 
pairs of DMPs (i.e. for primary CVR-prevention, secondary CVR-prevention, both types of 
CVR-prevention, and COPD) that were compared in the analyses.
8.2.3 Outcomes
We investigated the impact of the DMPs on patients’ healthy behaviour, measured by 
self-reported smoking status (current, former or never smoker) and physical activity 
(number of days in a week that a patient was physically active for more than 30 minutes). 
These outcomes were selected because healthy behaviour and self-management were 
two of the primary aims of all DMPs, either to lower the CVR or to reduce disease pro-
gression in COPD. We also measured the 3-level EQ-5D utility scores which were based 
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on the Dutch value set to estimate quality adjusted life years (QALYs) [169]. QALYs were 
calculated as the area under the EQ-5D utility curve over time. The questionnaire de-
signed to measure these outcomes also included questions about socio-demographic 
patient characteristics and a checklist of morbidities.
8.2.4 Costs
We estimated five categories of costs, i.e. 1) the costs of health care utilization, 2) the 
costs borne by patient for travelling to receive care and 3) the costs of productivity 
loss due to absence from paid work, 4) the development costs of the DMPs, and 5) the 
implementation costs of the DMPs.
The costs of health care utilization were based on a questionnaire asking patients 
about the number of caregiver contacts (GP, nurse practitioner, nurse, dietician, phys-
iotherapist, podiatrist, lifestyle coach, medical specialists in outpatient clinics etc.), 
hospital admissions and admission days, and medication use. The recall period for these 
questions was 3 months and we asked for all health care utilization, whether or not it 
was related to the disease targeted in the DMP. In addition to these costs, the travel costs 
of patients were calculated, using their self-reported distance to a health care provider. 
Finally, the costs of productivity loss due to illness were calculated, using the friction 
cost approach [172], based on questions about absence from paid employment due to 
illness. The duration of the friction period was 115 days. Standard unit costs as reported 
by [212] were applied (see Appendix 1). All costs were inflated to 2012 and reported on 
an annual basis per patient.
The development costs included the costs that were made during the preparation 
phase of DMPs e.g. labour costs for brainstorming sessions, training costs, and ICT sup-
port costs. The implementation costs were costs that occurred after the provision of DMP 
interventions to patients had started and included the costs for managing the DMP, the 
costs of multidisciplinary team meetings, the costs associated with collecting quality of 
care indicators for audit and feedback, the costs of materials used for patient education, 
and the costs of keeping the ICT operating. The development and implementation costs 
were systematically collected using a template based on the CostIt instrument of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) [197]. This template was completed during face-to-
face interviews with DMPs managers. During these interviews managers were also asked 
about the presence of additional funding to cover the specific elements of integrated 
care. Capital costs were amortized over their life span and allocated to the DMP based 
on square meters for the costs of buildings, and full-time equivalents for the costs of ICT 
and medical equipment (e.g. spirometer). The sum of the capital costs and the operating 
costs of a DMP was then divided by the number of patients participating in the DMP. 
The costs of developing a DMP were amortized in 5 years, recognizing that optimizing 
a DMP is an ongoing process. The combined development and implementation costs 
168 Chapter 8
per patient were consequently calculated by adding one fifth of the development costs 
to the annual implementation costs and dividing it by the number of DMP participants.
8.2.5 Propensity score matching
As a consequence of the observational study design, the patients in the comparators 
in each disease category differed in disease severity (as expressed in quality of life) and 
socio-demographic characteristics at baseline. Therefore, we used propensity score 
matching to reduce confounding caused by these differences. Inverse probability 
weighting was used to balance the most comprehensive and least comprehensive DMP 
in each pair with respect to age, gender (Male/Female), low education (Yes/No), presence 
of multi-morbidity (Yes/No), single as marital status (Yes/No), and EQ-5D at baseline. 
Inverse probability weighting was chosen because it is the preferred propensity score 
matching technique for small samples [213]. Stabilized inverse propensity scores were 
used as weights in order to preserve the sample size of the original data and to produce 
appropriate estimations of variance [232].
8.2.6 Estimated differences and cost-utility analysis (CUA)
For each of the four pairs, we performed bootstrapping to generate 5,000 samples from 
the original sample. For each bootstrap sample, repeated measurement analysis was 
performed by using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) models to estimate the 
difference in mean level of physical activity, proportion of current smokers, QALYs and 
yearly costs per patient from the health care perspective (including cost category 1) and 
the societal perspective (including cost categories 1, 2, and 3) at baseline, 12 months, 
and 24 months for each pair of comparators. The mean predicted values were adjusted 
for age, gender, education level, presence of multi-morbidity, EQ-5D and marital status 
at baseline as well as the stabilised inverse probability weight. We used a Gaussian 
distribution and identity link for the physical activity and QALY estimation, binomial 
distribution and logit link for the smoking estimation, and a gamma distribution and a 
log link for the costs estimation.
Based on the predicted outcomes, we calculated the cost-utility of the most compre-
hensive versus the least comprehensive DMP in terms of incremental costs per QALY 
gained in each disease sample. In this manner, 5,000 predicted incremental costs and 
5,000 predicted incremental QALYs were generated over a two year period (i.e. costs and 
QALYs at the first and second year were summed). The point estimate of the incremental 
cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) was calculated as the mean of the predicted incremental 
costs divided by the mean of the predicted incremental QALYs. The predicted incremen-
tal costs and predicted incremental QALYs were then plotted on a cost-effectiveness (CE) 
plane to show the uncertainty in the ICER.
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8.2.7 Sensitivity analysis
The CUA was also performed including the development and implementation costs per 
patient (cost categories 4 and 5) in order to investigate how sensitive the estimated 
ICERs are to these costs. When the implementation costs in year 2 were not available (i.e. 
in two DMPs), we linearly extrapolated the costs from implementation year 1.
8.3 Results
8.3.1 Defining the DMP comprehensiveness
The number of interventions per component of the CCM for each DMP is presented 
in Table 1. As this table shows, decision support, delivery system design and self-
management were the CCM components with the most interventions, followed by 
organizational support, ICT and community. Regarding primary CVR-prevention, 
CVR-DMP 4 was the most comprehensive (43 interventions) and CVR-DMP 7 was the 
least comprehensive (23 interventions). CVR-DMP 3 (29 interventions) was the most 
comprehensive and CVR-DMP 1 (23 interventions) was the least comprehensive in 
secondary CVR-prevention. Among the DMPs for both types of CVR-prevention, CVR-
DMP 6 was the most comprehensive (35 interventions) and CVR-DMP 9 was the least 
comprehensive (13 interventions). Moreover, in COPD, COPD-DMP 4 was the most 
Table 1 Number of interventions per DMP
ORG COM SM DS DSD ICT Total Comprehensive*
CVR-DMP 1 (secondary CVR-prevention) 0 4 6 6 6 1 23 Least
CVR-DMP 2 (both types of CVR-prevention) 0 3 5 6 5 5 24
CVR-DMP 3 (secondary CVR-prevention) 1 7 3 6 7 5 29 Most
CVR-DMP 4 (primary CVR-prevention) 3 7 6 12 9 6 43 Most
CVR-DMP 5 (both types of CVR-prevention) 1 4 6 7 5 6 29
CVR-DMP 6 (both types of CVR-prevention) 2 7 6 6 8 6 35 Most
CVR-DMP 7 (primary CVR-prevention) 2 1 6 6 7 1 23 Least
CVR-DMP 8 (both types of CVR-prevention) 0 5 6 5 4 5 25
CVR-DMP 9 (both types of CVR-prevention) 0 0 3 4 3 3 13 Least
COPD-DMP 1 2 4 2 8 6 6 28 Least
COPD-DMP 2 2 6 6 7 6 3 30
COPD-DMP 3 1 7 7 7 6 3 31
COPD-DMP 4 3 6 8 11 7 4 39 Most
Total 17 61 70 91 79 54
* within a disease category; ORG: organizational support; COM: community; SM: self-management; DS: de-
cision support; DSD: delivery system design; ICT: information and communication technology; CVR: cardio-
vascular risk; COPD: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; DMP: disease management program
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comprehensive (39 interventions) and COPD-DMP 1 was the least comprehensive (28 
interventions).
8.3.2 Sample characteristics
The sample size, patient characteristics at baseline and baseline values of the outcome 
measures of the most and the least comprehensive DMP within a disease category are 
presented in Table 2. Most patient characteristics differed between the DMPs in each 
disease category. Compared to the CVR DMPs, the COPD DMPs included patients with 
a higher co-morbidity score as measured by the Charlson co-morbidity index [170]. The 
COPD DMPs also included more low-educated, unemployed, currently smoking patients 
Table 2 Sample size, patient characteristics and predicted outcome measurements at baseline after pro-
pensity score matching
Primary CVR-
prevention
Secondary CVR-
prevention
Both types of CVR-
prevention
COPD
Most C.
CVR-DMP 
4
Least C.
CVR-DMP 
7
Most C.
CVR-
DMP 3
Least C.
CVR-DMP 
1
Most C.
CVR-DMP 
6
Least C.
CVR-DMP 
9
Most C.
COPD-
DMP 4
Least C.
COPD-
DMP 1
N baseline 133 34 112 120 257 157 88 133
N 12 months 84 20 58 80 161 90 61 93
N 24 months 64 20 33 58 147 104 51 93
Mean age (sd) 63.1 (10.5) 60.1 (11.3) 65.2 (8.0) 67.6 (10.5) 63.2 (10.4) 66.3 (10.3) 66.5 (9.9) 65.1 (11.4)
% Females 57 56 36 43 54 42 43 45
Mean Charlson 
index (sd)
1.4 (1.0) 1.6 (1.1) 1.9 (1.2) 1.7 (1.2) 1.6 (1.2) 1.4 (1.3) 2.1 (1.3) 2.4 (1.3)
% low 
education
41 44 38 40 44 31 45 56
% employment 45 59 34 35 46 42 35 27
% single 26 32 35 46 21 26 34 34
Mean physical 
activity (sd) #
4.78 (0.17) 5.60 (0.36) 4.89 
(0.18)
4.84 (0.22) 4.37 (0.14) 4.57 (0.18) 4.56 
(0.24)
4.92 (0.17)
% smokers# 0.132 0.234 0.280 0.326 0.163 0.185 0.352 0.452
QALY# 0.823 
(0.016)
0.836 
(0.020)
0.753 
(0.015)
0.751 
(0.015)
0.820 
(0.010)
0.820 
(0.010)
0.761 
(0.015)
0.759 
(0.015)
Mean costs: 
health care 
(sd) #
1,769 
(339)
1,732 
(491)
3,377 
(559)
2,982 
(545)
3,130 
(789)
2,840 
(622)
4,928 
(1,130)
6,194 
(1,351)
Mean costs: 
societal (sd) #
4,520 
(2,370)
6,444 
(3,376)
4,847 
(882)
4,430 
(1,100)
4,939 
(1,060)
3,707 
(771)
6,820 
(1,505)
7,757 
(1,692)
Notes: Most C. and Least C. refer to most comprehensive and least comprehensive respectively; CVR: car-
diovascular risk; COPD: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary; This table reports the patient characteristics at 
baseline; Low education was defined as no or only primary education; # predicted values after propensity 
score marching
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and costly patients than the CVR DMPs. Among the CVR DMPs, patients in the secondary 
CVR-prevention DMPs had the highest mean age, mean co-morbidity score, and mean 
costs as well as proportionally more low educated, males, employed, single, currently 
smoking patients. Patients in the secondary CVR-prevention DMPs also had the lowest 
mean QALY score at baseline among all DMPs.
8.3.3 Healthy behaviour
The results showed that the predicted physical activity increased over time in all DMPs. 
The level of physical activity was higher in the most comprehensive DMPs compared 
to the least comprehensive DMPs in three disease categories (Panel A of Table 3). Only 
patients in the least comprehensive primary CVR-prevention DMP were on average 0.15 
days at the first year and 0.34 days at the second year more physically active than the 
patients in the most comprehensive primary prevention-CVR DMP. However, in all cases 
the differences between the comparators were not statistically significant. Panel B of 
Table 3 shows that the proportion of current smokers decreased over time in all DMPs 
except for CVR-DMP 9. It also shows that there were proportionally less current smok-
ers in the most comprehensive DMPs at the first year (range across diseases samples: 
2%-7%) and the second year (range across diseases samples: 1%-7%) than in the least 
comprehensive DMPs. These differences were not statistically significant.
Table 3 Predicted healthy behaviour after propensity score matching
Panel	A:	Predicted	physical	activity
First year
Mean [CI]
Second year
Mean [CI]
Primary CVR-prevention (n:305;c:151)
CVR-DMP 4 (most comprehensive) 5.31 [4.94;5.69] 5.76 [5.37;6.16]
CVR-DMP 7 (least comprehensive) 5.46 [4.58;6.19] 6.10 [5.33;6.81]
Difference -0.15 [-0.98;0.79] -0.34 [-1.15;0.54]
Secondary CVR-prevention (n:365;c:200)
CVR-DMP 3 (most comprehensive) 5.14 [4.70;5.57] 5.23 [4.59;5.83]
CVR-DMP 1 (least comprehensive) 4.89 [4.44;5.31] 5.25 [4.69;5.81]
Difference 0.26 [-0.34;0.86] -0.02 [-0.83;0.79]
Both types of CVR-prevention (n:737;c:359)
CVR-DMP 6 (most comprehensive) 5.11 [4.81;5.41] 5.52 [5.23;5.80]
CVR-DMP 9 (least comprehensive) 5.00 [4.59;5.39] 5.47 [5.12;5.82]
Difference 0.11 [-0.38;0.61] 0.05 [-0.39;0.50]
COPD (n:470;c:198)
COPD-DMP 4 (most comprehensive) 5.31 [4.88;5.72] 5.33 [4.88;5.74]
COPD-DMP 1 (least comprehensive) 4.92 [4.58;5.26] 5.13 [4.67;5.59]
Difference 0.40 [-0.13;0.91] 0.19 [-0.45;0.83]
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8.3.4 QALYs
The predicted mean QALYs are presented in Table 4. In most cases, the QALYs decreased 
over time except for CVR-DMP 7 where the predicted mean QALY increased from 0.829 
in the first year to 0.832 in the second year. The predicted mean QALYs were higher in 
the most comprehensive compared to the least comprehensive DMP in the secondary 
CVR-prevention (by 0.019) in the first and the second year after DMP implementation. In 
COPD, the most comprehensive DMP had higher (by 0.016) predicted mean QALYs in the 
first implementation year than the least comprehensive COPD-DMP. However, this differ-
ence disappeared in the second year. The difference in the predicted QALYs between the 
comparators in the both types of CVR-prevention, favoured equally (by 0.017) the least 
comprehensive DMP in the first implementation year and the most comprehensive DMP 
in the second year. The least comprehensive DMP in primary CVR-prevention had higher 
predicted mean QALYs in the first year (by 0.010) and in the second year (by 0.022) than 
its comparator. In all diseases the differences were not statistically significant.
Table 3 Predicted healthy behaviour after propensity score matching (continued)
Panel	B:	Predicted	proportion	of	current	smokers
First year
% smoking [CI]
Second year
% smoking [CI]
Primary CVR-prevention (n:332;c:155)
CVR-DMP 4 (most comprehensive) 0.099 [0.046;0.153] 0.069 [0.024;0.114]
CVR-DMP 7 (least comprehensive) 0.166 [0.052;0.301] 0.135 [0.030;0.267]
Difference -0.067 [-0.211;0.057] -0.066 [-0.212;0.046]
Secondary CVR-prevention (n:425;c:212)
CVR-DMP 3 (most comprehensive) 0.205 [0.129;0.279] 0.215 [0.125;0.304]
CVR-DMP 1 (least comprehensive) 0.259 [0.183;0.334] 0.276 [0.185;0.370]
Difference -0.055 [-0.158;0.051] -0.061 [-0.188;0.063]
Both types of CVR-prevention (n:854;c:387)
CVR-DMP 6 (most comprehensive) 0.133 [0.092;0.173] 0.119 [0.078;0.159]
CVR-DMP 9 (least comprehensive) 0.153 [0.089;0.217] 0.191 [0.123;0.260]
Difference -0.020 [-0.100;0.055] -0.072 [-0.151;0.005]
COPD (n:484;c:210)
COPD-DMP 4 (most comprehensive) 0.303 [0.212;0.393] 0.292 [0.202;0.379]
COPD-DMP 1 (least comprehensive) 0.328 [0.241;0.416] 0.302 [0.218;0.387]
Difference -0.025 [-0.147;0.098] -0.010 [-0.124;0.108]
Notes: n: number of observations; c: number of patients; CI: confidence interval; CVR: cardiovascular risk; 
COPD: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary; The difference is calculated by subtracting the values of the least 
comprehensive DMP from the values of the most comprehensive DMP.
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8.3.5 Costs from the health care and societal perspective
The mean predicted yearly costs per patient are presented in Table 5. For primary CVR-
prevention, the difference in healthcare costs was €-1,045 (favouring the most compre-
hensive DMP) in the first year and €425 in the second year. For secondary CVR-preven-
tion, the difference in healthcare cost favoured the most comprehensive DMP in the 
first year (€-2,340) and in the second year (€-66). Similarly, the differences in healthcare 
costs favoured the most comprehensive DMP for both types of CVR-prevention (€-720 
in the first year and €-3,221 in the second year). In COPD, healthcare costs in the most 
comprehensive DMP were higher (by €1,787) in the first year and slightly lower (by €24) 
in the second year than in the least comprehensive DMP. The results from the societal 
perspective were similar, except for primary CVR-prevention were the most comprehen-
sive DMP had lower costs per patient (by €1,045) in the first year of implementation 
compared to the least comprehensive DMP. The most comprehensive COPD-DMP had 
higher costs in the second year compared to the least comprehensive DMP from the 
societal perspective. The difference in costs from the health care perspective in the first 
year in primary CVR was the only statistically significant difference.
Table 4 Predicted QALYs after propensity score matching
First year
Mean [CI]
Second year
Mean [CI]
Primary CVR-prevention (n:300;c:155)
CVR-DMP 4 (most comprehensive) 0.820 [0.791;0.848] 0.809 [0.773;0.846]
CVR-DMP 7 (least comprehensive) 0.829 [0.786;0.868] 0.832 [0.768;0.907]
Difference -0.010 [-0.045;0.029] -0.022 [-0.102;0.044]
Secondary CVR-prevention (n:402;c:212)
CVR-DMP 3 (most comprehensive) 0.761 [0.732;0.789] 0.737 [0.700;0.774]
CVR-DMP 1 (least comprehensive) 0.742 [0.710;0.772] 0.719 [0.671;0.764]
Difference 0.019 [-0.006;0.043] 0.019 [-0.030;0.068]
Both types of CVR-prevention (n:756;c:384)
CVR-DMP 6 (most comprehensive) 0.793 [0.770;0.815] 0.777 [0.749;0.806]
CVR-DMP 9 (least comprehensive) 0.810 [0.0.786;0.833] 0.760 [0.709;0.804]
Difference -0.017 [-0.038;0.004] 0.017 [-0.029;0.071]
COPD (n:454;c:210)
COPD-DMP 4 (most comprehensive) 0.752 [0.719;0.783] 0.721 [0.679;0.762]
COPD-DMP 1 (least comprehensive) 0.736 [0.703;0.769] 0.723 [0.682;0.764]
Difference 0.016 [-0.014;0.046] -0.002 [-0.049;0.043]
Notes: n: number of observations; c: number of patients; CI: confidence interval; CVR: cardiovascular risk; 
COPD: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary; The difference is calculated by subtracting the values of the least 
comprehensive DMP from the values of the most comprehensive DMP.
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8.3.6 Development and implementation costs
As Table 6 shows, the total costs and per patient costs of the DMP development and 
implementation were higher in the most comprehensive DMPs compared to the least 
comprehensive DMPs except for the COPD category.
8.3.7 Results from the cost-utility analysis
The results from the CUA are presented in Table 7. The incremental QALYs ranged 
from -0.032 in primary CVR-prevention to 0.038 in secondary CVR-prevention. Taking 
Table 5 Predicted yearly costs per patient after propensity score matching
Health care perspective Societal perspective
First year
Mean [CI]
Second year
Mean [CI]
First year
Mean [CI]
Second year
Mean [CI]
Primary CVR-prevention (n:341;c:155)
CVR-DMP 4 (most comprehensive) 1,398 
[978;1,971]
1,344 [879;1,978] 3,051 
[1,306;6,609]
2,034 [827;4,786]
CVR-DMP 7 (least comprehensive) 1,161 
[619;1,886]
920 [501;1,541] 4,096 
[759;10,682]
1,683 [468;5,092]
Difference 237 [-477;937] 425 [-228;1,702] -1,045 
[-7,413;3,421]
351 
[-1,665;2,032]
Secondary CVR-prevention (n:440;c:214)
CVR-DMP 3 (most comprehensive) 2,354 
[1,501;3,234]
3,225 
[1,238;6,940]
3,201 
[1,955;4,582]
4,031 
[1,488;8,780]
CVR-DMP 1 (least comprehensive) 4,693 
[2,599;7,419]
3,291 
[1,694;5,434]
5,543 
[3,058;8,904]
5,156 
[2,477;8,501]
Difference -2,340 [-5,138;-
64]
-66 [-3,148;4,117] -2,342 
[-5,834;566]
-1,125 
[-5,594;4,438]
Both types of CVR-prevention (n:885,c:389)
CVR-DMP 6 (most comprehensive) 3,386 
[1,791;6,183]
2,509 
[1,563;4,085]
4,228 
[2,454;6,793]
2,741 
[1,867;3,995]
CVR-DMP 9 (least comprehensive) 4,106 
[2,585;6,469]
5,730 
[1,946;12,156]
5,568 
[3,325;8,533]
8,007 
[2,715;19,385]
Difference -720 
[-2,663;1,461]
-3,221 
[-9,509;394]
-1,341 
[-4,096;1,262]
-5,266 
[-16,464;51]
COPD (n:502;c:211)
COPD-DMP 4 (most comprehensive) 6,688 
[3,321;11,614]
3,281 
[2,397;4,374]
8,355 
[4,097;14,168]
3,738 
[2,680;5,101]
COPD-DMP 1 (least comprehensive) 4,901 
[3,002;6,858]
3,305 
[2,530;4,209]
5,498 
[3,691;7,624]
3,553 
[2,693;4,577]
Difference 1,787 
[-1,794;6,404]
-24 [-1,185;1,199] 2,857 
[-1,582;8,508]
185 
[-1,264;1,787]
Notes: n: number of observations; c: number of patients; CI: confidence interval; CVR: cardiovascular risk; 
COPD: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary; The difference is calculated by subtracting the values of the least 
comprehensive DMP from the values of the most comprehensive DMP.
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the health care perspective (i.e. Panel A of Table 7), the most comprehensive DMP for 
CVR-primary prevention led to higher costs (certainty: 87%) when compared to the least 
comprehensive DMP. In contrast, the most comprehensive DMP providing secondary 
CVR-prevention and both types of CVR-prevention led to less costs (certainty: 78% 
and 96%, respectively). Moreover, the vast majority of the 5,000 simulated ICERs were 
located in the Eastern quadrant of the CE plane in the secondary CVR-prevention (91%) 
and the COPD (69%) denoting QALY gains from the implementation of comprehensive 
DMPs. When QALY gains were very small, the ICERs became very high.
Table 7 Results from the two-year CUA
Most comprehensive 
versus least 
comprehensive DMP
Incremental
Costs (€)
Incremental
QALYs
Mean ICER
(€)
% of 5000 simulated ICERs per 
quadrant in the CE plane
NW NE SW SE
Panel A: Health care perspective
CVR-prim # CVR-DMP 4 VS CVR-
DMP 7
661
(621)
-0.032
(0.045)
-20,515 67 20 9 3
CVR-sec$ CVR-DMP 3 VS
CVR-DMP 1
-2,405
(2,347)
0.038
(0.028)
-63,980 1 13 8 78
CVR-both CVR-DMP 6 VS
CVR-DMP 9
-3,940
(2,684)
<0.001
(0.026)
-11,571,968 2 2 49 47
COPD COPD-DMP 4 VS 
COPD-DMP 2
1,763
(2,287)
0.014
(0.027)
127,659 23 54 8 15
Panel B: Societal perspective
CVR-prim # CVR-DMP 4 VS CVR-
DMP 7
-694
(2,988)
-0.032
(0.045)
21,526 28 14 48 9
CVR-sec$ CVR-DMP 3 VS
CVR-DMP 1
-3,467
(3,115)
0.038
(0.028)
-92,220 1 12 8 80
CVR-both CVR-DMP 6 VS
CVR-DMP 9
-6,607
(4,443)
<0.001
(0.026)
-19,402,211 1 1 50 48
COPD COPD-DMP 4 VS 
COPD-DMP 1
3,042
(2,929)
0.014
(0.027)
220,338 26 59 5 10
Panel C: Sensitivity analysis: health care perspective including development and implementation costs
CVR-prim # CVR-DMP 4 VS CVR-
DMP 7
1,203
(603)
-0.032
(0.045)
-37,320 75 22 2 1
CVR-sec$ CVR-DMP 3 VS
CVR-DMP 1
-2,011
(2,336)
0.038
(0.028)
-53,486 1 17 7 75
CVR-both CVR-DMP 6 VS
CVR-DMP 9
-2,806
(2,609)
<0.001
(0.026)
-8,240,387 6 6 45 43
COPD COPD-DMP 4 VS 
COPD-DMP 1
1,527
(2,262)
0.014
(0.027)
110,579 22 52 9 17
# primary CVR-prevention; $secondary CVR-prevention; CVR = cardiovascular risk; COPD= Chronic Obstruc-
tive Pulmonary Disease; HC = Health Care perspective; SP = Societal Perspective; NE = North East; NW = 
North West; SW = South West; SE = South East. ICER: incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; CE: cost-effective-
ness; in brackets are standard deviations presented;
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As Panel B of Table 7 shows, the results from the CUA taking the societal perspec-
tive were similar to the results from the health care perspective except for the primary 
CVR-prevention. In this sample, 57% of the simulated ICERs indicated that the most 
comprehensive DMP led to cost savings instead of higher costs as found in the CUA 
from the health care perspective.
The CE planes are presented in Appendix 2 and the observed yearly costs and QALYs 
are presented in Appendix 3.
8.3.8 Sensitivity analysis
The results from the CUA taking the health care perspective and including the develop-
ment and implementation costs are presented in Panel C of Table 7. These results showed 
that the addition of development and implementation costs reduced the cost savings 
of the most comprehensive program in secondary and both types of CVR-prevention. 
Inclusion of these costs did not lead to noteworthy differences in the allocation of the 
5,000 simulated ICERs on the quadrants of the CE plane.
8.4 Discussion
In this study we have investigated the differences in physical activity, smoking status, 
QALYs and costs between the most and the least comprehensive DMP in four disease 
categories: primary CVR-prevention, secondary CVR-prevention, both types of CVR-
prevention, and COPD. A CUA was performed from the health care and societal perspec-
tive. Sensitivity analysis was performed to estimate the impact of DMP development 
and implementation costs on the cost-effectiveness.
Our study is one of very few studies providing evidence about the cost-effectiveness 
of DMPs for COPD and CVR in the Netherlands. We purposely did not aim to compare 
DMPs to usual care, because at the start of this study there were so many initiatives to 
provide integrated care across the entire country that it was impossible to construct a 
usual care group. Moreover, the decision to implement DMPs had already been taken 
and was stimulated by the nationwide introduction of the bundled payment system and 
other financial incentives [47]. Therefore, many DMP interventions have been diffused in 
usual care during the follow-up period. This is supported by the results of a cluster RCT 
that evaluated a COPD-DMP compared with usual care, were the authors concluded that 
usual care had moved into the direction of integrated care during the same period as our 
study [233]. Thus, our study addressed the question if investing in more comprehensive 
DMPs is cost-effective compared to less comprehensive DMPs.
Our results show that patients’ physical activity was improved in all DMPs during the 
two-year follow-up period. This improvement was higher among patients in the most 
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comprehensive DMPs, except for the primary CVR-prevention sample. However, the 
higher improvement in the most comprehensive DMPs tends to decrease in the second 
year of implementation when the mean physical activity in the least comprehensive 
DMP increased substantially. Why this occurred remains unclear. These findings, though 
not statistically significant, supplement existing evidence that DMPs improve physical 
activity [224,234].
Moreover, the results show that in all DMPs the percentage of current smokers was 
reduced during the follow-up period except for CVR-DMP 9. This is in line with the find-
ings of previous studies [224,234]. The most comprehensive DMPs appeared to be more 
effective in smoking cessation than the least comprehensive DMPs because they had a 
lower proportion of current smokers during the two-year follow-up period. This suggests 
that smoking cessation may be indirectly supported by interventions (e.g. monitoring, 
decision support systems, family participation) provided in addition to smoking specific 
interventions.
Furthermore, the results showed a negative trend in the quality of life of patients 
(expressed in QALYs) in all DMPs. The differences in QALYs between the comparators 
appeared to favour the most comprehensive DMPs in secondary CVR-prevention and in 
COPD, as 91% and 69% of bootstrap replications were in the Western quadrants, respec-
tively. This finding could be associated with the fact that patients in these DMPs were 
less healthy (approximately 0.76 QALYs at baseline) than in the primary CVR-prevention 
and both types of CVR-prevention (approximately 0.82 QALYs at baseline). If this asso-
ciation exists, then comprehensive DMPs seem to be more appropriate to address the 
needs of more “severe” or complex patients. This is also suggested in the literature [222]. 
Taking into account the increase in the number of “complex” patients (e.g. patients with 
multi-morbidity) [235] and their substantially higher costs [236], comprehensive DMPs 
may be seen as means to tackle this challenge.
The yearly costs per patient from the health care perspective favoured the most com-
prehensive DMPs in secondary CVR-prevention and in both types of CVR-prevention. In 
these DMPs, patients had on average higher costs at baseline and substantially lower 
costs in the first and second year of implementation than patients in the least compre-
hensive DMPs. In contrast, patients in the most comprehensive primary CVR-prevention 
had higher costs from the health care perspective compared to patients in the least 
comprehensive DMP. However, this difference reversed when taking the societal per-
spective, because productivity loss was lower in the most comprehensive DMP. The costs 
of the COPD patients favoured the least comprehensive DMPs taking both perspectives. 
Taking these results into account, it can be argued that most comprehensive DMPs may 
be able to reduce costs, at least from the societal perspective. However, the evident vari-
ability in costs of patients included in Dutch DMPs [204,209] may influence the potential 
of the most comprehensive DMPs to save costs. Therefore, the comprehensiveness of 
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DMPs should be closely targeted to the case-mix of the patient group at interest. In ad-
dition, the potential cost savings from the implementation of comprehensive DMPs are 
likely to be reduced by the higher development and implementation costs associated 
with these programs.
An important issue of discussion is how to define the comprehensiveness of a DMP. 
In this study DMP comprehensiveness was defined as the number of different interven-
tions per component of the CCM. However, previous studies showed that besides the 
number of interventions also the intensity of these interventions and active strategies 
to support implementation of these interventions were related to improved quality of 
care and reduced health care utilization [237,238]. Therefore, in future studies, these ele-
ments should complement the number of DMP interventions when defining the DMP 
comprehensiveness.
Furthermore, we found indications that the comprehensiveness of DMPs, expressed 
as the number of interventions, relates to higher development and implementation costs 
[239]. This finding should be considered thoroughly by DMP providers when designing 
the mix of interventions. It would be wise to estimate the comprehensiveness level at 
which the marginal development and implementation costs do not exceed the marginal 
health care savings (i.e. to find a Pareto optimal equilibrium). This estimation should 
anticipate that the development and implementation costs per enrolee will become 
lower when more patients will be enrolled in the DMP and caregivers gain experience in 
managing and maintaining a DMP.
The evidence provided by the CUA from the societal perspective (the perspective 
preferred by the Dutch health care authorities) indicated that the most comprehensive 
DMPs were likely to be cost saving (primary CVR-prevention, secondary CVR-prevention 
and both types of CVR-prevention) and/or more effective (secondary CVR-prevention 
and COPD) in most disease samples. Especially in secondary CVR-prevention, the most 
comprehensive DMP dominated the least comprehensive DMP (i.e. QALY gains at 
lower costs). The results from the sensitivity analysis (i.e. including development and 
implementation costs) were in the same line. This evidence points out that the compre-
hensiveness of DMPs expressed in number of interventions covering the spectrum of 
the CCM has the potential to improve quality of life of more severe patients (e.g. patients 
diagnosed with COPD and CVD) either at higher or even at lower costs.
This study has several strengths. First, the pragmatic study design allowed the evalu-
ation of real-world data of DMPs implemented in common daily practice. Second, we 
selected comparators from a wide set of DMPs across four different disease categories 
to be compared while, most evaluation studies compare only two alternatives within a 
single disease. Third, different types of outcomes and costs were included in the evalu-
ation. Fourth, we applied stabilised inverse probability weighting as a propensity score 
matching method to optimize comparability between DMPs. Fifth, sophisticated regres-
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sion analysis was used to account for skewed data, missing responses, and repeated 
measurements. Sixth, the bootstrapping method applied in the analyses enabled the 
appropriate estimation of the uncertainty in the predicted outcomes. A major limitation 
of the study was the lack of clinical data. However, future research could investigate the 
impact of comprehensive DMPs on clinical outcomes and use decision-analytic models 
to extrapolate improvements in intermediate clinical outcomes to final outcomes.
8.5 Conclusions
This study showed that developing and providing comprehensive DMPs for CVR and 
COPD is potentially cost-saving, effective or cost-effective. DMP providers, health 
insurers, and policy makers should focus on the comprehensiveness of the DMPs in 
the Netherlands rather than trying to identify which interventions drive the effects of 
integrated care. Find the right mixture of interventions that is optimally comprehensive 
for a specific target population is the greatest challenge.
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Appendix 1 Unit cost prices used in the costs analysis
2009 2010 2011 2012
Inflation rate-
Dutch Statistics (CBS)
1,2 1,3 2,3 2,5
GP session 28 28 29 30
GP home visit 43 44 45 46
GP phone contact 14 14 15 15
Inpatient day 457 463 474 485
Day care treatment 251 254 260 267
Intensive care unit day 2,183 2,211 2,262 2,319
Outpatient visit 72 73 75 76
Emergency room visit 151 153 156 160
Physical therapy 36 36 37 38
Speech therapy (session) 33 33 34 35
Occupational therapy (hour) 22 22 23 23
Dietary advice (hour) 27 27 28 29
Home care (hour) 35 35 36 37
cost/km 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21
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Appendix 2 Cost-effectiveness planes from the main adjusted CUA
Primary CVR-prevention 
Health care perspective    Societal perspective 
 
Secondary CVR-prevention 
Health care perspective    Societal perspective 
 
Both CVR-preventions 
Health care perspective    Societal perspective 
 
COPD 
Health care perspective    Societal perspective 
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Appendix 3 Observed mean costs and mean QALYs per DMP
Total health care costs Total societal costs QALYs
1st Year 2nd Year 1st Year 2nd Year 1st Year 2nd Year
Primary
CVR-prevention
CVR-DMP 4 mean 1,197 1,250 1,888 1,588 0.825 0.811
SD (1,703) (2,256) (6,834) (6,186) (0.172) (0.151)
n 83 63 121 121 77 41
CVR-DMP 7 mean 969 1,001 3,813 841 0.829 0.728
SD (1,197) (1,358) (11,966) (1,381) (0.172) (0.292)
n 20 20 30 30 18 9
Secondary
CVR-prevention
CVR-DMP 3 mean 2,574 2,727 3,916 2,891 0.791 0.810
SD (5,242) (8,720) (10,456) (8,735) (0.181) (0.097)
n 58 33 58 33 56 26
CVR-DMP 1 mean 4,795 3,752 5,164 5,224 0.749 0.704
SD (11,485) (10,629) (12,044) (12,499) (0.197) (0.179)
n 78 57 78 57 70 39
Both types of CVR-
prevention
CVR-DMP 6 mean 2,897 1,638 3947 1929 0.810 0.762
SD (15,988) (2,724) (16998) (3292) (0.190) (0.213)
n 159 145 159 145 151 96
CVR-DMP 9 mean 4,270 4,900 6,220 6,275 0.799 0.755
SD (7,724) (21,398) (14,906) (22,807) (0.208) (0.220)
n 90 102 90 102 79 53
COPD COPD-DMP 4 mean 4,556 2,491 5,399 7,016 0.806 0.749
SD (9,309) (2,404) (10,596) (14,357) (0.180) (0.233)
n 65 67 65 78 63 49
COPD-DMP 1 mean 6,010 3,663 2,654 3,957 0.689 0.671
SD (12,695) (4,888) (2,554) (5,151) (0.219) (0.227)
n 78 81 67 81 77 56
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Abstract
Objectives: The aim of this paper is to develop a methodological framework to facilitate 
the application of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) for a comprehensive eco-
nomic evaluation of disease management programs (DMPs).
Methods: We studied previously developed frameworks for the evaluation of DMPs and 
different methods of MCDA and we used practical field experience in the economic 
evaluation of DMPs and personal discussions with stakeholders in chronic care.
Results: The framework includes different objectives and criteria that are relevant for 
the evaluation of DMPs, indicators that can be used to measure how DMPs perform on 
these criteria, and distinguishes between the development and implementation phase 
of DMPs. The objectives of DMPs are categorised into a) changes in the process of care 
delivery, b) changes in patient lifestyle and self-management behaviour, c) changes in 
biomedical, physiological and clinical health outcomes, d) changes in health-related 
quality of life, and e) changes in final health outcomes. All relevant costs of DMPs are 
also included in the framework. Based on this framework we conducted a MCDA of a 
hypothetical DMP versus usual care.
Conclusions: We call for a comprehensive economic evaluation of DMPs that is not just 
based on a single criterion but takes into account multiple relevant criteria simultane-
ously. The framework we presented here is a step towards standardising such an evalu-
ation.
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9.1 Introduction
Many countries have taken initiatives toward integration in chronic care by develop-
ing and implementing disease management programs (DMPs), which are expected to 
improve effectiveness and efficiency of chronic care delivery [47,57]. Schrijvers (2009) 
define these programs as “a group of coherent interventions designed to prevent or 
manage one or more chronic conditions using a systematic, multidisciplinary approach 
and potentially using multiple treatment modalities” [24]. Health technology assess-
ment (HTA) could have a leading role in informing decision makers around the world 
about the extent to which DMPs meet these expectations [49]. However, despite the 
attention that DMPs have received the last decade, the evidence from the relatively 
few HTA studies [2,49] is inconclusive. This can largely be explained by the variation in 
design, outcome measures, and costing methods used in the economic evaluations of 
DMPs [57,62].
Evidentially, the lack of a methodological framework for the HTA of DMPs has contrib-
uted to this variation and made the comparison of results hardly possible, meaning that 
much time and financial resources have been spent inefficiently [63]. Current decision-
making incorporates traditional cost-effectiveness studies that may not be suitable for 
the comparison between DMPs and usual care. This is because DMPs are complex, mul-
tifaceted interventions that have multiple effects such as improved self-management 
capabilities, coordination and continuity of care, reduced risk factors and complication 
rates, improved quality of life, which cannot be expressed in a single unit of effect like 
a quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) that is traditionally used in economic evaluations of 
health care interventions. Therefore, the establishment of a methodological framework 
to perform an analysis incorporating the most relevant costs and effects is desirable in 
performing economic evaluations of DMPs valuable to decision making.
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is developed to support decision making 
by allowing for a systematic trade-off between multiple, and sometimes conflicting ef-
fects and costs simultaneously in an explicit, transparent and consistent way [240,241]. 
Usually, policy makers implicitly consider and weigh those outcomes (criteria) and 
incorporate them in decision-making in a deliberate way. However, such “intuitive” deci-
sion making may not be transparent and it may be complicated by conflicting criteria 
or different opinions among stakeholders regarding the importance of different criteria 
[242], which jeopardizes the accountability of decision makers to patients, insurance-
payers, and professionals.
The aim of this study is to develop a methodological framework to facilitate the appli-
cation of MCDA in a broader economic evaluation of DMPs including the most relevant 
outcomes and cost categories.
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9.2 Methods
We developed a methodological framework for the application of MCDA in a large study 
in which we evaluate twenty-two DMPs for several chronic diseases in the Netherlands 
[128]. For the development of the framework, we studied literature to identify and un-
derstand MCDA techniques that could be applied to the evaluation of DMPs. To identify 
the objectives and criteria—the first and most important steps in MCDA—we studied 
frameworks that had previously been used to evaluate DMPs. The frameworks of Steuten 
et al. [63] and Lemmens et al. [243] were the most relevant in this respect. We also used 
practical field experience in the ongoing broad HTA of the twenty-two DMPs mentioned 
above and personal discussions with integrated care providers, health insurers, scientific 
and practical experts in the integrated chronic care field as inspiration in understand-
ing the complexities of DMPs and conceiving the idea for the application of MCDA in 
their evaluation. Finally, we conducted a MCDA of a hypothetical DMP versus usual care 
based on our framework to illustrate its application.
9.3 An introduction to MCDA
MCDA has been successfully applied in other areas of public decision making, like the 
environmental area [244]. Interest in MCDA for priority-setting in health care is growing 
rapidly the last decade [245-247]. This is because MCDA overcomes the limitations of 
other priority-setting techniques such as cost-effectiveness, burden of disease, or equity 
analysis that concentrate on single criteria [248]. MCDA elicits preferences for alternative 
interventions by assessing the extent to which the objectives have been achieved using 
measurable criteria [245]. In this process, different criteria are weighted according to 
their relative importance to the decision. Hence, MCDA is a sophisticated method for 
comparing complex interventions such as DMPs incorporating all relevant categories of 
outcomes and costs [247,249,250].
The mains steps in conducting a MCDA include: (i) establishing the decision context 
and identifying the options to be appraised, (ii) identifying objectives and criteria, (iii) 
scoring by measuring the performance of each option on each criterion, (iv) assigning 
weights to each criterion, (v) combining the weights and scores to get the overall value, 
(vi) examining the results and performing sensitivity analysis [246]. There are numerous 
different techniques for performing MCDA and their selection depends on the decision 
situation and the familiarity of the researchers/decision makers with a MCDA technique. 
However, the techniques that have proven to be most feasible and suitable are the 
Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [244].
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9.4 Evaluation frameworks relevant to DMPs
Steuten et al. [63] and Lemmens et al. [243] developed frameworks to evaluate DMPs. 
These frameworks identified structure, process, and outcome indicators used in the 
evaluation of DMPs. The structure indicators (e.g., method of reimbursement, pres-
ence of ICT system) are not relevant to HTA because they cannot be used to assess and 
quantify the performance of a DMP. Rather, these indicators are conditions for a DMP 
to perform well influencing therefore the process and outcome indicators. Lemmens 
et al. [243] distinguished two mechanisms underlying the effects of DMPs on processes 
and final outcomes. The first is the patient’s learning and behavioral change mechanism 
and the second is the professional support and behavioral change mechanism. These 
mechanisms lead to changes in process indicators such as disease-specific knowledge 
and self-care behavior as well as adherence to evidence-based guidelines and use of 
monitoring systems, respectively. Both frameworks relate changes in processes to 
changes in outcomes such as health-related quality of life (HR-QoL), mortality, clinical 
health status, and all relevant costs and distinguish them as important factors in the 
evaluation of DMPs.
9.5 Identifying objectives, criteria, and measurements
Using the previously mentioned frameworks, we identified objectives of DMPs that can 
be included in the second step of performing a MCDA. The extent to which these objec-
tives are achieved can be assessed by introducing a set of criteria similar to the process 
and outcomes indicators included in the frameworks of Steuten et al. [63] and Lemmens 
et al. [243]. In the next sections, we discuss different criteria per objective and we pro-
vide some examples of indicators that could be used to measure the performance scores 
on each criterion (step 3 in MCDA).
9.5.1 Criteria to Assess the Performance of DMPs
The effects of DMPs cover a wider range of outcomes influencing aspects of the deliv-
ery process as well as intermediate and final health outcomes. Although the ultimate 
objective might be to improve health outcomes, it should be kept in mind that it may 
take a long time before quality improvements in structure and process are translated 
into changes in health outcomes [53]. Thus changes in the process of care delivery and 
changes in intermediate outcomes may become goals by themselves.
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9.5.2 Changes in the Process of Care Delivery
Because one of the main objectives of DMPs is to change care delivery toward integra-
tion of care, measurements of this process change should be used. The Assessment of 
Chronic Illness Care (ACIC) and the Patient Assessment of Chronic Illness Care (PACIC) 
could be used as a process indicator of integrated care improvement from the care 
professional and patient perspective, respectively [25]. These instruments cover many 
process indicators described in the framework related to performance of care provid-
ers and continuity of care by Steuten et al. [63]. Moreover, as co-ordination between 
professionals of different disciplines is a crucial element of effective disease manage-
ment [251], measurements of coordination level such as the relational coordination 
survey [252] could be used in the evaluation. In addition, performance indicators, such 
as proportion of patients receiving care according to evidence-based guidelines would 
also be suitable to measure changes in care delivery [253]. Examples are the proportion 
of participants that get smoking cessation support in a COPD-DMP, the proportion of 
participants receiving podiatric care and annual eye controls in a diabetes-DMP, and the 
proportion of participants receiving statins in a cardiovascular-DMP.
9.5.3 Changes in Patient Lifestyle and Self-management Behavior
Because lifestyle improvement of people with chronic conditions is an important objec-
tive of DMPs, measurements of patients’ lifestyle behavior such as smoking, exercise 
and nutrition should be part of the evaluation [68]. There are numerous instruments to 
measure physical activity, including self-report questionnaires such as the Epic Norfolk 
Physical Activity Questionnaire (EPAQ) [254] and activity monitors like pedometers and 
accelerometers. The lifestyle changes are part of self-management. But self-management 
includes much more than this. It refers to any behavioral change that enables patients 
to take conscious decisions on many aspects of every-day life with a chronic disease. 
It includes accepting the disease, maintaining social contacts and support, keeping 
emotional balance, exercises to improve self-efficacy and adaption to the disease, for 
example by applying energy-saving techniques, stress management, working on ad-
equate illness perceptions, etc. It also refers to teaching patients to adequately comply 
with therapy and how to act in case of disease worsening [68]. Part of this is measured 
by the Self-Management Ability Scale (SMAS) [155].
9.5.4 Changes in Biomedical, Physiological, and Clinical Health Outcomes
Depending on the disease that is targeted, changes in biomedical, physiological, and 
clinical health outcomes such as blood pressure, cholesterol, forced expiratory volume 
in 1 second (FEV1), glycated hemoglobin (Hba1c), exacerbations, and complications are 
crucial outcome measurements of DMPs, because they may change disease progression 
and predict long-term changes in the health status of a patient. These outcomes are 
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also informative to providers and contractors of DMPs (e.g., health insurers) that are 
negotiating about the quantity, price, and quality of care [47,196].
9.5.5 Changes in Health-Related Quality of Life
Health-related quality of life should be incorporated in the evaluation of DMPs to assess 
improvements in the quality of life of the participating patients. Although disease-
specific questionnaires may be more sensitive to change, it can be argued that generic 
measurements of HR-QoL such as the Short Form 36 (SF-36) or the EuroQol 5 dimensions 
questionnaire (EQ-5D) might be most suitable to the evaluation of DMPs because a 
significant proportion of patients with a chronic disease suffers from multiple morbidi-
ties. A DMP targeted to one disease may have spill-over effects on other diseases (e.g., 
multiple diseases may benefit from more physical activity or a better nutritional status). 
However, disease-specific measures such as the St George’s Respiratory Questionnaire 
(SGRQ) and domain-specific measures such as the Barthel scale (measuring activities of 
daily-living) [255] could also be included, depending on the purposes of the study.
9.5.6 Changes in Final Health Outcomes
The time horizon of empirical (economic) evaluations of DMPs is often not long enough 
to actually observe a change in (quality-adjusted) life-years. When the association be-
tween previously mentioned categories of health outcomes and the changes in quality 
and length of life is clear, it may be possible to extrapolate the outcomes that occur 
within a shorter time period into life-years or QALYs gained using decision analytic 
disease models [53]. Although there are some attempts to include self-management 
and patient perceptions in such models [256], extensive applications suitable for DMPs 
do not exist yet.
9.5.7 Related Costs
The costs in the evaluation of the DMPs can be distinguished into direct costs within 
the health care sector: (i) costs of development, (ii) costs of implementation, (iii) costs of 
diagnosis and treatment, direct costs outside the health care sector: (iv) costs borne by 
the patient/family, (v) costs of informal care, and indirect costs: (vi) costs of productivity 
losses (vii). Measurements of health care usage costs (e.g., outpatient and inpatient care 
and medication costs), the costs borne by the patient/family, the costs of informal care, 
and costs of productivity loss are similar to the conventional medical technologies, and 
are extensively discussed in the literature [255]. Therefore, we discuss only the measure-
ment of development and implementation costs hereafter.
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9.5.8 Development and Implementation Costs
Development costs include all costs made during the preparation phase of a DMP such 
as labor time of personnel that participated in brainstorming sessions and logistic ar-
rangements, training costs, and costs of software that supports audit and feedback. 
These costs could be estimated by using information that can generally be obtained 
from the managers of DMPs. The DMP implementation costs begin when the provision 
of DMP interventions to patients starts. Examples of implementation costs include the 
costs of managing the DMP, the costs of multidisciplinary team meetings, the costs as-
sociated with collecting quality of care indicators for audit and feedback, the costs of 
materials used for patient education, and the costs of keeping the ICT operating. Costing 
instruments such as the one developed by the World Health Organization [197] could be 
adjusted to systematically collect the development and implementation costs of DMPs.
9.6 Assembling the framework for the MCDA of DMPs
Having identified the most important objectives and criteria for assessing the achieve-
ment of each objective, we developed a framework for the application of MCDA in the 
economic evaluation of DMPs. The framework (see Figure 1) distinguishes between the 
development phase of DMPs and the implementation phase. In the development phase, 
a mixture of patient-directed (e.g., self-management training), professional-directed 
(e.g., education and training) and organizational interventions (e.g., electronic patient 
records) [243], are usually selected, designed, and prepared to be implemented. The 
development costs accumulated in this phase are also incorporated in our framework.
In the implementation phase, the interventions are infused in the organization 
that provides the DMP to patients with a single or multiple chronic diseases. One of 
the short-term outcomes can be a change in patients’ and providers’ knowledge, skills, 
and attitudes that can have an impact on the uptake of patient/professional-directed 
interventions and influence changes in other outcome measures [243]. Hence, in our 
framework, the changes in knowledge, skills and attitudes are seen as part of the 
mechanism through which the changes in the outcome categories can be achieved, 
rather than as separate outcome categories themselves. The framework shows that 
DMP interventions can aim to influence the process of care delivery and patient life-
style and self-management behavior directly or by means of professional and patient 
knowledge, skills, and attitude. Suggested criteria to assess the changes in the patient 
lifestyle and self-management behavior are also part of the framework. They include 
self-management abilities, smoking behavior, physical activity, and nutrition. Likewise, 
the framework includes suggestions for criteria to assess changes in the care delivery 
process, for example disease management level, coordination level and indicators of the 
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extent to which care is provided according to guidelines/care standards. In many cases, 
changes in the process of care delivery would trigger changes in patient behavior and 
vice versa.
Both changes in patient behavior and care delivery lead to changes in biomedical, 
physiological, and clinical health outcomes and changes in HR-QoL. Furthermore, 
changes in biomedical, physiological, and clinical health outcomes may influence the 
HR-QoL. Together, these changes result in changes in final health outcomes (QALYs and/
or life expectancy) in the medium-term, but more likely, the long-term.
We acknowledge that disease management is an iterative process in which changes 
in biomedical, physiological and clinical outcomes and change in HR-QoL may trigger 
new changes in the process of care delivery and patient behavior. This is indicated in our 
framework by the circular arrow at the top of Figure 1.
Finally, the costs that occur during the implementation phase (i.e., DMP implementa-
tion costs, treatment costs, costs borne by the patient/family, costs of informal care, and 
costs of productivity loss) are added to the framework to ensure the calculation of the 
total costs of the DMPs.
9.7 A hypothetical case study
To illustrate how MCDA can be performed in the evaluation of DMPs, a hypothetical 
example is given of a COPD-DMP that is compared with usual care. Usual care is de-
fined as “care most commonly provided by organizations without a DMP” [62]. A list of 
interventions such as included in Supplementary Table 1, may be used as a checklist to 
distinguish between the interventions in usual care and the interventions in the DMP. 
The DMP aims to achieve improvements in all outcome categories of the framework (i.e., 
the six bold squares) plus a measure that relates the costs to the final outcomes, that 
is, the cost-effectiveness. For each objective, one or more criteria are chosen from the 
framework to compare the performance of the two treatments.
In this example, for changes in process of care delivery the self-management support 
criterion (measured by the ACIC) is chosen. Smoking and self-efficacy score are chosen 
as criteria for changes in patient lifestyle and self-management. They were measured as 
the percentage of patients that had successfully quit smoking at 12 months and by the 
self-efficacy domain of the SMAS, respectively. The criterion for the biomedical health 
outcomes is the lung function measured in FEV1% predicted and for changes in HR-QoL 
is the disease-specific QoL measured by the SGRQ. Moreover, the total costs per patient 
are selected as the criterion for the costs and the QALY is the criterion for changes in 
final health outcomes in this example. In addition to these criteria, the cost-effectiveness 
ratio calculated by dividing total costs per patient by the QALY per patient is also taken 
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into account. To bring our hypothetical DMP closer to reality, we have used findings from 
existing studies that evaluated DMPs and usual care against these criteria. We used three 
studies [127,197,257] as we could not find a single study reporting results for the whole 
spectrum of the selected criteria. The results are shown in the performance matrix in 
Table 1.
The next step in implementing MCDA is to standardize the performance measures 
(i.e., retransform the results on different criteria onto the same scale). In this example, 
we have chosen a method that enables us to standardize performance measures with 
different ranges which is:
Sij	=
xij
(xij2 + xyj2)1/2
where Sij is the standardization of the performance value x of the i alternative against 
the j criterion, where i is either the DMP or usual care and j are the criteria in Table 1. 
The performance value of the y alternative against the j criterion is denoted as xyj. In the 
case of the SQRG scores and costs where the scale has a reverse direction (the highest 
the least preferred), the reciprocal of the performance values (i.e. 1/xij and 1/xyj) is used 
in the formula. After standardization, the performance values have a range between 0 
(lowest) and 1 (highest). The standardized performance values of each criterion for the 
two alternative options are presented in Table 2.
Following the steps of the MCDA, weights have been attached to each criterion in our 
example. These weights reflect the relative importance of each criterion in the decision 
making. As mentioned in a previous section, there are several methods to obtain these 
weights but their application is outside the scope of this paper. Complying with MCDA 
manuals, the sum of the hypothetical weights is 1 [249].
In the next step the standardized performance values are combined with the criteria 
weights in order to estimate the total scores. These are calculated using:
 Ti = ∑
n
j=1
 Sij × wj
where Ti is the total score for alternative i and wj is the weight for criterion j. As illustrated 
in Table 2, the total score is 0.73 for the hypothetical DMP and 0.67 for usual care. Con-
sidering this, the DMP option is preferred to the usual care option because it has the 
highest total score in our example.
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9.8 Discussion and conclusion
Our framework contributes to the methodology of HTA of DMPs by providing an ana-
lytical structure to set up a MCDA in the complex field of disease management where 
multiple comparisons of different interventions and different outcomes and costs have 
to be made simultaneously. By valuing a broader set of outcomes than just the QALY, 
this method may overcome the limitations of a conventional CEA. Moreover, even when 
a DMP evaluation has a time horizon that is not long enough to capture changes in final 
health outcomes, this framework can still support decision making because it consid-
ers a great range of objectives and outcomes. This framework can also evaluate DMPs 
targeted to patients with multi-morbidity by selecting criteria that are relevant for such 
population.
It is important to note that our framework does not intend to explain the mechanisms 
through which changes can be achieved, as it is done by many theories on behavioral 
change. Our framework focuses on the decision criteria used in evaluating a DMP. Nev-
ertheless, one of the major challenges is the selection of the criteria to be included in 
the MCDA, because it is impossible to include all aspects that are possibly influencing 
decision making. Should they be restricted to the objectives (outcomes categories 
and costs) included in our framework or are there other, wider criteria that need to 
be incorporated such as size of the target population or the difficulty to motivate the 
target population? Should the average cost/QALY ratio be one of the criteria or not, 
considering that decision making is commonly based on the incremental ratio of ad-
ditional costs compared with current care divided by the gain in QALYs? Also, for the 
same objective, different and multiple criteria can be chosen, which may be equally 
relevant and for each criterion multiple indicators and measurements may be available. 
To overcome these challenges, previous studies have mostly used literature reviews, 
semi-structured interviews, and expert opinions to restrict the criteria to a manageable 
number [247,258]. One way forward would be that the researchers and decision makers 
would agree on a core or minimal set of criteria and indicators for each objective that 
Table 2 Example of scoring the two treatment alternatives
Criterion Self-man-
agement 
support
Smoking Self-
efficacy
Lung 
function
Disease 
specific 
quality of 
life
Total 
costs per 
patient
QALY Cost-effec-
tiveness 
ratio
Total 
score*
Weights 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.20 1.00
Standardized performance scores
DMP 0.90 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.62 0.72 0.64 0.73
Usual care 0.45 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.78 0.69 0.77 0.67
* Total score was calculated as a weighted sum of the standardized performance scores
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would be used for a certain period (see Supplementary Table 2). Additional criteria could 
be added to this set where relevant.
Obtaining the weights is another challenge. There are different methods available, 
which are roughly categorized into value-based methods, outranking methods, and 
goal-achievement methods [244]. A discrete-choice experiment is an example of a 
value-based method, but it requires independence between the criteria. The application 
of the Analytic Network Process (ANP), which is an extension of the AHP, may be the most 
suitable as it overcomes the concerns about the dependence between criteria [259]. 
AHP is a value-based approach using pair-wise comparisons between criteria and DMPs 
to derive numerical weights and performance scores. It is called hierarchical because 
criteria can be divided into sub-criteria. The scores and weights are developed for each 
individual criterion initially and then aggregated assuming multiplicative preferences. 
The essence of ANP is the possibility to include dependence between the criteria in a 
decision. This advantage seems to be important to perform an evaluation of DMPs using 
MCDA because the outcomes of DMPs may be interacting, failing therefore, to ensure 
independence between the criteria, as it is required by the other MCDA methods.
In conclusion, we have presented a framework for the application of MCDA to si-
multaneously assess the broader outcomes and costs of DMPs. This methodology may 
stimulate and facilitate a much broader economic evaluation of DMPs that is currently 
done. It is desirable to further explore the applicability of MCDA approaches to DMPs. 
Therefore, we have planned empirical applications of this framework within the context 
of a large study in which we evaluate twenty-two different DMPs [128]. The framework 
could be used in reimbursement decisions for DMPs or in negotiation processes between 
DMP providers and health insurers after having collected the necessary information 
on the selected criteria. Using this framework, decision makers on governmental and 
organizational level as well as health insurers and other payers could be provided with 
comprehensive information about what DMPs actually deliver on patient, professional 
caregiver, and organizational level and to what costs. This would improve the transpar-
ency about which criteria play a role in the decision making process and to what extent 
[242]. As a result, the results of MCDA could support decision makers to improve consis-
tency in decision making and accountability to patients and professionals with the final 
aim to improve the quality and efficiency of chronic disease care.
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Supplementary Table 1 Indicative list of DMP interventions per Chronic Care Model component*
Interventions per CCM component Usual 
care
(√)
DMP
(√)
Description of 
specific intervention
Organizational support
Integrated financing
Specific subsidies for foreign population
Sustainable financing agreements with health insurers
Other:
Community
Cooperation with external community partners
Treatment and care pathways in outpatient and inpatient care
Involvement of patient groups and patient panels in care design
Discussion panel for community partners related to chronic care
Regional training course
Family participation
Other:
Self-management
Promotion of disease specific information
Individual care plan
Life-style interventions (e.g. physical activity, diet, smoking cessation)
Support of self-management (e.g. internet, email or sms, 
e-consultation)
Tele-monitoring
Personal coaching
Motivational interviewing
Informational meetings
Mirror interviews
Group sessions for patient and family
Cognitive behavioural therapy
Other:
Decision support
Care standards
Uniform treatment protocol in outpatient and inpatient care
Training and independence of practise assistants
Professional education and training for care providers
Audit and feedback
Development and implementation of care protocols for immigrants
Structural participation in training sessions
Quality of Life questionnaire
Registration of process and outcome indicators
Qualitative evaluation of health care via focus-groups with patients
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Interventions per CCM component Usual 
care
(√)
DMP
(√)
Description of 
specific intervention
Periodic evaluation of DMP interventions and feedback
Measurement of patient satisfaction
Other:
Delivery system design
Multidisciplinary cooperation between outpatient and inpatient care
Delegation of care from specialist to nurse/care practitioner
Development of health pathways and protocols
Substitution of inpatient with outpatient care
Systematic follow-up of patients
Specific plan for immigrant population
Meetings of different disciplines for exchanging knowledge/
information
Monitoring of high-risk patients
Board of clients
Periodic discussion sessions between care professionals and patients
Stepped care method
Other:
ICT
Electronic Patient Records system (with/without patient portal)
Hospital Information System
Integrated Information System
Use of ICT for Internal and/or regional benchmarking
Systematic registration by every caregiver
Exchange of information between different care disciplines
Other:
adjusted from: Wagner, E. H., Glasgow, R. E., Davis, C., Bonomi, A. E., Provost, L., McCulloch, D., et al. (2001). 
Quality improvement in chronic illness care: A collaborative approach. The	 Joint	Commission	 Journal	on	
Quality	Improvement,	27(2), 63-80. *Wagner’s Chronic Care Model (CCM) provides a framework of elements 
that must be considered when developing improvement strategies for providing care for people with 
chronic diseases, originally including: a) self-management, b) decision support, c) delivery system design, 
d) clinical information systems, e) health care organization, and f ) community resources and policies.
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Supplementary Table 2 Indicative list of core criteria and potential indicators per objective
Changes in process of care delivery
Criteria: Indicators:
Disease management level Assessment of Chronic Illness Care (ACIC),
Patient Assessment of Chronic Illness Care (PACIC)
Coordination level Relation coordination survey
Performance indicators Indicators related to care process e.g. proportion of 
patients receiving care according to evidence-based 
guidelines
Changes in patient lifestyle and self-management behaviour
Criteria: Indicators:
Smoking % of participant that quitted smoking
Nutrition Nutritional status e.g. % of daily calories available from 
fat, Body Mass index
Self –management behaviour Self-Management Ability Scale (SMAS)
Physical activity level Epic Norfolk Physical Activity Questionnaire (EPAQ),
Short Questionnaire to Assess Health-enhancing 
Physical Activity (SQUASH),
activity monitors (e.g. pedometers and accelerometers)
Changes in biomedical, physiological, and clinical health outcomes
Criteria (depending on disease(s) of the target 
population):
Indicators:
Blood pressure mmHg
Cholesterol level mmol/l
Lung function FEV1, FVC
Changes in health related quality of life (HRQoL)
Criteria: Indicators:
Generic HRQoL SF-36 questionnaire
Utilities EQ-5D questionnaire, SF-6D questionnaire
Changes in final health outcomes
Criteria: Indicators:
Quality Adjusted Life Years QALYs
Changes in costs
Criteria: Indicators:
Costs from the health care perspective Sum of: a) developments costs, b) implementation costs, 
c) diagnosis, treatment and care costs
Costs from the societal perspective Sum of the above mentioned costs plus: a) costs borne 
by the patient/family, b) costs of informal care, c) costs of 
productivity loss
Changes in combined objectives
Cost-effectiveness/utility Incremental cost-effectiveness/utility ratio
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10.1 Main findings
10.1.1 Payment schemes implemented to promote integrated care and their 
impact
Several European countries have implemented financial agreements to promote the 
integration of chronic care, including pay-for-coordination (PFC), pay-for-performance 
(PFP), bundled payment and global payment. These agreements provided incentives 
to different stakeholders. The reforms in Austria (financial pooling), Denmark (regional 
budgets), and Germany (global payment) provided financial incentives and means to 
financial poolers and payers. On the other hand, the implementation of PFP in France, 
England, Estonia, Hungary and Portugal targeted the financial reward of primary care 
physicians. In the Netherlands however, the implementation of bundled payment pro-
vided financial incentives to both health insurers and health care providers. Combina-
tions of financial agreements were evident in France (PFC and PFP) and Germany (Global 
payment and PFC).
The interviews in Chapter 2 showed that all financial agreements appeared to have 
changed the structure of chronic care delivery. PFC, as it was implemented in Austria, 
France and Germany, was perceived to be the most successful in increasing collaboration 
within and across health care sectors, whereas PFP, as it was implemented in England 
and France, was perceived most successful in improving other indicators of the quality 
of the care process. The most commonly mentioned barriers to the implementation of 
payment schemes were the misaligned incentives among stakeholders and gaming of 
the system by care providers.
In the Netherlands, these barriers could be overcome by meeting a set of necessary 
conditions described in Chapter 3. These conditions included written liabilities and 
responsibilities of stakeholders that are linked to care standards, promotion of financial 
incentives to health insurers to act as purchasers of efficient chronic care, establishment 
of transparent relationship between performance indicators and the bundled payment 
and development of adequate information systems.
Regarding the impact of the payment schemes, the results from the empirical analysis 
in Chapter 4 showed that PFP and all-inclusive financial agreements have the potential 
to reduce substantially the growth of health care expenditure. It also appeared that PFC 
has the potential to reduce outpatient health care expenditure. In details, the annual 
growth of outpatient expenditure was decreased in countries with PFC (by 21.28 US$ per 
capita) and in countries with all-inclusive agreements (by 216.60 US$ per capita). When 
modeling impact as a non-linear function of time during the total 4-year period after 
implementation, PFP decreased the growth of hospital and administrative expenditure 
and all-inclusive agreements reduced the growth of outpatient expenditure.
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10.1.2 Variability in costs related to DMPs
The results in Chapter 5 demonstrated the existence of large variability in costs of 
patients with different chronic diseases enrolled in Dutch DMPs. This variation ranged 
across the investigated DMPs from about €400 to €2,000 (including travelling and pro-
ductivity loss) per patient per 3-months and was present within and across diseases. The 
results further showed that age, the presence of cardiovascular disease, multi-morbidity 
and payments on top of the payment for the usual care had a positive relation with 
costs, while better quality of life was associated with lower health care costs.
Further, the results in Chapter 6 demonstrated large variability in the development 
and implementation (D&I) costs of DMPs implemented in the Netherlands. The develop-
ment costs varied from €5,891 to €274,783 and the implementation costs varied from 
€7,278 to €387,879 across DMPs. This variation can be explained by the large variability 
in DMP development duration, size of DMP providing organization, and the level of 
integrated care in the providing organization prior to the implementation of a DMP. 
The qualitative analysis showed that the development duration and level of integrated 
care were associated with the attributes of the interventions, project leadership, and the 
history of the ICT systems used in a DMP. The findings also indicated the existence of 
economies of scale and economies of scope which may reduce D&I costs.
10.1.3 Cost and effects of DMPs
After a year of implementation (Chapter 7), DMPs were associated with improvements 
in integration of CVR care (0.10 PACIC units), physical activity (+0.34 week-days in which 
patients had at least 30 minutes of moderate or severe physical activity) and smoking 
cessation (8% less smokers) in all diseases. Furthermore, increases in physical activity 
and in self-efficacy were predictive of an improvement in patient’s quality-of-life. On the 
cost side, the changes in health care utilization costs were not statistically significant 
and the D&I costs were an important driver of total costs per patient included in a DMP. 
When comparing the most with the least effective DMP in a disease category, the vast 
majority of bootstrap replications (range:73%;97%) pointed to cost savings, except 
for COPD (21%). QALY gains were small (range:0.003;+0.013) and surrounded by great 
uncertainty.
Moreover, the results from the two-year follow-up after DMP implementation (Chap-
ter 8) also showed that patients’ physical activity was improved and the percentage 
of current smokers was reduced in (almost) all DMPs. However, patients in the most 
comprehensive DMPs increased their physical activity more (except for the primary 
CVR-prevention) and had higher smoking cessation rates. In addition, the evidence 
provided by the CUA from the societal perspective (the perspective preferred by the 
Dutch health care authorities) indicated that the most comprehensive DMPs were likely 
to be cost saving (primary CVR-prevention, secondary CVR-prevention and both types of 
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CVR-prevention) and/or more effective (secondary CVR-prevention and COPD) in most 
disease samples.
Although Chapters 7 and 8 included a broad range of costs and effects in the evalua-
tion of DMPs, the application of the framework provided in Chapter 9 would have further 
strengthen the broad and robust evaluation of DMPs. The developed framework fa-
cilitates the application of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) by including different 
objectives and criteria that are relevant in the evaluation of DMPs, providing indicators 
to measure the performance of DMPs, and distinguishing between the development 
and implementation phase of DMPs.
10.2  Designing appropriate payment schemes for integrated care in 
Europe
During the last three decades, purchasers of health care in the U.S. have investigated 
alternative payments schemes to stimulate integration of care. These schemes aimed 
to contain costs and improve quality of care. The most well-known payment schemes 
implemented in the U.S. are global payment, accountable care organizations with 
shared savings program, PFP, bundled payment, and PFC [71]. These schemes are not 
just an alternative method for paying health care providers. They introduced financial 
risk to providers, explicit measures of quality improvement driven by financial incentives 
to providers, efforts towards patient-centred care through integration and coordination 
of care, and financial incentives for patient safety. Positive evidence from the implemen-
tation of these payment schemes are reported in the literature [44,46,166,260].
Part A of this thesis showed that most the abovementioned payment schemes were 
adopted in European countries to reach the same aims (i.e. cost containment and im-
proved quality of care) by stimulating integrated care. However, most of these payment 
schemes were adapted to be “transferable” to the European context and were accompa-
nied by broader reforms in the European health care systems. The adoption (i.e. which) 
and adaptation (i.e. how) of a payment scheme in a European country were based on the 
structure of its health care system. For example, all-inclusive payments (i.e. bundled pay-
ment and global payment) were adopted in countries with a risk-equalization system in 
health care financing (e.g. the Netherlands and Germany). Further, payment schemes 
were often combined (e.g. global payment with PFC in Germany) or provided on top 
of traditional payment schemes (e.g. PFP on top of capitation and FFS in England). Us-
ing the main features of a health care system as stepping stones to achieve a payment 
reform in chronic care would save time and effort to have it successfully implemented.
Similar to the U.S., health policy makers in Europe considered also the structure of 
the financial incentives of key stakeholders in each country when designing payment 
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schemes for integrated care. As a result, newly introduced payment schemes in Europe 
targeted those stakeholders who were expected to adjust their behaviour and provided 
them with adequate financial incentives. This is crucial factor of a successful reform 
considering that misaligned incentives between health care stakeholders were found to 
be the strongest barriers in payment reform. However, the consecutive reforms denote 
that the right mixture and level of financial incentives to stimulate stakeholders towards 
integrated care is still to be found in Europe.
A solution to this would ideally be the integration of payment of all necessary health 
services for people with chronic diseases. Part A in this thesis showed that the imple-
mented payment schemes to integrated care in European countries achieved different 
targets. For example, PFC appeared to be the most successful in increasing collabora-
tion within and across health care sectors, whereas bundled payment was perceived 
to integrate financing of different care sectors. In addition, the implemented payment 
schemes appeared able to reduce the growth of health care expenditure in different 
health care sectors. For example PFC and all-inclusive payments reduced the growth 
in outpatient expenditure while PFP reduced the growth in hospital expenditure. 
Therefore, a blended payment scheme that has a yearly risk-adjusted global payment as 
basis and PFC and PFP as additional payments is likely to overcome the barriers of each 
individual scheme and provide the strongest financial incentives to control health care 
expenditure. Similar blended payment schemes in the U.S. proved to improve quality of 
care and reduce health care expenditure [46].
The designers of such a blended payment structure would face a number of chal-
lenges. First, it should be thoroughly considered whether the global payment to health 
care providers would be per insured, per patient, per citizen or per specific population. 
The structure of a health care system should be included in this consideration. For 
example, a global payment per specific population would be easier to be implemented 
in U.K. where NHS is the main purchaser of care than in The Netherlands were several 
health insurers purchase care within a region. Second, the D&I costs of DMPs (when 
applicable) should also be incorporated in a blended payment. These costs are expected 
to fluctuate over time due to economies of scale, economies of scope and the cumula-
tive management experience. This fluctuation would be difficult to be incorporated in 
the (negotiated) global payment component. Third, the PFP component should reward 
good performance on various outcomes of integrated care including indicators related 
to multi-morbidity, prevention and self-management. Fourth, the global payment and 
the PFP components of a blended scheme should be designed in a way that discourages 
health care providers to “game” (by “upcoding” the severity of the patients and aiming 
only to score high on the performance indicators instead of improving the quality of 
care, respectively) the payment system.
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As Part A showed, “gaming” of payment schemes and misaligned incentives of 
stakeholders were the strongest barriers of payment reforms. These barriers may also be 
present in the introduction of a blended payment scheme as described above. Shared 
savings could also be added as additional payment to the blended payment scheme 
in order to overcome these barriers. Under this payment component, one or more care 
providers and one or more health insurers form an agreement that savings relative to 
a benchmark can be returned to the providers and/or insurers. Therefore, health care 
providers and payers have aligned incentives to contain costs and improve care qual-
ity. To achieve full alignment across stakeholders, the allocation of gains among the 
participating health care providers should financially satisfy all involved parties [261]. 
Furthermore, a part of the gains could be used to support intensive prevention and self-
management support programs and reward patients (e.g. by reducing co-payments for 
patients who achieved their healthy behaviour goals).
The last and probably the most important ingredient in designing and introducing 
an appropriate payment scheme for integrated care, is the strong willingness and com-
mitment of the health care authorities to facilitate this process. Re-positioning financial 
incentives and changing behaviour in health care sector, which requires a large share of 
a country’s GDP and workforce, is not an easy task.
10.3 Determinants of DMP cost-effectiveness
The evidence about the cost-effectiveness of DMPs is inconclusive [2,49]. A reason for this 
is that the nature of a DMP differs substantially from the conventional medical technolo-
gies (e.g. drugs, devices, treatment equipment, surgical interventions, screening, and 
vaccination programs) that have most commonly been subjected to economic evalu-
ation. DMPs commonly contain a mixture of many different interventions that involve 
changes in the process of the chronic care delivery and the behaviour of caregivers and 
patients. Part B and Part C in this thesis showed that the cost-effectiveness of DMPs vary 
considerably and it is most likely depending on the components and intensity of the 
program, the success of the implementation, the (case-mix of the) target population, 
the D&I costs, and time.
On the effectiveness side, DMPs that provided a larger number of interventions across 
the six components of the CCM were found to be potentially cost-saving, effective or 
cost-effective (see Chapter 8). However, the effectiveness depends also on the mixture 
of interventions provided by a DMP. Different combinations of interventions within and 
across the components of the CCM could lead to different effects of the program. The 
results in Chapter 7 indicated that interventions that stimulate physical activity and self-
efficacy were predictive of an increase in patient’s quality of life. Therefore, the inclusion 
210 Chapter 10
of these interventions in a DMP would increase its effectiveness. Furthermore, patients 
with multiple morbidities seem to benefit less than patients with one disease. This may 
imply that the current disease-specific DMPs do not address the needs of patients with 
multi-morbidity and therefore, they are less effective for this population.
It is also expected that the effectiveness of DMPs would be higher, if the intensity 
level of the interventions would be carefully determined and customised to the needs of 
the participating patients. An appropriate mixture of interventions but at low intensity 
level would presumably not be effective to chronic patients with high unmet needs.
Moreover, Part C in this thesis reported that comprehensive DMPs seem to be more 
appropriate to address the needs of more severe or complex patients. This means that 
the comprehensiveness of the DMPs should be aligned with the case-mix of patients 
to address effectively the needs of patients especially of those with multi-morbidity. 
In addition, the motivation and health literacy of the target population determines the 
effectiveness of the DMP [12]. Patients that are not willing or not able to become health 
managers and comply with treatment plans would barely get benefits from DMPs, 
thereby limiting its effectiveness on the aggregated level.
It is obvious that if the provided interventions are not successfully implemented then 
the effectiveness (if any) of the DMP would be limited. Therefore, finding the right mix-
ture and density of interventions that is optimally comprehensive for a specific target 
population and successfully implemented is the recipe to maximize the effectiveness 
of DMPs. Successful implementation strategy requires carefully planning that takes into 
account the nature of the innovation; characteristics of the professionals and patients 
involved; and the social, organisational, economic and political context [262].
On the cost side, Part B of this thesis reported wide variation in D&I costs of DMPs, 
which is driven primarily by the duration of the development phase, the labor in-
tensiveness needed to develop and implement a DMP, and the size of the providing 
organization. As a result, the D&I costs would be lower in DMPs with experienced and 
capable DMP managers, developed infrastructure (e.g. ICT system), and high level of 
care integration prior to the development phase. These costs would also be lower if 
existing economies of scale and economies of scope would be optimally explored 
and exploited. This means that once an organization has invested in developing and 
providing a DMP, it should utilize the accumulated knowledge and infrastructure 
to include more patients in the DMP and to provide more DMPs. By doing this, the 
costs of providing a DMP are expected to become lower, thereby increasing its cost-
effectiveness.
Furthermore, it should be realized that if the D&I costs outweigh the potential 
cost savings of a DMP then its cost-effectiveness is at stake. The sensitivity analysis in 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 showed that the inclusion of D&I costs did not change the cost-
effectiveness of the compared DMPs. However, it should be reminded that the analysis 
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compared DMPs. If a DMP was compared to usual care, where there are no D&I costs, the 
impact of these costs on the cost-effectiveness of a DMP would be larger.
Time is undoubtedly a major determinant of the cost-effectiveness of DMPs. It is ex-
pected that evident improvements in quality of care and patient health behavior would 
slow down disease progression, reduce symptoms, prevent events (e.g. stroke) and 
avoid complications (e.g. diabetic foot ulcers). This would increase the cost-effectiveness 
of DMPs in the long term by improving patient’s quality of life (or even mortality) and 
reducing hospitalization costs, which are the main drivers of total DMP costs.
10.4  Relevance and implications for stakeholders in the Dutch chronic 
care
Chapter 3 highlighted possible threats to and necessary conditions for the success of 
the bundled payment in the Netherlands. Almost five years after the introduction of 
this payment scheme, these conditions have not been met and the possible threats are 
still present [93,196]. Five major conditions remain unfulfilled in the implementation 
of bundled payment. These include the adequate definition and measurement of per-
formance indicators, the well-performing integrated ICT systems, the alignment of the 
provided DMP interventions and the targeted population, and the inclusion of a greater 
variety of health services in the bundled payment.
The current Dutch performance indicators are based on clinical guidelines and 
protocols and focus more on the process of care delivery rather than on outcome 
measurements. However, the current set of performance indicators does not include 
measures related to the provision of patient-tailored care, adequate treatment of multi-
morbid patients, and coordination of multi-disciplinary teams. These processes are core 
elements in the provision of integrated care and improvements in them should be mea-
sured and rewarded. Further, performance indicators targeting disadvantaged groups 
and economically deprived population should be included in the reward of health care 
providers. A study showed that tackling health inequalities has a larger effect on patient 
health than the current performance indicators included in the British Quality and Out-
comes Framework [260]. Chapter 2 showed a general trend of PFP schemes towards the 
inclusion of process performance indicators that adequately reflect the aims of the pay-
ment scheme. This is because process performance measurements capture important 
information that is otherwise not measured and may have large effects on patient health 
[263]. In addition, the performance is currently measured at the organizational-level and 
it does not reflect the needs of a specific population. Patient-specific or group-specific 
(e.g. patients with multi-morbidity) performance indicators tailored to the needs of a 
specific population group would enable the reward of patient-tailored care. An example 
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would be to reward health care providers for the holistic assessment of patients with 
multi-morbidity and for monitoring the interaction of their medical treatment for 
different diseases. Another example would be that reducing body mass index among 
obese patients should be rewarded regardless the fact that they are still considered as 
overweight (i.e. their BMI is above a specific threshold). Measuring both absolute and 
relative improvements on specific indicators would stimulate high-performing provid-
ers to maintain their performance levels and motivate low-performing providers to 
achieve relatively high performance [264].
The last five years, there were many attempts to establish effective communication 
between ICT systems (e.g. between primary and secondary care), implement integrated 
ICT systems, and register clinical data appropriately in the ICT systems. Remarkable im-
provements have been made ever since. However, the result of these attempts is far from 
having achieved well-performing ICT systems able to facilitate integration of chronic 
care. Despite recent improvements, the patient data is still not adequately registered 
and sufficiently shared between different health care providers. Chapter 6 indicated that 
an ICT system is a driver of D&I costs and suggested the collective involvement and 
support of health insurers, care organizations and authorities in their full development. 
The recognition of the shared benefits of an ICT development by the stakeholders may 
be not enough to trigger their involvement and active participation. Practical solutions 
to the technical and privacy challenges of linking ICT systems should also be provided. 
In addition, providers would be (more) motivated to register processes and outcomes 
if these registration data were used in the clinical practice (e.g. to guide treatment 
choices), public reporting, and/or to support payment schemes.
Furthermore, Chapter 5 pointed out that DMPs included sub-group of patients 
with high costs for which the potential cost savings due to DMPs may be higher than 
for other patients and Chapter 7 concluded that patients with multi-morbidity seem 
to benefit less from DMPs than patients with a single chronic disease. The DMPs, as 
currently implemented in the Netherlands, provide the same set of interventions to 
patients with similar clinical profiles without sufficient incorporation of patient needs, 
preferences and capabilities. Taking into account the variability in patient needs with 
one or more chronic diseases, this approach of providing DMPs may be not efficient. 
Predictive modelling to identify a group of patients that can potentially obtain the 
maximum effectiveness of a specific set of DMP interventions should be applied during 
the development phase of DMPs. For example, Chapter 7 showed that the inclusion of 
physical activity interventions in COPD-DMPs and the support of COPD patients to get 
or remain in employment are linked with reduced health care costs of these patients. 
In this approach, several sets of DMP interventions could be combined to provide a 
patient-tailored package of disease management interventions. This is also discussed 
in Chapter 8 where more comprehensive DMPs appeared to address more adequately 
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the needs of severe/complex patients than less comprehensive DMPs. Moreover, it is 
evident that the cost-effectiveness of DMPs would increase by providing customized set 
of interventions to chronic patients. This would trigger health insurers to invest in such 
programs, which is a condition for the success of the bundled payment (Chapter 3). At 
the same time, the financial risk exposure of the DMP providers would be reduced if the 
negotiated bundled payment would adequately differentiate (i.e. full risk equalization) 
based on the case-mix of patients that receive a specific set of interventions and would 
fully include the DMP development and implementation costs.
The bundled payment is disease specific and includes only a part of the total health 
care expenditure for chronic care (e.g. physiotherapy, smoking cessation support, 
hospital care and medication are not or to fully included in this payment). The narrow 
scope of services included in this payment enfolds two threats for the success of the 
scheme from the list of threats described in Chapter 3. There is a risk of segmentation 
of care between a) contracted and non-contracted providers, b) different diseases 
per patient, and c) services covered in the basic and supplementary health insurance 
packages. Further, bundled payment and registration of performance indicators 
improved the transparency in health service delivery but double payments and other 
inefficiencies are not eliminated. This withholds the alignment of the financial incentives 
between health care stakeholders which is an important facilitator of the success of a 
payment scheme (see Chapter 2). To overcome the narrow scope of bundled payment, 
global payment as implemented in the U.S. would be necessary to be in place. One of 
the most popular models of global payment is the alternative quality contract (AQC) 
implemented in the BlueCross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, which combines a health 
status–adjusted global payment with performance incentives for meeting quality and 
safety benchmarks. Contracted providers can improve margins through quality bonuses 
of up to 10 percent and by reducing spending growth below the level of inflation [149]. 
However, such a payment would require adequate performance measurement with data 
from well-developed ICT systems for a set of interventions tailored to patient needs, as 
described above. These elements are included in the current initiatives towards the so 
called “population based budgeting” which is a global payment adapted to the Dutch 
health care setting. Hopefully the findings of this thesis about payment schemes for 
integrated care and their barriers for success as well as the potentials of providing DMPs 
for improving outcomes and reducing costs will be considered in the design of the next 
Dutch payment scheme for integrated care.
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10.5  Methodological challenges and responses in the evaluation of 
integrated care
As stated in the literature, the economic evaluation of DMPs is challenging [49], a fact 
that is reflected in large variation in objectives, designs, indicators, target audiences, and 
actors involved [206] and the inconclusive evidence [40].
The first challenge includes the definition of DMPs (or integrated care programs) be-
cause there is a diversity of interventions and intervention intensity provided by these 
programs. Even the same set of interventions would have been differently implemented 
in other settings and countries. This variation in the definition of DMPs results in treat-
ment variations. The specific interventions and their intensity as well as the specific con-
text (i.e. targeted patient population, organizational experience with integrated care, 
relevant policies at national level) should be recorded and stated in order to provide an 
understanding of the “treatment”. A detailed list (as used in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9) 
with implemented interventions completed and updated periodically by the providing 
organization complemented with qualitative data about the context of the intervention 
could ensure the sufficient definition of an evaluated DMP.
Further, establishing the counterfactual of DMPs is difficult. Identifying health care 
providers and patients willing to take the chance to be assigned to a control group 
that does not participate in a DMP is difficult, even if one thinks that it is still ethically 
acceptable. Further, DMPs often include interventions at organizational-level such as 
redesign of care delivery and new ICT systems. These interventions are likely to affect all 
patients within an organization increasing therefore, the risk of contamination from an 
intervention group (patients participating in a DMP) to a control group (patient not par-
ticipating in a DMP). Thus, it is difficult to identify a control group of patients within an 
organization which provides DMP. This can be avoided by adopting a cluster-RCT were 
the organizations (not patients) are randomly allocated to the treatment and control 
groups. However, such a design requires substantial financial resources and commit-
ment from many health care providers in different organizations. Randomization may 
be also difficult to be achieved as researcher may have limited power in determining 
the participating organizations in a DMP. Even if a control group is adequately speci-
fied, national or regional quality improvement policies and initiatives may influence the 
treatment in the control group. To overcome this, a detailed list of the interventions 
offered to the control group should be recorded similar to the intervention group. As a 
result, many evaluation studies of DMPs adopted observational study design. Chapter 
7 and Chapter 8 demonstrated retrospective statistical methods such as propensity 
score matching that can be used to reduce confounding from non-randomisation. How-
ever, an optimal propensity score matching would require a relatively large sample size 
which is often not the case in the evaluation of DMPs. In addition, DMP evaluations are 
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frequently subject to selection bias because a specific group of patients tends to be 
included in DMPs (e.g. those motivated to change, those with frequent disease-episodes 
or those with a higher SES). Nevertheless, the response rate is frequently problematic. 
For the latter, missing data analysis and multiple imputation as performed in Chapter 5 
or repeated measurement analysis as performed in Chapter 8 could be used to reduce 
selection bias. However, these techniques are most suitable when the percentage of 
missing observations is not too large [185,192]. Repeated measurement analysis (i.e. 
analysing of longitudinal data) could also reduce biases due to regression to the mean.
Another challenge is the selection of indicators and instruments to measure out-
comes and costs. DMPs aim to improve the quality of the care process, improve patients’ 
self-management abilities, enhance patients’ health and reduce costs. Thus, different 
measures should be employed in the evaluation which makes the data collection 
process laborious for researchers (demanding in financial resources and time), patients 
(lengthy questionnaires at the expense of the response rate), and health care providers 
(lengthy questionnaires and cumbersome data extraction from ICT systems). As a result 
the data richness and availability is at stake. Carefully selecting validated measures 
that are expected to capture the effect of DMPs on key outcomes (e.g. biochemically 
validated smoking rates when smoking cessation interventions are included in the DMP 
and disease-specific quality of life instruments) may overcome this challenge.
Another challenge is the determination of an appropriate follow-up period in the 
evaluation of DMPs. This thesis argued that improvements in process and intermediate 
outcomes take a long time to be reflected in final outcomes. This would be solved by 
adopting long follow-up periods in the evaluation but that would discourage patients 
and health care providers to participate in the evaluation and increase the required 
research budget. It would also increase the uncertainty of the results because the care 
delivered in DMPs (and eventually in control groups) would be more likely to have 
changed due to updates of clinical guidelines and further health care reforms. Hence, 
using observational data to estimate long-term effects is unavoidable.
10.6 Recommendations for future research
George Bernard Shaw once said in a toast to Albert Einstein “Science is always wrong, 
it never solves a problem without creating ten more.” This thesis is not an exception to 
this argument. While it provided evidence about the payment and economic evaluation 
of integrated care, it also highlighted numerous challenges to be addressed in future 
research.
With regards to the payment of integrated care, future research may investigate 
the impact of financial agreements on a wide range of outcomes (e.g. quality of care 
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and morbidity) in the long-term using a large dataset at national/regional/organiza-
tional level with more observations after implementation of a payment scheme. In PFP 
schemes, future research may determine the optimal level of payment to accelerate 
quality improvement and investigate net cost savings (i.e. financial rewards subtracted 
from costs savings in health care utilization). Such research is data-intensive, requiring 
time-series on targeted and other outcome measures for intervention and (credible) 
control group.
Regarding the variability in costs of DMPs, further research can investigate whether a 
broader set of factors (than those included in Chapter 5) has a relation with health care 
costs of patients included in DMPs. Such factor could include, on DMP-level, the size of 
a DMP, the number and type of care providers involved in a DMP and the intensity (i.e. 
frequency and type of interventions) of DMPs. On patient-level, they may include more 
indicators of disease severity, prior health care utilization, health literacy, disease per-
ceptions and self-management behaviour. An investigation of cost patterns in patients 
with and without multi-morbidity focusing on the combination of morbidities could 
also be an interesting topic for further investigation. In addition, future research should 
investigate in details the existence of economies of scale and economies of scope in the 
provision of DMPs and their relation with the D&I costs of DMPs.
With respect to the evaluation of DMPs, future research may use predictive model-
ling (as suggested in Chapter 7) to determine patient profiles for specific sets of DMP 
interventions as well as to investigate how the comprehensiveness (expressed in num-
ber of interventions and intensity) and the case-mix of patients determines the cost-
effectiveness of these programs (as suggested in Chapter 8). Finally, future research may 
identify a core or minimal set of criteria and indicators for each objective to be used in 
the evaluation framework presented in Chapter 9 and obtain weights for each criterion 
that reflect stakeholder preferences, to enable multi-criteria decision analyses.
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11.1 Summary
Chronic diseases have an increasingly negative impact on a) population health by in-
creasing morbidity and mortality, b) society by increasing health inequalities and burden 
to informal care givers, and c) economy by requiring enormous financial resources and 
jeopardizing macro-economic development (e.g. consumption, capital accumulation, 
labour productivity and labour supply). Integrated care is the most promising concept 
in redesigning care to tackle the increasing threat of chronic diseases. Several European 
countries have experimented with models for integrating care, most frequently in the 
form of disease management programs (DMPs). These models were often supported by 
payment schemes to provide financial incentives to health care providers for implement-
ing integrated care. This thesis aimed to investigate these payment schemes and assess 
their impact (Part A), explore the variability in costs of DMPs (Part B), and determine the 
costs and effects of DMPs (Part C).
Part A- Payment of integrated care
Chapter 2, explored the adoption and success of payment schemes that promote inte-
gration of chronic care in European countries. A literature review and fifteen interviews 
with experts in care for chronic diseases were carried out to obtain detailed informa-
tion regarding the payment schemes, facilitators and barriers to their implementation, 
and their perceived success. Austria, France, England, the Netherlands, and Germany 
have implemented payment schemes that were specifically designed to promote the 
integration of care for chronic patients. Prominent factors facilitating implementation 
included stakeholder cooperation, adequate financial incentives for stakeholders, and 
flexible task allocation among different care provider disciplines. Commonly reported 
barriers to implementation included misaligned incentives across stakeholders and 
gaming. The implemented payment schemes targeted different stakeholders in differ-
ent countries depending on the structure and financing of each health care system. All 
payment reforms appeared to have changed the structure of care for chronic patients. 
Pay-for-coordination (PFC), as it was implemented in Austria, France and Germany, was 
perceived to be the most successful in increasing collaboration within and across health 
care sectors, whereas pay-for-performance (PFP), as it was implemented in England and 
France, was perceived most successful in improving other indicators of the quality of 
the care process such as coordination in primary care. The interviewees stated that the 
impact of the payment reforms on health care expenditures remained questionable. The 
chapter concluded that the success of a payment scheme depends on the details of the 
specific implementation in a particular country, but a combination of the schemes may 
overcome the perverse incentives in each individual scheme.
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Chapter 3, described the recent attempts in the Netherlands to stimulate the deliv-
ery of integrated care for chronic patients, focusing specifically on the new integrated 
payment scheme and the barriers to introducing this scheme. Based on literature, gov-
ernment documents, personal communications and site visits to DMPs, the most impor-
tant conditions for the success of the new payment scheme were identified including 
complete care protocols describing both general and chronic disease-specific care 
modules, coverage of all components of a DMP by basic health care insurance, adequate 
information systems that facilitate communication between care givers, explicit links 
between the quality and the price of a DMP, expansion of the amount of specialized care 
included in the chain-DTC (i.e. bundled payment), inclusion of a multi-morbidity factor 
in the risk equalization formula of insurers, and thorough economic evaluation of DMPs.
Chapter 4 studied the impact of financial agreements, which were introduced in 
European countries to stimulate integration of care, on health care expenditure. This 
study used difference-in-differences models to estimate differences in health care 
expenditure trends before and after the introduction of the payment reforms using 
OECD and WHO data from 1996 to 2013 from 9 intervention countries and 16 control 
countries. Intervention countries included countries with PFC, PFP, and/or all-inclusive 
agreements (bundled and global payment) for integrated care. The results showed that 
the annual growth of outpatient expenditure was decreased in countries with PFC (by 
21.28 US$ per capita) and in countries with all-inclusive agreements (by 216.60 US$ per 
capita) at the year of implementation. The growth of hospital and administrative expen-
diture was decreased in countries with PFP by 64.50 US$ per capita and 5.74 US$ per 
capita, respectively. During the total 4-year period after implementation, PFP decreased 
the growth of hospital and administrative expenditure and all-inclusive agreements 
reduced the growth of outpatient expenditure. The chapter concluded that financial 
agreements are potentially powerful tools to stimulate integrated care and influence 
health care expenditure. A blended payment scheme that combines elements of PFC, 
PFP, and all-inclusive payments is likely to provide the strongest financial incentives to 
control health care expenditure.
Part B- Cost variation in disease management programs
Chapter 5 identified factors on patient-level and organizational-level that explain 
the variability in costs of patients with different chronic diseases enrolled in a DMP. 
Generalized linear mixed models were specified to perform a multi-level analysis of 
cross-sectional data from 16 DMPs across 3 disease areas in the Netherlands. Multiple 
imputation, subgroup analysis per disease and analysis from both the health care and 
the societal perspectives were also performed. The results showed that age, the pres-
ence of cardiovascular disease, multi-morbidity and additional payments on top of the 
base payment for the usual care had a positive relation with costs, while better quality 
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of life was associated with lower health care costs. In the COPD sample, physical activity 
and employment were associated with lower health care costs. This chapter showed 
that there is great variability in health care costs among patients included in DMPs and 
identified patient and organizational explanatory factors. The findings are relevant to 
the design of future DMPs and their payment schemes.
Chapter 6 investigated the variability in and drivers of D&I costs among 22 Dutch 
DMPs and highlighted characteristics that impact them by using descriptive statistical 
analysis, document analysis and interviews. The development costs varied from €5,891 
to €274,783 and the implementation costs varied from €7,278 to €387,879 across DMPs. 
Personnel costs were the main component of development costs. Development costs 
were strongly correlated with the implementation costs (ρ = 0.55), development du-
ration (ρ = 0.74), and number of FTEs dedicated to DMP development. Organizations 
with a large size and high level of integrated care prior to the implementation of a DMP 
had relatively low development costs. These findings were in line with the cross-case 
qualitative comparison where programs with a longer history, more experienced project 
leadership, previously established ICT systems, and less complex patient populations 
had lower D&I costs. The chapter concluded that there is wide variation in D&I costs of 
DMPs, which is driven primarily by the duration of the development phase and the staff 
needed to develop and implement a DMP. These drivers are influenced by the attributes 
of the DMP, characteristics of the target population, project leadership, and ICT involved. 
There are indications of economies of scale and economies of scope, which may reduce 
D&I costs.
Part C- Economic evaluation of integrated care
Chapter 7 investigated the 1-year changes in costs and effects of 1,322 patients in 16 
DMPs for cardiovascular risk (CVR), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and 
diabetes mellitus (DMII) in the Netherlands and explored the within-DMP predictors 
of these changes. A cost-utility analysis was also performed from the health care and 
societal perspective comparing the most and the least effective DMP within each dis-
ease category. The results showed wide variation in development and implementation 
costs between DMPs (range: €16;€1,709) and highlighted the importance of economies 
of scale. Changes in health care utilization costs were not statistically significant. DMPs 
were associated with improvements in integration of CVR care (0.10 PACIC units), physi-
cal activity (+0.34 week-days in which patients had at least 30 minutes of moderate or 
severe physical activity) and smoking cessation (8% less smokers) in all diseases. Since 
an increase in physical activity and in self-efficacy were predictive of an improvement 
in quality-of-life, DMPs that aim to improve these are more likely to be effective. When 
comparing the most with the least effective DMP in a disease category as defined by 
the EQ5D, the vast majority of bootstrap replications (range:73%;97%) pointed to cost 
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savings, except for COPD (21%). QALY gains were small (range:0.003;+0.013) and sur-
rounded by great uncertainty. The chapter concluded that after one year there were 
indications of improvements in level of integrated care for CVR patients and lifestyle 
indicators for all diseases, but in none of the diseases we have found statistically sig-
nificant cost savings due to DMPs. However, it is likely that it takes more time before 
the improvements in care lead to reductions in complications and hospitalizations and 
hence to cost savings.
Chapter 8 compared the physical activity, smoking status, quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) and yearly costs per patient between the most and the least comprehensive 
DMP in four disease categories: primary CVR-prevention, secondary CVR-prevention, 
both types of CVR-prevention, and COPD (n:1,034). Propensity score matching increased 
comparability between DMPs. A two-year cost-utility analysis (CUA) was performed from 
the health care and societal perspective. Sensitivity analysis was performed to estimate 
the impact of DMP development and implementation costs on the cost-effectiveness. 
The results showed that patients in the most comprehensive DMPs increased their physi-
cal activity more (except for the primary CVR-prevention) and had higher smoking ces-
sation rates. The incremental QALYs ranged from -0.032 to 0.038 across all diseases. From 
a societal perspective, the most comprehensive DMP decreased costs in the primary 
CVR-prevention (certainty: 57%), secondary CVR-prevention (certainty: 88%), and both 
types of CVR-prevention (certainty: 98%). Moreover, the implementation of comprehen-
sive DMPs led to QALY gains in secondary CVR-prevention (certainty: 92%) and COPD 
(certainty: 69%). The chapter concluded that the most comprehensive DMPs for CVR and 
COPD have the potential to be cost-saving, effective, or cost-effective compared to the 
least comprehensive DMPs. The challenge for Dutch stakeholders is to find the optimal 
mixture of interventions that is most suited for each target group.
Chapter 9, developed a methodological framework to facilitate the application of 
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) for a comprehensive economic evaluation of 
disease management programs (DMPs). This was achieved by studying previously de-
veloped frameworks for the evaluation of DMPs and different MCDA methods and using 
practical field experience in the economic evaluation of DMPs and personal discussions 
with stakeholders in chronic care. The framework includes different objectives and crite-
ria that are relevant for the evaluation of DMPs, indicators that can be used to measure 
how DMPs perform on these criteria, and distinguishes between the development and 
implementation phase of DMPs. The objectives of DMPs are categorised into a) changes 
in the process of care delivery, b) changes in patient lifestyle and self-management 
behaviour, c) changes in biomedical, physiological and clinical health outcomes, d) 
changes in health-related quality of life, and e) changes in final health outcomes. All 
relevant costs of DMPs are also included in the framework. Based on this framework we 
conducted a MCDA of a hypothetical DMP versus usual care. The chapter calls for a com-
Summary 225
prehensive economic evaluation of DMPs that is not just based on a single criterion but 
takes into account multiple relevant criteria simultaneously. The framework presented 
in this chapter is a step towards standardising such an evaluation.
Chapter 10, provided a general discussion starting with the main findings of the 
preceding chapters. In this chapter, a blended payment scheme was suggested to over-
come potential barriers to the successful payment reform by providing an appropriate 
mix of financial incentives to health care providers and health payers. The structure of 
a health care system should be considered when designing such a blended payment 
scheme and the DMP development and implementation costs should be incorporated 
in the payment. Further, the PFP component should reward good performance and a 
shared savings scheme could be used to avoid “gaming” and align the incentives of the 
stakeholders. Moreover, this chapter argued that finding the right mixture and density 
of DMP interventions that is optimally comprehensive for a specific target population 
and successfully implemented is the recipe to maximize the effectiveness of DMPs. The 
implications of the thesis’ findings were also discussed in Chapter 10. They were mainly 
related to the adequate definition and use of performance indicators, the design of a 
well-established ICT integrated system, the alignment of the DMP interventions with 
the targeted population, and the greater inclusion of health services in the bundled 
payment. The methodological challenges and potential solutions to overcome them as 
well as suggestions for future research conclude Chapter 10.
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11.2 Samenvatting
Chronische ziekten hebben een steeds grotere weerslag op a) de volksgezondheid: 
stijgende morbiditeit en mortaliteit, b) de samenleving: toenemende ongelijkheid in 
gezondheid en een groter beroep op informele zorgverleners, en c) de economie: een 
groter beslag op de financiële middelen dat de macro-economische ontwikkelingen in 
gevaar brengt (bijv. consumptie, kapitaalaangroei, arbeidsproductiviteit en aanbod op 
de arbeidsmarkt). Als het gaat om een herontwerp van de zorg met als doel de toe-
nemende dreiging van chronische ziekten aan te pakken, is integrale zorg het meest 
veelbelovende concept. In verschillende Europese landen wordt geëxperimenteerd 
met modellen voor integrale zorg, meestal in de vorm van ‘disease management pro-
gramma’s’ (DMP’s). Deze modellen worden vaak ondersteund door een bekostigings-
systematiek die zorgaanbieders een financiële prikkel moeten bieden om integrale 
zorg te implementeren. Dit proefschrift heeft als doel deze bekostigingssystemen te 
onderzoeken en het effect ervan te beoordelen (deel A), de variabiliteit van de kosten 
van DMP’s te verkennen (deel B) en vast te stellen welke kosten en effecten DMP’s met 
zich meebrengen (deel C).
Deel A- De bekostiging van integrale zorg
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een verkenning van de invoering en het succes van bekostigings-
systemen ter bevordering van de integratie van zorg voor chronisch zieken in Europese 
landen. Er is een literatuuronderzoek uitgevoerd en er zijn vijftien interviews gehouden 
met deskundigen op het gebied van de zorg voor chronisch zieken teneinde uitvoerige 
informatie te verkrijgen over de bekostigingssystemen, de factoren die de implementa-
tie van deze systemen bevorderen en belemmeren en het veronderstelde succes ervan. 
Oostenrijk, Frankrijk, Engeland, Nederland en Duitsland hebben bekostigingssystemen 
ingevoerd die specifiek gericht waren op het bevorderen van de integratie van de zorg 
voor chronisch zieken. Belangrijke factoren die de implementatie bevorderden waren 
samenwerking tussen belanghebbenden, adequate financiële prikkels voor belangheb-
benden en een flexibele taakverdeling over verschillende disciplines van zorgaanbieders. 
Vaak genoemde belemmeringen voor de implementatie waren verkeerd afgestemde 
prikkels voor belanghebbenden en speculatief gedrag. De bekostigingssystemen waren 
in verschillende landen gericht op verschillende belanghebbenden, afhankelijk van de 
structuur en financiering van het betreffende zorgstelsel. Alle bekostigingshervormingen 
bleken te hebben bijgedragen aan een verandering van de structuur van de zorg voor 
chronische patiënten. PFC (pay-for-coordination), een systeem waarbij expliciet wordt 
betaald voor de coördinatie van zorg, zoals dat in Oostenrijk, Frankrijk en Duitsland werd 
ingevoerd, werd ervaren als de meest succesvolle manier om de samenwerking binnen 
en tussen gezondheidszorgsectoren te verbeteren. PFP (pay-for-performance), zoals dat 
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in Engeland en Frankrijk werd ingevoerd, werd ervaren als de meest succesvolle manier 
om andere indicatoren van de kwaliteit van het zorgproces, zoals de coördinatie van 
de primaire zorg, te verbeteren. De geïnterviewden gaven aan dat het effect van de 
bekostigingshervormingen op de uitgaven voor de gezondheidszorg twijfelachtig was. 
De conclusie van het hoofdstuk is dat het succes van een bekostigingssysteem afhangt 
van de bijzonderheden van de specifieke implementatie in een bepaald land, maar dat 
de perverse prikkels in ieder afzonderlijk systeem door een combinatie van verschil-
lende systemen kan worden ondervangen.
Hoofdstuk 3 bevat een beschrijving van de recente pogingen in Nederland om de 
levering van integrale zorg voor chronische patiënten te bevorderen, met specifieke 
aandacht voor de nieuwe integrale bekostigingssystematiek en de belemmeringen 
voor de invoering daarvan. Op basis van literatuur, overheidsdocumenten, persoonlijke 
communicaties en bezoeken ter plaatse aan DMP’s zijn de belangrijkste voorwaarden 
voor het welslagen van de nieuwe bekostigingsregeling in kaart gebracht, waaronder 
protocollen voor complete zorgtrajecten waarin zowel algemene zorgmodulen als zorg-
modulen specifiek gericht op bepaalde chronische ziekten worden beschreven, dekking 
van alle onderdelen van een DMP door de basisverzekering voor zorgkosten, toerei-
kende informatiesystemen die de communicatie tussen zorgverleners vereenvoudigen, 
expliciete verbanden tussen de kwaliteit en de prijs van een DMP, uitbreiding van de 
hoeveelheid specialistische zorg die is opgenomen in de keten-DBC (d.w.z. gebundelde 
betaling), opname van een multimorbiditeitsfactor in het risicovereveningsmodel van 
verzekeraars en een uitvoerige economische evaluatie van DMP’s.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt gekeken naar het effect van financiële overeenkomsten die in 
Europese landen zijn uitgevoerd om de integratie van zorg te bevorderen, op uitgaven 
voor de gezondheidszorg. Voor dit onderzoek is gebruikgemaakt van “difference-in-
differences”-modellen om een inschatting te maken van verschillen in trends in de 
uitgaven voor de gezondheidszorg vóór en na de invoering van de bekostigingsher-
vormingen op basis van gegevens van de OECD en de WHO van 1996 tot 2013 uit 9 
interventielanden en 16 controlelanden. De interventielanden waren landen met PFC, 
PFP, en/of alomvattende bekostigingssystemen (gebundelde bekostiging en alomvat-
tende budgetten) voor integrale zorg. De resultaten wezen uit dat de jaarlijkse stijging 
van de uitgaven voor poliklinische zorg in landen met PFC en landen met alomvattende 
bekostigingssystemen in het jaar van invoering was afgenomen met respectievelijk 
21,28 dollar per capita en 216,60 dollar per capita. De stijging van de ziekenhuiskosten 
en administratieve uitgaven was in landen met PFP afgenomen met respectievelijk 
64,50 dollar per capita en 5,74 dollar per capita. Gedurende de gehele periode van vier 
jaar na invoering leidde PFP tot een afname van de stijging van ziekenhuiskosten en 
administratieve uitgaven en resulteerde alomvattende bekostiging in een afname van 
de stijging van de uitgaven voor poliklinische zorg. De conclusie van het hoofdstuk is 
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dat financiële overeenkomsten potentieel krachtige instrumenten zijn om integrale zorg 
te bevorderen en de uitgaven voor de gezondheidszorg te beïnvloeden. Een gemengd 
bekostigingssysteem waarin elementen van PFC, PFP en alomvattende bekostiging 
worden gecombineerd, zal naar verwachting de krachtigste financiële prikkels ter be-
heersing van de uitgaven voor de gezondheidszorg bieden.
Deel B- Variatie in de kosten van programma’s voor ziektebeheer
In hoofdstuk 5 worden factoren op patiëntniveau en organisatieniveau aangewezen 
waarmee de variabiliteit van de kosten van patiënten met verschillende chronische 
ziekten die aan een DMP deelnemen, kunnen worden verklaard. Er zijn gegeneraliseerde 
lineaire gemengde modellen gebruikt om multi-level analyses van cross-sectionele data 
van de 16 DMP’s verspreid over 3 ziektegebieden in Nederland uit te voeren. Ook zijn 
meervoudige imputaties, subgroepanalyses per ziekte en analyses vanuit zowel het 
gezondheidszorgperspectief als het maatschappelijk perspectief uitgevoerd. De resul-
taten wezen uit dat er een positieve relatie bestaat tussen leeftijd, de aanwezigheid van 
cardiovasculaire ziekte, multimorbiditeit en aanvullende bekostiging boven op de ba-
sisbekostiging voor de gebruikelijke zorg enerzijds en de kosten anderzijds. Een betere 
kwaliteit van leven was geassocieerd met lagere kosten van de gezondheidszorg. In de 
COPD-groep waren lichaamsbeweging en het hebben van betaald werd geassocieerd 
met lagere kosten van de gezondheidszorg. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat er sprake is 
van grote variabiliteit in de kosten van de gezondheidszorg onder patiënten die aan 
DMP’s deelnemen en dat die variabiliteit samenhangt met zowel patiëntkenmerken als 
organisatiekenmerken. De bevindingen zijn relevant voor de opzet van toekomstige 
DMP’s en de daarbij behorende bekostigingssystematiek.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt de variabiliteit van de kosten voor ontwikkeling en imple-
mentatie van 22 Nederlandse DMP’s onderzocht, alsmede de factoren die deze kosten 
bepalen. Dit gebeurt aan de hand van een descriptieve statistische analyse, een docu-
mentanalyse en interviews. De ontwikkelingskosten van de verschillende DMP’s varieer-
den van € 5.891 tot € 274.783 en de implementatiekosten van € 7.278 tot € 387.879. De 
personeelskosten vormden het belangrijkste onderdeel van de ontwikkelingskosten. De 
ontwikkelingskosten hingen nauw samen met de uitvoeringskosten (ρ = 0,55), ontwik-
kelingsduur (ρ = 0,74) en het aantal FTE’s dat werd ingezet voor de ontwikkeling van 
DMP’s. Bij grote organisaties die voorafgaand aan de implementatie van een DMP een 
hoog niveau van integrale zorg kenden, waren de ontwikkelingskosten relatief laag. 
Deze bevindingen waren in overeenstemming met de kwalitatieve vergelijking tussen 
programma’s, waarbij programma’s met een langere geschiedenis, projectleiders met 
meer ervaring, eerder ingevoerde ICT-systemen en minder complexe patiëntenpopu-
laties lagere kosten voor ontwikkeling en implementatie hadden. De conclusie van dit 
hoofdstuk is dat de kosten voor de ontwikkeling en implementatie van DMP’s sterk 
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uiteenlopen, waarbij de duur van de ontwikkelingsfase en het personeel dat nodig is 
om een DMP te ontwikkelen en te implementeren, de voornaamste bepalende factoren 
zijn. Deze factoren worden beïnvloed door de kenmerken van het DMP, kenmerken van 
de doelpopulatie, projectleiding en de hierbij betrokken ICT. Er zijn aanwijzingen dat 
er sprake is van schaalvoordelen en toepassingsvoordelen, die tot lagere kosten voor 
ontwikkeling en implementatie kunnen leiden.
Deel C- Economische evaluatie van integrale zorg
Hoofdstuk 7 bevat een beschrijving van een onderzoek naar de veranderingen in de 
kosten en effecten gedurende één jaar bij 1.322 patiënten in 16 DMP’s voor cardiovascu-
lair risico (CVR), chronische obstructieve longziekte (COPD) en diabetes mellitus (DMII) 
in Nederland. Ook worden in dit hoofdstuk de predictoren van deze veranderingen ver-
kend. Er werd ook een kostenutiliteitsanalyse uitgevoerd vanuit het gezondheidszorg-
perspectief en het maatschappelijk perspectief, waarbij het meest effectieve DMP en het 
minst effectieve DMP binnen iedere ziektecategorie werden vergeleken. De resultaten 
vertoonden een grote variatie in kosten voor ontwikkeling en implementatie tussen 
DMP’s (van € 16 tot € 1.709) en onderstreepten het belang van schaalvoordelen. Ver-
anderingen in gezondheidszorgkosten waren niet statistisch significant. Bij alle ziekten 
werden DMP’s in verband gebracht met verbeteringen ten aanzien van de integratie van 
CVR-zorg (0,10 PACIC-eenheden), lichaamsbeweging (+0,34 weekdagen waarop patiën-
ten ten minste 30 minuten matige of zware lichaamsbeweging hadden) en het stoppen 
met roken (8% minder rokers). Aangezien een toename van lichaamsbeweging en ‘self-
efficacy’ voorspellend waren voor een verbetering van de kwaliteit van leven, hebben 
DMP’s die gericht zijn op verbetering hiervan een grotere kans effectief te zijn. Wanneer, 
binnen een ziektecategorie, het meest effectieve DMP vergeleken wordt met het minst 
effectieve DMP in termen van de EQ-5D, wijst het merendeel van de bootstrapreplicaties 
(73% tot 97%) op kostenbesparingen. Dit geldt niet voor COPD (21%). De QALY-winst 
was laag (0,003 tot +0,013) en omgeven met grote onzekerheid. De conclusie van dit 
hoofdstuk is dat er na één jaar aanwijzingen waren dat er sprake was van verbeteringen 
in het niveau van integrale zorg voor CVR-patiënten en van leefstijl voor alle ziekten, 
maar dat voor geen van de ziekten statistisch significante kostenbesparingen werden 
gevonden. Het heeft waarschijnlijk meer tijd nodig vooraleer de verbeteringen in zorg 
tot minder complicaties en ziekenhuisopnamen en dus tot kostenbesparingen zullen 
leiden.
In hoofdstuk 8 worden lichaamsbeweging, rookstatus, voor kwaliteit gecorrigeerde 
levensjaren (QALY’s) en de jaarlijkse kosten per patiënt van het meest uitgebreide DMP 
vergeleken met die van het minst uitgebreide DMP in vier ziektecategorieën: primaire 
CVR-preventie, secundaire CVR-preventie, beide typen CVR-preventie en COPD (n:1.034). 
Propensity score matching werd gebruikt om de vergelijkbaarheid tussen DMP’s te ver-
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groten. Er is een twee-jaars kostenutiliteitsanalyse (CUA) uitgevoerd vanuit het gezond-
heidszorgperspectief en het maatschappelijk perspectief. Er is een sensitiviteitsanalyse 
uitgevoerd om het effect van de kosten voor de ontwikkeling en implementatie van 
DMP’s op de kosteneffectiviteit in te schatten. De resultaten wezen uit dat bij patiënten 
in de meest uitgebreide DMP’s een grotere toename van lichaamsbeweging optrad 
(behalve bij de primaire CVR-preventie) en dat in deze patiëntengroep meer personen 
stopten met roken. De incrementele QALY’s varieerden van -0,032 tot 0,038. Vanuit 
een maatschappelijk perspectief leidde het meest uitgebreide DMP tot een daling 
van de kosten van primaire CVR-preventie (zekerheid: 57%), secundaire CVR-preventie 
(zekerheid: 88%) en beide typen CVR-preventie (zekerheid: 98%). Bovendien leidde 
de implementatie van uitgebreide DMP’s tot QALY-winst bij secundaire CVR-preventie 
(zekerheid: 92%) en COPD (zekerheid: 69%). De conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is dat de 
meest uitgebreide DMP’s voor CVR en COPD in potentie kostenbesparend, effectief of 
kosteneffectief zijn ten opzichte van de minst uitgebreide DMP’s. De uitdaging voor 
Nederlandse belanghebbenden is de optimale combinatie van interventies te vinden 
die voor iedere doelgroep het meest geschikt is.
In hoofdstuk 9 wordt een methodologisch raamwerk ontwikkeld om de toepassing 
van een multi-criteria besluitvormingsanalyse (MCDA) voor een uitgebreide economi-
sche evaluatie van DMP’s te vereenvoudigen. Hiervoor zijn eerder ontwikkelde kaders 
voor de evaluatie van DMP’s en verschillende MCDA-methoden onderzocht en is ge-
bruik gemaakt van onze praktijkervaringen met economische evaluatie van DMP’s en 
persoonlijke gesprekken met belanghebbenden in de chronische zorg. Het kader bevat 
verschillende doelstellingen en criteria die relevant zijn voor de evaluatie van DMP’s 
en indicatoren om te meten hoe goed de DMP’s score op deze criteria. In het kader 
wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen de ontwikkelingsfase en de implementatiesfase van 
DMP’s. De doelstellingen van DMP’s worden ingedeeld in a) veranderingen in het proces 
van zorgverlening, b) veranderingen in de leefstijl en het zelfmanagement gedrag van 
patiënten, c) veranderingen in biomedische, fysiologische en klinische gezondheids-
uitkomsten, d) veranderingen in gezondheidsgerelateerde kwaliteit van leven, en e) 
veranderingen in finale gezondheidsuitkomsten. Tevens zijn alle relevante kosten van 
DMP’s in het kader opgenomen. Op basis van dit raamwerk is een MCDA uitgevoerd van 
een hypothetisch DMP ten opzichte van de gebruikelijke zorg. Dit hoofdstuk roept op 
tot een bredere economische evaluatie van DMP’s die niet op slechts één enkel criterium 
gebaseerd is maar waarbij rekening gehouden wordt met meerdere relevante criteria 
tegelijkertijd. Het in dit hoofdstuk gepresenteerde kader is een stap in de richting van 
standaardisering van een dergelijke evaluatie.
Hoofdstuk 10 bevat een algemene discussie op basis van de voornaamste bevindin-
gen van de voorgaande hoofdstukken. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een gemengde bekos-
tigingssystematiek voorgesteld met een passende combinatie van financiële prikkels 
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voor zorgaanbieders en zorgbetalers. Het ontwerp van die systematiek moet worden 
afgestemd op de structuur van het zorgstelsel, en de kosten voor de ontwikkeling en 
implementatie van DMP’s dienen in de bekostiging te worden opgenomen. Verder dient 
de PFP-component goed functionerende DMP’s te belonen en kan een systeem van ge-
zamenlijk gedeelde besparingen “speculatief gedrag” voorkomen en de prikkels voor de 
belanghebbenden op elkaar afstemmen. Bovendien wordt in dit hoofdstuk gesteld dat 
het vinden van de juiste combinatie en intensiteit van DMP-interventies die optimaal 
zijn afgestemd op een specifieke doelpopulatie en met succes worden geimplemen-
teerd, het recept is voor een maximale effectiviteit van DMP’s. De implicaties van de 
bevindingen van het proefschrift worden ook besproken in hoofdstuk 10. Deze hebben 
vooral betrekking op de juiste definitie en het juiste gebruik van prestatie-indicatoren, 
het ontwerp van een goed functionerend geïntegreerd ICT-systeem, afstemming van 
de DMP-interventies op de doelpopulatie en het opnemen van meerdere typen ge-
zondheidszorg in de gebundelde betaling. Tot slot worden in hoofdstuk 10 de metho-
dologische uitdagingen en mogelijke oplossingen alsook suggesties voor toekomstig 
onderzoek besproken.
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